Institution of Gas Engineers & Managers
Enhancing Green Hydrogen Forecasting with a Spatio-temporal Graph Convolutional Network Optimized by the Ninja Algorithm
Nov 2025
Publication
In light of increased international efforts to combat climate change sustainable infrastructure is shifting toward green hydrogen produced through renewable-powered electrolysis. Still it is challenging to forecast the production of green hydrogen because environmental and system factors are variable both in time and space. We introduce a new system that utilizes a Spatio-Temporal Graph Convolutional Network (STGCN) and a novel algorithm the Ninja Optimization Algorithm (NiOA) to address this issue. Using the framework binary NiOA performs feature selection while continuous NiOA optimizes both the model architecture and the number of variables in the data simultaneously. It is clear from the research that forecasting results have shown significant improvement. The STGCN model achieved an R2 of 0.8769 and an MSE of 0.00375 whereas the STGCN with NiOA reached an R2 of 0.9815 and an MSE of only 7.48 × 10−8. Due to these improvements adaptive metaheuristics show even greater promise in delivering more accurate forecasting and reduced computational requirements for addressing critical environmental issues. The suggested strategy can be followed repeatedly providing a solid framework for the effective modeling of renewable energy systems and making green hydrogen projects more dependable.
An Effective Integrated Optimal Day-ahead and Real-time Power Scheduling Approach for Hydrogen-based Microgrid
Oct 2025
Publication
The increasing penetration of renewable energy sources in power systems poses significant challenges for maintaining grid reliability mainly due to the variability and uncertainty of solar and demand profiles. Microgrids equipped with diverse storage technologies have emerged as a promising solution to address these issues.This paper proposes an integrated day-ahead and real-time power scheduling approach for grid-connected microgrids equipped with both conventional and hydrogen-based ESSs. While existing strategies often address day-ahead and real-time scheduling separately or rely on a single storage technology this work introduces a unified framework that exploits the complementary characteristics of batteries and hydrogen systems. The proposed approach is based on a novel two-stage stochastic optimization model embedded within a hierarchical optimization framework to address these two intertwined problems efficiently. For the day-ahead scheduling a two-stage stochastic programming energy management model is solved to optimize the microgrid schedule based on forecasted load demand and PV production profiles. Building upon the day-ahead schedule another optimization model is solved which addresses real-time power imbalances caused by deviations in actual PV production and load demand power profiles with respect to the forecasted ones with the aim of minimizing operational disruptions. Simulation results demonstrate the validity of the proposed approach achieving both cost reductions and minimal power imbalances. By dynamically adjusting energy flows and using both conventional batteries and hydrogen systems the proposed approach ensures improved reliability reduced operational costs and enhanced integration of RES in microgrids. These findings highlight the potential of the proposed hierarchical framework to support the large-scale deployment of RES while ensuring resilient and cost-effective microgrid operations.
Blockchain-based Traceability and Certifications of Hydrogen Refueling Station Components
Oct 2025
Publication
As hydrogen gains prominence in energy systems its adoption as an energy source for fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) necessitates the establishment of hydrogen refueling stations (HRS). These stations contain critical compo-nents including nozzles storage tanks heat exchangers and compressors which must be certified by regulatory agen-cies to ensure safety and public trust. Current certification processes are fragmented and manually intensive creating inefficiencies and limiting transparency across the infrastructure lifecycle. In this paper we propose a blockchain-based solution that creates a secure and auditable network for certifying key HRS components. The system integrates an EVM-compatible blockchain decentralized storage and a modular suite of smart contracts (SCs) that formalize registration bidding accreditation certification and governance. Each contract encodes a distinct actor-driven work-flow enabling traceable and role-specific operations. A Decentralized Application (DApp) interface supports real-time and role-based interaction across the ecosystem. We present and evaluate the SCs and their underlying algorithms us-ing gas usage analysis load testing and security auditing. Load testing across the certification lifecycle shows stable transaction throughput and predictable cost profiles under increasing actor activity. A static security analysis con-firms resilience against common vulnerabilities. Our cost analysis indicates that while the framework is technically deployable on public blockchains the execution costs of certain functions make it more cost-effective for private blockchains or Layer 2 networks. We also compare our framework with existing systems to highlight its novelty and technical advantages. Our SCs DApp interface and load testing scripts are publicly available on GitHub.
Modelling a Small-scale Hydrogen Valley: Optimisation Under Techno-economic and Environmental Perspectives
Oct 2025
Publication
Renewable hydrogen is a promising pathway to decarbonise hard-to-electrify sectors though its widespread deployment remains hindered by economic challenges. Hydrogen valleys integrated regional systems have emerged as a strategic solution to scale up hydrogen infrastructure and demand. This study assesses the technoeconomic feasibility of a hydrogen valley in southeastern Crete based on the CRAVE-H2 project using a MixedInteger Linear Programming (MILP) optimisation model. The system serves multiple end-uses: touristic fuel cell buses and a vessel as well as cold ironing for ships at berth. In addition to renewable generators electricity can be supplied via a hybrid storage system or purchased from the grid with dispatch optimised according to hourly market prices. A customised modelling framework is developed within PyPSA using the Linopy extension enabling the inclusion of piecewise affine approximations of non-linear performance curves for electrolysers and fuel cells alongside operating range constraints. Hydrogen leakage is also explicitly modelled to assess its environmental and economic implications. The model delivers optimal component sizing energy dispatch strategies and key performance metrics including Levelised Cost Of Hydrogen (LCOH) aggregated Levelised Cost Of Energy (LCOE) and carbon intensity. Most scenarios yield competitive LCOH values between 5.36 and 8.21 €/kgH2 increasing to 15 €/kgH2 under full decarbonisation due to extensive storage investments. Hydrogen emissions that may exceed 10 % of total production in worst-case scenarios become more pronounced in fully decarbonised scenarios. These findings underline the importance of emissions tracking and provide practical insights to inform the design of cost-effective low-emission hydrogen valleys.
Pathways to Green Hydrogen Production as a Sustainable Energy Solution in Kenya by 2040
Nov 2025
Publication
Given the Kenyan challenges in energy availability accessibility and affordability exploring green hydrogen as a sustainable energy solution is supreme. This study aimed to assess the potential of green hydrogen production a transformative clean energy technology and its implications for Kenya's future energy. The specific objectives were to identify the drivers of change that could accelerate green hydrogen adoption and policy recommendations. The study employed a scenario planning approach focusing on four key steps: defining the scenario and time horizon identifying drivers of change and developing and applying scenarios. The diffusion of innovation theory guided the study. Twelve key critical drivers of change were identified with societal and industry acceptance of green hydrogen and compatibility with existing energy infrastructure being the strongest drivers of change from cross-impact analysis results. The study outlined four plausible future scenarios for adoption: Successful Production (best scenario) Low Production Chaotic Transition and Rejection of Green Hydrogen Production (worst scenario). Major opportunities include advancements in hydrogen production export potential and job creation. Cost competitiveness analysis is essential comparing Kenya's hydrogen with traditional fuels and African peers. Economic models suggest that Kenya's renewable energy can lower costs enhancing its position in clean energy innovation. However critical challenges involve regulatory uncertainty ethical concerns public misconceptions about green hydrogen safety and financial barriers due to high initial investment costs. The study recommended that the Kenyan government invest in renewable energy infrastructure formulate a comprehensive national hydrogen policy and establish an enabling environment to attract private investment. In conclusion green hydrogen production stands as a strategic pillar for Kenya’s sustainable energy transition and further research should focus on strengthening regulatory frameworks and enhancing public engagement to unlock its full potential.
Uncertainty Ahead: Should Stand-alone Energy Systems Bet on Hydrogen Backup?
Oct 2025
Publication
Achieving net zero by 2050 will require decarbonising stand-alone energy applications. Hydrogen is increasingly viewed as a promising energy carrier but its economic viability remains uncertain due to the lack of consensus on future demand and limited deployment of key components such as fuel cells in stationary stand-alone applications. This study investigates whether hybridising batteries with hydrogen can deliver meaningful cost benefits under future cost trajectories. Using a Monte Carlo framework we simulate 8000 scenarios across constant and seasonal load profiles varying the capital costs of batteries fuel cells electrolysers and hydrogen tanks based on 2025 estimates and 2050 projections. Our results show that hydrogen integration only becomes economically attractive when multiple component costs decline simultaneously. The fuel cell-to-battery power capital cost ratio emerges as the dominant driver of levelised cost of energy (LCOE) improvements. For constant loads median LCOE savings remain below 12 % with more than 5 % savings only achieved when the fuel cell cost is less than 7 times that of the battery. Seasonal nighttime loads offer a wider theoretical LCOE savings range (0–156 %) but substantial gains occur only under unrealistic cost mixes where battery costs remain high and fuel cell costs fall sharply. These findings highlight the sensitivity of hydrogen viability to load profile characteristics and cost interdependencies. They underscore the need for targeted cost reduction strategies particularly for fuel cells to justify added system complexity. These findings are important considerations for future investment and policy decisions.
Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Mitigation Potential of Existing and Planned Hydrogen Projects
Nov 2025
Publication
Hydrogen will play a critical role in decarbonizing diverse economic sectors. However given limited sustainable resources and the energy-intensive nature of its production prioritizing its applications will be essential. Here we analyse approximately 2000 (low-carbon) hydrogen projects worldwide encompassing operational and planned initiatives until 2043 quantifying their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and mitigation potential from a life cycle perspective. Our results demonstrate the variability in GHG emissions of hydrogen applications depending on the geographical location and hydrogen source used. The most climate-effective hydrogen applications include steel-making biofuels and ammonia while hydrogen use for road transport power generation and domestic heating should be discouraged as more favourable alternatives exist. Planned low-carbon hydrogen projects could generate 110 MtH2 yr−1 emit approximately 0.4 GtCO2e yr−1 and potentially reduce net life cycle GHG emissions by 0.2–1.1 GtCO2e yr−1 by 2043 depending on the substituted product or service. Addressing the current hydrogen implementation gap and prioritizing climate-effective applications are crucial for meeting decarbonization goals.
Assessing the Impact of Integration of Hydrogen Blending from Municipal Solid Waste and Biomass with Gas Turbine on Performance of Traditional Coal Power Plants
Oct 2025
Publication
Producing hydrogen from municipal solid waste (MSW) presents a transformative and sustainable solution for waste management. This paper presents a system that integrates MSW gasification with a traditional coal power plant (TCPP) along with biomass gasification and a gas turbine. It also incorporates a water recovery Rankine cycle (RC) that utilizes flue gas for electricity generation making it a key strategy for cleaner energy and effective waste disposal. The study examines three scenarios: MSWHIRBGT1 MSWHIRBG and MSWHIRBGT2. In the MSWHIRBGT2 electricity generation reaches 877 MW. This achievement results from the injection of hydrogen from MSW gasification into the TCPP boiler combined with advanced biomass technologies and flue gas recovery from TCPP. MSWHIRBGT2 achieves energy and exergy efficiencies of 46.9 % and 43.05 % making it the optimal choice for enhancing power generation in future energy solutions. All scenarios resulted in reduced CO2 emissions compared to a conventional coal-fired power plant of the same capacity highlighting the proposed system’s contribution to a cleaner environment. Furthermore the impact of different percentages of injected hydrogen on the concentrations of CO CO2 H2 H2S SO3 and SO2 in the flue gas is analyzed. Results show that higher hydrogen injection reduces CO by 81 % and H2 by 94 % while increasing SO3 and CO2 levels by 96 % and 39 % respectively. This demonstrates the environmental benefits of the technologies being implemented.
Life Cycle Assessment of Hydrogen-based Fuels Use in Internal Combustion Engines of Container Ships until 2050
Oct 2025
Publication
Hydrogen-based fuels are potential candidates to help international shipping achieve net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by around 2050. This paper quantifies the environmental impacts of liquid hydrogen liquid ammonia and methanol used in a Post-Panamax container ship from 2020 to 2050. It considers cargo capacity changes electricity decarbonization and hydrogen production transitions under two International Energy Agency scenarios: the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) and the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE). Results show that compared to the existing HFO ship hydrogen-based propulsion systems can decrease cargo weight capacity by 0.3 % to 25 %. In the NZE scenario hydrogen-based fuels can reduce GHG emissions per tonne-nautical mile by 48 %–65 % compared to heavy fuel oil by 2050. Even with fully renewable hydrogenbased fuels 18 %–31 % of GHG emissions would still remain. Using hydrogen-based fuels in internal combustion engines requires attention to minimize environmental trade-offs.
Sustainability-aligned Pathways for Energy Transition: A Review of Low-carbon Energy Network Solutions
Nov 2025
Publication
Transformation of the energy sector is necessary to meet climate targets and ensure universal access to reliable and affordable energy. Despite progress more than 675 million people still lack electricity and 770 million face an unreliable power supply. Renewable energy now provides nearly 30 % of global electricity generation and represents approximately 17.9 % of total final energy consumption. This amount is insufficient for the 1.5 ◦C pathway and requires a tripling of renewable capacity by 2030. Energy efficiency also lags with average annual gains of 1.6 % compared with the 4 % required for climate-aligned energy scenarios. Therefore this paper reviews pathways toward decentralized low-carbon solutions that can accelerate global energy transformation. The review paper examines how technologies such as microgrids virtual power plants energy storage systems and vehicleto-grid (V2G) solutions are reshaping modern energy systems. It highlights that digitalization smart grids and sector integration are key to building flexible and consumer-focused networks. However achieving sustainable energy access requires more than new technologies. Strong governance fair financing and social inclusion are equally important to ensure a just and balanced energy transition. Case studies from Asia Africa and Latin America show how policy innovative financing and regional cooperation can drive progress despite challenges such as underinvestment fossil fuel dependency and energy poverty. The review demonstrates that an integrated approach combining technological innovation financial mechanisms and inclusive policies can collectively build low-carbon resilient and equitable energy systems.
Competition and Equilibrium in Future Global Renewable Hydrogen Trade: A Game-theoretic Analysis
Nov 2025
Publication
Global renewable hydrogen trade is expected to play a key role in decarbonizing future energy systems. Yet hydrogen exporters may deviate from perfectly competitive behaviour to influence prices similarly to the existing fossil fuel market with important implications for consumer welfare and the pace of the energy transition. This study develops a global renewable hydrogen trade model that captures potential strategic interactions among exporters using a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework. The model is formulated as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) and solved under three alternative equilibria: a profitmaximizing Nash equilibrium a cost-minimizing Nash equilibrium and a welfare-maximizing benchmark representing perfect competition. Results indicate that producers may strategically reduce their export quantities by up to 40 % relative to perfect competition to maximize profits. Such behaviour raises prices to a minimum of 4.5 USD/kg in 2050 across major import markets thereby significantly eroding consumer surplus. Strategic behaviour of dominant exporters also shifts trade flows reshaping the global allocation of hydrogen supply. Sensitivity analysis further reveals that financing costs play a key role in shaping strategic producers’ behaviour with lower financing costs helping to reduce prices and stimulate demand. These findings highlight the implications of imperfect competition in global hydrogen trade and suggest that policy measures may be needed to mitigate potential negative consequences.
Modeling Electrochemical Impedance Spectroscopy of Hydrogen Complexes During Hydrogen Evolution on Single-stom Electrocatalysts
Nov 2025
Publication
Single Atom Catalysts (SACs) are an emerging frontier in heterogeneous electrocatalysis. They are made of metal atoms atomically dispersed on a matrix. A lot of attention has been dedicated to the study of Hydrogen Evolution Reaction (HER) mechanism due to its relevance in energy conversion technologies both with computational and experimental methods. The classical HER mechanism can be described by a Volmer–Heyrovsky–Tafel mechanism where the two desorption steps are competitive. The Volmer-Heyrovsky mechanism is conventionally proposed for single-atom catalysts. It has been computationally demonstrated that hydrogen complexes can form on SACs due to their analogy with homogeneous catalysts. Unfortunately it is hard to “visualize” these species experimentally. Electrochemical Impedance Spectroscopy (EIS) could be the most promising approach to study electrocatalytic mechanisms. In this work we present microkinetic and Electrochemical Impedance Spectroscopy models for HER on SACs describing Volmer-Heyrovsky and a mechanism mediated by the formation of hydrogen complexes. Our simulated data applied to a case study based on Pd@TiN show that Tafel plots will not suffice in the visualization of hydrogen complexes formation and will need the support of electrochemical impedance spectra in order to clarify the correct mechanism.
Assessing the Cost-effective Deployment and Operation of Water Electrolyzers in Global Net-zero CO2 Energy Systems
Nov 2025
Publication
This study investigates the cost-optimal capacity and operation of water electrolyzers in global net-zero CO2 energy systems. The production costs of hydrogen are largely determined by the electrolyzer capacity factor (i.e. full-load hours); therefore a global energy system model with an hourly temporal resolution was employed to consider the intermittency of variable renewable energy (VRE) and the dynamics of power system operations. Proton exchange membrane electrolysis is assumed in this study. The optimization results suggest three main findings. First water electrolysis is estimated to be a cost-effective option for achieving net-zero CO2 emissions. Under default technology assumptions the global installed capacity is projected to reach 2719 GW by 2050 with the majority of hydrogen consumed in the industry sector. Scaling up the supply chain is essential to realize this pathway. Second hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels are economically competitive with negative emission technologies (NETs). A modest deployment of CO2 storage and NETs provides favorable conditions for water electrolysis deployment—and vice versa. Third flexible operation is critical to the widespread deployment of water electrolysis. In the default case the global weighted average capacity factor of electrolyzers is estimated at 37 % in 2050 to follow VRE output fluctuations. The results also indicate that limited operational flexibility may significantly hinder the cost-competitiveness of electrolyzer deployment.
A CFD Comparison of Interfacial Phase Change Models for Boil-off, Self-pressurisation and Thermal Stratification in Liquid Hydrogen Storage Tanks
Nov 2025
Publication
Liquid hydrogen (LH2 ) is a promising energy carrier for future clean fuel technologies. However its cryogenic storage and handling pose significant challenges particularly due to self-pressurisation and boil-off from ambient heat ingress. Accurate modelling of these phenomena is essential for the safe and efficient design of LH2 storage systems. A key aspect of such modelling is the selection and implementation of an appropriate interfacial phase change model. This study presents a comparative assessment of three widely used phase change models; the Schrage model the Modified Energy Jump (MeJ) model and the Lee model. A parametric study was conducted across three coefficients for each model with validation performed against five experimental benchmark cases from NASA’s K-Site and MHTB cryogenic tanks focusing on planar interface problems with thermally induced phase change under normal gravity. A CFD approach using STAR-CCM+ was employed to evaluate each model’s ability to predict tank pressure temperature and boil-off behaviour. The Schrage model demonstrated the most robust and accurate results exhibiting minimal sensitivity to coefficient variation and offering both numerical stability and physical fidelity. It demonstrated a maximum mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) of just 3.0% in its pressurisation predictions. The MeJ model showed comparable accuracy when its heat transfer coefficient was appropriately selected highlighting its reliance on an empirically derived coefficient. In contrast the Lee model performed the poorest exhibiting numerical divergence at high coefficient values and substantial deviation in its prediction of self-pressurisation with errors of up to 11% MAPE. These findings provide practical guidance for the selection and implementation of phase change models in CFD simulations and highlight key considerations for modelling LH2 storage tanks in industrial applications.
The Development of an Analysis Framework for the Integration of Low-carbon Hydrogen into Multi-regional Natural Gas Energy Systems
Nov 2025
Publication
In 2023 global carbon dioxide emissions reached 40 billion tonnes 60 % more than in 1990 intensifying climate concerns. This study explores hydrogen-natural gas blending as a transitional strategy for decarbonization across several regions and energy sectors – residential commercial industrial and agricultural. A multi-regional analysis framework evaluates integration of 20 % by volume low-carbon hydrogen blending into natural gas systems by identifying hydrogen producers importers and exporters based on production and import costs. Applied to Canada 528 scenarios (2026–2050) assess inter-regional hydrogen trade within Canadian provinces. The lowest-cost scenario involves Alberta exporting hydrogen produced through autothermal reforming with 91 % carbon capture and storage and British Columbia producing its own. The grid electrolysis scenario achieves the highest GHG reductions with a 4.5 % GHG mitigation in Canada with full energy system representation. These findings provide insights for policymakers and stakeholders in advancing hydrogen infrastructure and decarbonization strategies.
Techno-economic Analysis of Technologies for Decarbonizing Low- and Medium-Temperature Industrial Heat
Dec 2025
Publication
Decarbonizing industrial heat is critical for achieving climate targets. This study evaluates the economic viability of technologies for decarbonizing industrial heat in Europe through a techno-economic analysis. High-temperature heat pumps (HTHPs) and electric hydrogen and biomass boilers are compared in terms of levelized cost of heat (LCOH) under various scenarios including the impact of thermal storage leveraging dynamic electricity prices. In scenarios for the year 2030 we show that HTHPs leveraging free excess heat achieve LCOH values at least 30% to 60% lower than hydrogen boilers and up to 37% lower than biomass boilers. Integrating daily thermal storage reduces LCOH by up to 15% for heat pumps and 27% for electric boilers. By 2050 anticipated cost and efficiency improvements further enhance the competitiveness of heat pumps. These results highlight the economic advantage of HTHPs particularly when integrating excess heat and thermal storage.
Hydrogen Reduction of Combusted Iron Powder: Role of the Fluidization Regime on the Conversion
Nov 2025
Publication
Fluidized bed systems play a crucial role in industrial processes such as combustion and gasification. In the Iron Power Cycle fluidized bed systems are essential for enabling the reduction of combusted iron back to iron making them a critical component in the regeneration step of the cycle. This study investigates the impact of operating gas velocity on conversion by performing reduction experiments at three distinct fluidization numbers (us/umf): 16 (bubbling regime) 55 (transition region) and 100 (fully turbulent regime). Experiments were conducted to determine the appropriate velocities for each regime ensuring optimal fluidization conditions across reduction temperatures ranging from 500 to 700 ⚬C. The results reveal that conversion rates increase significantly with gas velocities. At 500 ⚬C operating at approximately six times higher velocity leads to a sixfold improvement in conversion when using iron-oxide particles with a Sauter mean diameter of 61 µm. However while enhanced velocities improve reaction efficiency challenges remain at elevated temperatures (T ≥ 500 ⚬C) where iron undergoes defluidization when exposed to hydrogen. Once defluidization occurs refluidization proves impossible with either hydrogen or nitrogen raising concerns about process stability. These insights highlight the potential for optimizing fluidized bed reduction through velocity control while also underscoring the need for additional measures to mitigate unstable fluidization during high-temperature iron oxide reduction.
Thermal and Heat Transfer Dynamics in High Pressure, High Aspect Ratio Hydrogen Tank Filling Processes
Nov 2025
Publication
A thermodynamic modeling framework is introduced to describe hydrogen refueling station configurations and capture detailed thermal dynamics in vehicle tanks with large aspect ratios. With an aspect ratio larger than three axial discretization of temperature allows to recover accurate temperature profiles and show that the gas and liner temperature are always highest towards the rear of the tanks. The framework is validated against experimental data and used to investigate the internal heat transfer dynamics. As aspect ratio grows larger the amount of cooling received by the rear region decreases as the incoming turbulent jet does not reach the latter. The current thermal management strategy of pre-cooling is therefore limited showing marginal improvements even with a cooling temperature of -50 ◦C. Potential solutions are to increase the filling duration time or to carefully design the tank with higher thermal diffusivity and adequate external means of cooling.
Flashback Behavior and Safety Implications of Hydrogen-natural Gas Mixtures
Nov 2025
Publication
Hydrogen blending in natural gas systems is a key transitional strategy for reducing carbon emissions. This study explores the influence of hydrogen on combustion properties including flame flashback risk quenching distance and energy efficiency. Experimental and computational analyses demonstrate that hydrogen addition increases flame speed but reduces calorific value and quenching distance thereby impacting combustion stability and safety. Findings suggest that optimizing burner design and combustion control strategies is essential for safely and efficiently using hydrogen-enriched natural gas. Experimental validation confirmed that a 1.50 mm channel dimension effectively prevented flame flashback for hydrogen concentrations up to 40% in natural gas. As energy systems evolve toward decarbonization this research provides critical insights into the feasibility and challenges of hydrogen integration in residential or industrial applications. The study investigated the combustion behavior of natural gas enriched with various concentrations of hydrogen (up to 25%). Dynamic or fluctuating mixing conditions were excluded as the implementation of such a system in energy sector applications would necessitate a stable and well-defined gas composition.
261 HyPurge - Direct Purging of Networks to Hydrogen for H100 Fife, Final Report
Mar 2026
Publication
Steer Energy and
SGN
The HyPurge project aimed to explore the comparative challenges in purging gas network pipes to hydrogen compared to purging to Natural Gas. A comparative study has been carried out investigating the purging performance of hydrogen and methane on pipe diameters across the range of sizes to be used by SGN in the H100 Fife project.
The most significant discovery of the project is that the very low density of hydrogen does not make direct purging between air and hydrogen impossible or even difficult. In many cases direct purging a system in like for like conditions is more efficient for hydrogen than for methane. At the time of writing it is believed that this is due to the higher coefficient of diffusion for hydrogen.
These findings should provide SGN with confidence that direct purging is a viable option for commissioning and decommissioning the networks for H100 Fife.
Over 750 direct purges or purge related tests have been carried out during this project. The results provide evidence to fill the knowledge gap regarding direct purging performance between air and hydrogen.
Key messages from this work are: 1) Hydrogen purges are generally more efficient than Natural Gas purges. The total volume of air-fuel mixture created in a purge involving hydrogen is likely to be less than one involving Natural Gas.
In tests purges from air to hydrogen have been consistently more efficient than purges from air to methane. Purges from both fuel gases back to air have a relatively similar performance to each other. The low density of hydrogen did not present any challenges for direct purging operations. This means that less fuel-air mix and less fuel in total is released for a hydrogen purge compared to a Natural Gas purge. 2) Hydrogen purges are generally more flammable than Natural Gas purges. The flammable volume of air-fuel mixtures created inside the pipe during a purge involving hydrogen is likely to be greater than one involving Natural Gas.
Although less air-fuel mixture is created during a hydrogen purge the wider flammable range of hydrogen means that the volume of mixture that is flammable inside the pipe is greater for a hydrogen purge than for a Natural Gas purge. 3) The total volume of flammable air-fuel mixtures generated outside of the pipe during a purge involving hydrogen is likely to be less than one involving Natural Gas. The upper flammable limit does not prevent vented fuel becoming flammable once it mixes with air outside of the pipe.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The most significant discovery of the project is that the very low density of hydrogen does not make direct purging between air and hydrogen impossible or even difficult. In many cases direct purging a system in like for like conditions is more efficient for hydrogen than for methane. At the time of writing it is believed that this is due to the higher coefficient of diffusion for hydrogen.
These findings should provide SGN with confidence that direct purging is a viable option for commissioning and decommissioning the networks for H100 Fife.
Over 750 direct purges or purge related tests have been carried out during this project. The results provide evidence to fill the knowledge gap regarding direct purging performance between air and hydrogen.
Key messages from this work are: 1) Hydrogen purges are generally more efficient than Natural Gas purges. The total volume of air-fuel mixture created in a purge involving hydrogen is likely to be less than one involving Natural Gas.
In tests purges from air to hydrogen have been consistently more efficient than purges from air to methane. Purges from both fuel gases back to air have a relatively similar performance to each other. The low density of hydrogen did not present any challenges for direct purging operations. This means that less fuel-air mix and less fuel in total is released for a hydrogen purge compared to a Natural Gas purge. 2) Hydrogen purges are generally more flammable than Natural Gas purges. The flammable volume of air-fuel mixtures created inside the pipe during a purge involving hydrogen is likely to be greater than one involving Natural Gas.
Although less air-fuel mixture is created during a hydrogen purge the wider flammable range of hydrogen means that the volume of mixture that is flammable inside the pipe is greater for a hydrogen purge than for a Natural Gas purge. 3) The total volume of flammable air-fuel mixtures generated outside of the pipe during a purge involving hydrogen is likely to be less than one involving Natural Gas. The upper flammable limit does not prevent vented fuel becoming flammable once it mixes with air outside of the pipe.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
301 HyPurge Safe Tooling, Final Report
Mar 2026
Publication
SGN and
Steer Energy
This project has investigated equipment used to carry out purging of gas networks with a view to providing tooling for commissioning SGN’s H100 Fife project.
It has built on work including the HyPurge NIA2_SGN0008 and Lot 1 of the Hydrogen Skills and Standards for Heat projects. The project has further advanced the body of purge theory founded and developed in those previous projects. The HyPurge project showed that direct purging was feasible with hydrogen; this project has investigated some of the hazards presented and recommended tooling to mitigate those hazards.
Flame arrestors are specified for certain network operations involving Natural Gas. It is recommended that the current procedures regarding flame arrestors are kept for hydrogen and a range of flame arrestors suited to hydrogen use has been identified.
Purge tables specify minimum speeds for purging related to pipe diameter. These minimum purge speeds are used to suppress the buoyancy driven effect of a less dense gas to preferentially flow over a denser gas. The lower buoyancy of hydrogen suggests an increase in purge speed of 1.7x those recommended for methane. This increase is not required in smaller diameters (100 mm and below) where it has been found that diffusion effects dominate purge performance resulting in greater flexibility for purging. Therefore purge tables have been produced giving recommended minimum purge speeds for methane and hydrogen according to the PE pipe diameters proposed in the H100 Fife project.
A purge stack with additional features to assist with hydrogen purging has been developed in this project. The features include a restriction at the end of the stack to mitigate burn-back in the event of a vent ignition. Specific restriction sizes are linked to the diameter of network pipes being purged and each individual restriction is tailored to achieve the correct purge speed for the given network pipe diameter. A pressure gauge on the stack indicates sufficient back pressure showing the correct purge flow is being achieved. The stack also includes a hydrogen wHystle (developed by Steer independently) to provide feedback on purge progress in real time.
A review of non-sparking tool requirements has been carried out. Purge operations are such that it is unlikely that non-sparking tools will provide a significant reduction in hazard. The conclusions from this are that the current recommendations from SGN’s mainlay procedures on non-sparking tools and ignition prevention will be suitable for hydrogen use.
A preliminary investigation into the consequences of in-pipe ignitions has been carried out. The investigation has shown that the overpressures generated are affected by several different factors. The proportion of the pipe that contains the flammable mixture affects the ability of the system to absorb the overpressure through non-flammable gas buffer zones. Once detonable zones increase in size then the absolute length of the detonable zone in relation to pipe diameter becomes a dominant factor. The most significant hazard to be prevented is an in-pipe detonation therefore the volume of detonable mixture is an important factor that may result in a limit to the permitted length for direct purging in a given pipe diameter.
The hazards presented during purging have been investigated and three specific hazards have been studied. These are ignition of the vent in-pipe ignition and burn back from a vent ignition into the pipe. Although none of these events are likely to occur ignition of the vent is the most likely and the consequence of this is similar with hydrogen and methane. In-pipe ignition is the event with the greatest consequence and although very unlikely this should be avoided.
Proposed further work includes: data mining from the body of purge studies to date identification of the growth of flammable and detonable zones vs. purge length a study into static electricity generation and consequence testing on ignitions in a variety of 90 mm and 125 mm PE pipes of different lengths.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz
It has built on work including the HyPurge NIA2_SGN0008 and Lot 1 of the Hydrogen Skills and Standards for Heat projects. The project has further advanced the body of purge theory founded and developed in those previous projects. The HyPurge project showed that direct purging was feasible with hydrogen; this project has investigated some of the hazards presented and recommended tooling to mitigate those hazards.
Flame arrestors are specified for certain network operations involving Natural Gas. It is recommended that the current procedures regarding flame arrestors are kept for hydrogen and a range of flame arrestors suited to hydrogen use has been identified.
Purge tables specify minimum speeds for purging related to pipe diameter. These minimum purge speeds are used to suppress the buoyancy driven effect of a less dense gas to preferentially flow over a denser gas. The lower buoyancy of hydrogen suggests an increase in purge speed of 1.7x those recommended for methane. This increase is not required in smaller diameters (100 mm and below) where it has been found that diffusion effects dominate purge performance resulting in greater flexibility for purging. Therefore purge tables have been produced giving recommended minimum purge speeds for methane and hydrogen according to the PE pipe diameters proposed in the H100 Fife project.
A purge stack with additional features to assist with hydrogen purging has been developed in this project. The features include a restriction at the end of the stack to mitigate burn-back in the event of a vent ignition. Specific restriction sizes are linked to the diameter of network pipes being purged and each individual restriction is tailored to achieve the correct purge speed for the given network pipe diameter. A pressure gauge on the stack indicates sufficient back pressure showing the correct purge flow is being achieved. The stack also includes a hydrogen wHystle (developed by Steer independently) to provide feedback on purge progress in real time.
A review of non-sparking tool requirements has been carried out. Purge operations are such that it is unlikely that non-sparking tools will provide a significant reduction in hazard. The conclusions from this are that the current recommendations from SGN’s mainlay procedures on non-sparking tools and ignition prevention will be suitable for hydrogen use.
A preliminary investigation into the consequences of in-pipe ignitions has been carried out. The investigation has shown that the overpressures generated are affected by several different factors. The proportion of the pipe that contains the flammable mixture affects the ability of the system to absorb the overpressure through non-flammable gas buffer zones. Once detonable zones increase in size then the absolute length of the detonable zone in relation to pipe diameter becomes a dominant factor. The most significant hazard to be prevented is an in-pipe detonation therefore the volume of detonable mixture is an important factor that may result in a limit to the permitted length for direct purging in a given pipe diameter.
The hazards presented during purging have been investigated and three specific hazards have been studied. These are ignition of the vent in-pipe ignition and burn back from a vent ignition into the pipe. Although none of these events are likely to occur ignition of the vent is the most likely and the consequence of this is similar with hydrogen and methane. In-pipe ignition is the event with the greatest consequence and although very unlikely this should be avoided.
Proposed further work includes: data mining from the body of purge studies to date identification of the growth of flammable and detonable zones vs. purge length a study into static electricity generation and consequence testing on ignitions in a variety of 90 mm and 125 mm PE pipes of different lengths.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz
351 Hazardous Area Impact Mitigation Phase 1
Mar 2026
Publication
Steer Energy and
SGN
This programme of work aims to generate empirical evidence of gas concentration with respect to distance from the vent tip for a range of hydrogen releases. The measured data is to be compared to the Zone 2 exclusion distances specified by the IGEM/SR/25 hydrogen supplement.
Test cases have been shared with Steer Energy that calculate the new hazardous areas as per the hydrogen supplement for common infrastructure such as pressure regulating installations/stations. The result of these test cases was a significant increase in the calculated hazardous zone distances for hydrogen compared to those for Natural Gas. The overall programme aims are to measure gas releases replicating these test cases and to compare the measured hazardous zones to the calculated hazardous zones. This report covers Stage 1 of the programme of work which comprised an initial examination using small releases as a fast and economical method to assess the likelihood of differences between measured and calculated zones.
Experimental equipment was setup to release gas at controlled flow rates to match those of the IGEM/SR/25 hydrogen supplement tables. A moveable array of gas detectors was positioned above the vent tip to measure the shape and magnitude of the resulting gas plume from the release.
In all 22 tests were conducted with gas released from two different vent diameters 13 mm and 48 mm. Two gas types hydrogen and methane were used. Ideal and non-ideal vents were tested across a limited range of flows. The measured data enabled colourmaps of the vents to be created showing the shape and magnitude of the resulting gas plumes.
The results of the study have shown that in all cases the shape of the plumes from the measured vents are significantly different to the dispersion distances specified in the relevant tables of IGEM/SR/25. In most cases no gas was detected throughout the majority of the specified hazardous area instead a thin vertical cylindrical plume of gas was measured often extending above the specified dispersion zones. This was seen in both hydrogen and methane tests.
The test results from this initial phase of the project cast some doubt on the findings from the previous NIA project ATEX Equipment & SR/25 Modification Assessment that used the SR/25 calculator developed from the hydrogen supplement tables. In some instances the horizontal dispersion distance for hydrogen was calculated to be over 6 times the value for Natural Gas (see Figure 2) with its resulting hazardous area exclusion zone having potentially serious consequences on the viability of the corresponding AGIs without mitigations. However results from the initial tests undertaken during this phase of work demonstrate significant inconsistencies between the calculated results and empirical tests. This should be further investigated in phase 2 as initial conclusions show that the larger hazardous zones mentioned above are seemingly overstating the risk. The previous work also modelled the hazardous areas using full bore releases whereas relief valves on the network tend to incorporate flow limiting orifices therefore further exacerbating the perceived increased risk.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Test cases have been shared with Steer Energy that calculate the new hazardous areas as per the hydrogen supplement for common infrastructure such as pressure regulating installations/stations. The result of these test cases was a significant increase in the calculated hazardous zone distances for hydrogen compared to those for Natural Gas. The overall programme aims are to measure gas releases replicating these test cases and to compare the measured hazardous zones to the calculated hazardous zones. This report covers Stage 1 of the programme of work which comprised an initial examination using small releases as a fast and economical method to assess the likelihood of differences between measured and calculated zones.
Experimental equipment was setup to release gas at controlled flow rates to match those of the IGEM/SR/25 hydrogen supplement tables. A moveable array of gas detectors was positioned above the vent tip to measure the shape and magnitude of the resulting gas plume from the release.
In all 22 tests were conducted with gas released from two different vent diameters 13 mm and 48 mm. Two gas types hydrogen and methane were used. Ideal and non-ideal vents were tested across a limited range of flows. The measured data enabled colourmaps of the vents to be created showing the shape and magnitude of the resulting gas plumes.
The results of the study have shown that in all cases the shape of the plumes from the measured vents are significantly different to the dispersion distances specified in the relevant tables of IGEM/SR/25. In most cases no gas was detected throughout the majority of the specified hazardous area instead a thin vertical cylindrical plume of gas was measured often extending above the specified dispersion zones. This was seen in both hydrogen and methane tests.
The test results from this initial phase of the project cast some doubt on the findings from the previous NIA project ATEX Equipment & SR/25 Modification Assessment that used the SR/25 calculator developed from the hydrogen supplement tables. In some instances the horizontal dispersion distance for hydrogen was calculated to be over 6 times the value for Natural Gas (see Figure 2) with its resulting hazardous area exclusion zone having potentially serious consequences on the viability of the corresponding AGIs without mitigations. However results from the initial tests undertaken during this phase of work demonstrate significant inconsistencies between the calculated results and empirical tests. This should be further investigated in phase 2 as initial conclusions show that the larger hazardous zones mentioned above are seemingly overstating the risk. The previous work also modelled the hazardous areas using full bore releases whereas relief valves on the network tend to incorporate flow limiting orifices therefore further exacerbating the perceived increased risk.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
SIF Beta Phase: Velocity Design with Hydrogen, WP2 - Particle Transportation Tests and CFD Modelling Results, Interim Report
Mar 2026
Publication
This study conducted theoretical modelling and experimental work to investigate if there were differences in particle transportation behaviour in hydrogen compared to natural gas. It was found that both experimental data and predictions indicate that the majority of particles are currently mobile at the standard maximum natural gas velocity of 20m/s thus an increase in velocity to 70m/s with hydrogen should not result in an increase in particle transportation. The experimental observations are that natural gas can transport particles at lower velocities than hydrogen and this is thought to be due to the higher density of natural gas. The consequence is that at a velocity of 20m/s natural gas would transport all mobile particles as would hydrogen at higher velocities and this means that high velocity hydrogen cannot transport more particles already transported by natural gas.
Therefore this study indicates that the mitigations for example filtration requirements and engineering policies and procedures should be unaffected by changing to hydrogen as no change to particle loading is anticipated.
CONCLUSIONS
• Modelling has been undertaken to predict particle flight and rolling velocities in 100% hydrogen and 100% natural gas to support experiments.
o Initial comparison between the CFD modelling and British Gas modelling indicates results are similar for both particle rolling and flight velocities for 100% hydrogen at 2barg.
o For 100% methane the British Gas model results are 32-38% lower than those predicted by CFD modelling.
• Initial particle transportation experiments have been conducted using a purpose built test facility at Spadeadam to investigate particle transportation in 100% hydrogen and 100% natural gas at 2barg and 40mbarg.
o Initial experimental results indicate that particle transportation occurred at lower velocities in natural gas than for hydrogen.
o From experimental data rolling and flight of particles occurs over a range of velocities and there is not one specific velocity to instigate rolling or flight.
o Tests were performed for services in hydrogen. However a limited amount of sand was observed to travel up the service compared to the mains.
• Both experimental data and predictions indicate that the majority of particles are currently mobile at the standard maximum natural gas velocity of 20m/s (for unfiltered gas) thus an increase in velocity to 70m/s with hydrogen should not result in an increase in particle transportation.
• This study indicates that the mitigations used for natural gas should still be effective for hydrogen service
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Therefore this study indicates that the mitigations for example filtration requirements and engineering policies and procedures should be unaffected by changing to hydrogen as no change to particle loading is anticipated.
CONCLUSIONS
• Modelling has been undertaken to predict particle flight and rolling velocities in 100% hydrogen and 100% natural gas to support experiments.
o Initial comparison between the CFD modelling and British Gas modelling indicates results are similar for both particle rolling and flight velocities for 100% hydrogen at 2barg.
o For 100% methane the British Gas model results are 32-38% lower than those predicted by CFD modelling.
• Initial particle transportation experiments have been conducted using a purpose built test facility at Spadeadam to investigate particle transportation in 100% hydrogen and 100% natural gas at 2barg and 40mbarg.
o Initial experimental results indicate that particle transportation occurred at lower velocities in natural gas than for hydrogen.
o From experimental data rolling and flight of particles occurs over a range of velocities and there is not one specific velocity to instigate rolling or flight.
o Tests were performed for services in hydrogen. However a limited amount of sand was observed to travel up the service compared to the mains.
• Both experimental data and predictions indicate that the majority of particles are currently mobile at the standard maximum natural gas velocity of 20m/s (for unfiltered gas) thus an increase in velocity to 70m/s with hydrogen should not result in an increase in particle transportation.
• This study indicates that the mitigations used for natural gas should still be effective for hydrogen service
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
MOBs Phase 3: Task 2 - Building Surveys
Mar 2026
Publication
There is a requirement for gas distribution network (GDN) operators to understand the cost safety and practicality of converting network pipelines from supplying natural gas to hydrogen in multi-occupancy buildings (MOBs).
SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to understand the steps needed to convert MOBs to Hydrogen. The program is formed through 4 main work packs broken down into 2 main stage gated programmes (Part A = WP1 2 & Part B = WP3 4).
Surveys of 18 multi-occupancy buildings of various heights ages and construction methods were undertaken to:
1) identify issues specific to building types/architectures and gas installations that could affect a conversion to hydrogen and
2) collect data that will feed into the development of the QRA (Task 1) the analysis of network capacity (Task 3) the assessment of ventilation of enclosures ducts and dwellings (Task 4) and the assessment of fittings present in gas installations in MOBs (Task 5)
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to understand the steps needed to convert MOBs to Hydrogen. The program is formed through 4 main work packs broken down into 2 main stage gated programmes (Part A = WP1 2 & Part B = WP3 4).
Surveys of 18 multi-occupancy buildings of various heights ages and construction methods were undertaken to:
1) identify issues specific to building types/architectures and gas installations that could affect a conversion to hydrogen and
2) collect data that will feed into the development of the QRA (Task 1) the analysis of network capacity (Task 3) the assessment of ventilation of enclosures ducts and dwellings (Task 4) and the assessment of fittings present in gas installations in MOBs (Task 5)
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
MOBs Phase 3: Task 4 - Ventilation Report
Mar 2026
Publication
There is a requirement for gas distribution network (GDN) operators to understand the cost safety and practicality of converting network pipelines from Natural Gas to Hydrogen in multi-occupancy buildings (MOBs). Previous work undertaken during project ‘MOBs Work Pack 2 Asset Information Review’ [1] considered the requirements for pressure testing commissioning and decommissioning of MOBs following a conversion to Hydrogen and identified the following gaps in technical evidence.
“How does Hydrogen affect the requirements for ventilation and explosion relief?”
“Work is required to understand the ventilation requirements of meters installed inside dwellings whether existing ventilation in MOBs is adequate and the practicalities of increasing the ventilation should it be required. Work has already been undertaken under the NIA project ‘NIA_WWU_2_12 – Ventilation Within Buildings’[2]. It was proposed that ROSEN review the NIA_WWU_2_12 work and confirm its applicability to MOBs”.
"Further work is required including a study consisting of a review of relevant British Standards (BS 8313 [77] BS 6891 [75] and BS 5925 [78]) and validation through case studies to determine how duct dimensions and ventilation requirements are affected by Hydrogen. This work would also need to determine whether the size and positioning of existing vents are adequate with Hydrogen.
“Further work is required to determine whether the ventilation in dwellings is adequate for risers and laterals located within and passing through dwellings.”
SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to understand the steps needed to convert MOBs to Hydrogen including any testing required to address any evidence gaps. This report focuses on the ventilation requirements associated with the conversion of MOBs from Natural Gas to Hydrogen. The objectives of this task are to:
• Determine ventilation requirements for meters risers and laterals inside buildings.
• Determine ventilation requirements for typical meter banks and energy centres with Hydrogen and how they compare with ventilation requirements for Natural Gas and update Table 6 of IGEM/G/5 Edition 3 [2]
• Determine ventilation requirements for typical ducts with Hydrogen and how they compare with ventilation requirements for Natural Gas and update Table 8 of IGEM/G/5 Edition 3.
• Investigate the feasibility of adding ventilation to MOBs which will need to be positioned so as not to compromise fire safety if located in a fire compartment.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
“How does Hydrogen affect the requirements for ventilation and explosion relief?”
“Work is required to understand the ventilation requirements of meters installed inside dwellings whether existing ventilation in MOBs is adequate and the practicalities of increasing the ventilation should it be required. Work has already been undertaken under the NIA project ‘NIA_WWU_2_12 – Ventilation Within Buildings’[2]. It was proposed that ROSEN review the NIA_WWU_2_12 work and confirm its applicability to MOBs”.
"Further work is required including a study consisting of a review of relevant British Standards (BS 8313 [77] BS 6891 [75] and BS 5925 [78]) and validation through case studies to determine how duct dimensions and ventilation requirements are affected by Hydrogen. This work would also need to determine whether the size and positioning of existing vents are adequate with Hydrogen.
“Further work is required to determine whether the ventilation in dwellings is adequate for risers and laterals located within and passing through dwellings.”
SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to understand the steps needed to convert MOBs to Hydrogen including any testing required to address any evidence gaps. This report focuses on the ventilation requirements associated with the conversion of MOBs from Natural Gas to Hydrogen. The objectives of this task are to:
• Determine ventilation requirements for meters risers and laterals inside buildings.
• Determine ventilation requirements for typical meter banks and energy centres with Hydrogen and how they compare with ventilation requirements for Natural Gas and update Table 6 of IGEM/G/5 Edition 3 [2]
• Determine ventilation requirements for typical ducts with Hydrogen and how they compare with ventilation requirements for Natural Gas and update Table 8 of IGEM/G/5 Edition 3.
• Investigate the feasibility of adding ventilation to MOBs which will need to be positioned so as not to compromise fire safety if located in a fire compartment.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
MOBs Phase 3: Task 3 - Network Pipeline Capacity
Mar 2026
Publication
There is a requirement for gas distribution network (GDN) operators to understand the cost safety and practicality of converting network pipelines from supplying Natural Gas to Hydrogen in multi-occupancy buildings (MOBs). Previous work undertaken during project ‘MOBs Work Pack 2 Asset Information Review’ identified the following gap in technical evidence relating to network pipeline capacity:
♦ The adequacy of the diameter of existing risers and laterals to supply the energy required with Hydrogen need to be investigated.
♦ The effects of an increased flow rate velocity or increased pressure (pipe integrity) should it be required to meet the demand without increasing the diameter of risers and laterals. This would need to consider the effect of altitude on Hydrogen riser systems the pressure drops from existing fittings and additional safety devices installed (e.g. excess flow valves) and the minimum pressure required to ensure safe operation of Hydrogen appliances.
SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to understand the steps needed to convert MOBs to Hydrogen. The program is formed through 4 main work packs broken down into 2 main stage gated programmes (Part A = WP1 2 & Part B = WP3 4). This report is part of Work Pack 3 and summarises Task 3. The objective of Task 3 is to address evidence by examining the effects of increased volumetric flowrate velocity and/or increased pressure (pipe integrity) using the OLGA (V2021.2) pipeline simulator.
An earlier report described the survey of eighteen multi-occupancy buildings of various heights ages and construction methods. Of the eighteen multi-occupancy buildings eight were selected for analysis of capacity. A further two buildings representative of standard riser and lateral design were modelled with the data taken from the SGN management procedure SGN/PM/RL/1.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
♦ The adequacy of the diameter of existing risers and laterals to supply the energy required with Hydrogen need to be investigated.
♦ The effects of an increased flow rate velocity or increased pressure (pipe integrity) should it be required to meet the demand without increasing the diameter of risers and laterals. This would need to consider the effect of altitude on Hydrogen riser systems the pressure drops from existing fittings and additional safety devices installed (e.g. excess flow valves) and the minimum pressure required to ensure safe operation of Hydrogen appliances.
SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to understand the steps needed to convert MOBs to Hydrogen. The program is formed through 4 main work packs broken down into 2 main stage gated programmes (Part A = WP1 2 & Part B = WP3 4). This report is part of Work Pack 3 and summarises Task 3. The objective of Task 3 is to address evidence by examining the effects of increased volumetric flowrate velocity and/or increased pressure (pipe integrity) using the OLGA (V2021.2) pipeline simulator.
An earlier report described the survey of eighteen multi-occupancy buildings of various heights ages and construction methods. Of the eighteen multi-occupancy buildings eight were selected for analysis of capacity. A further two buildings representative of standard riser and lateral design were modelled with the data taken from the SGN management procedure SGN/PM/RL/1.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Hazardous Area Impact Mitigations (HAIM) Phase 2a: Full Scale Testing, Interim Report
Mar 2026
Publication
This project has built on the Hazardous Area Impact Mitigation (HAIM) Phase 1 project (NIA2_SGN0041) results that identified a disparity between hazardous zones measured during initial testing and those specified in the IGEM/SR/25 Hydrogen supplement. The aim of the HAIM Phase 2 project is to scale up the measurements to confirm the behaviour of larger vents equivalent to the test cases presented in the ATEX Equipment & IGEM/SR/25 Modification Assessment (NGNG_NIA_346) project.
The formation of a technical review group has informed the project team of the parameters and some of the assumptions used for the modelling leading to the development of the SR/25 Hydrogen Supplement. The difference between the modelled and measured data seen in the HAIM Phase 1 project has been attributed to the modelled data being carried out under a minimum of 0.5 m/s cross winds. Completely still conditions are not expected to occur hence this 0.5 m/s minimum. The result of this wind on the model leads to a significant reduction of the height of the resulting plume and a corresponding increase in the radial displacement of the plume from the vent tip. This has shifted the focus of this project towards examining wind influenced vents.
Two sets of experiments are provided in this interim report: measurements of plumes from wind influenced vents and plumes from fixtures and fitting leaks. The report also includes early results from plume ignition studies which have shown that ignition is not instantaneous for high velocity plumes.
The wind influenced plume tests have measured 0.0005 kg/s hydrogen releases from 50 mm and 15 mm vent pipes. The largest hazardous zone for these releases stipulated in IGEM/SR/25 hydrogen supplement is Xr = 2.5 m and Xh = 1.5 m so these were used as the extent of measurement. With no wind the plume rises vertically from the vent tip with no radial deflection. Measured concentration peaks have exceeded the lower flammable limit (LFL) at the 1.5 m measurement height. The influence of wind radially displaces the plume the higher the wind the larger the displacement. Concentration peaks are reduced but a wind of 0.5 m/s still permitted levels above the 4 % LFL value. Wind levels of 1.0 m/s displaced the plume to the end of the 2.5 m measurement array. Wind levels of 1.5 m/s broke up the plumes potentially driving pockets of gas beyond the 2.5 m measurement array.
Partial ignition of both vent types was possible at 1.5 m above the vent tip but complete sustained ignition was only possible when closer than 1 m to the vent tip.
Plumes from higher pressure (above 0.1 barg) fixture and fitting leaks have shown a good correlation between the shapes of modelled and measured vents. Except for the lowest pressure leaks which are momentum-dominated jets the resulting plumes are long and thin unaffected by buoyancy. The concentration decay in measured plumes is observed to be faster with distance compared to modelled values. Typically the measured distance to reach 2 % volume from the leak position is about half of the specified zone distances.
Limited ignition tests have been conducted but ignition from a 2 barg adverse downward pointing leak was challenging beyond 30 cm from the leak. The hydrogen jet also repeatably extinguished the methane flame used as pilot light during tests.
The next steps for the project are to carry out more measurements and to scale up the magnitude of the gas releases. This will provide more evidence supporting specified magnitudes of hazardous zones. In addition it is proposed that mitigation measures are explored that could reduce the specified hazardous zones for given vents. This could include design guidelines for hydrogen vents.
Further ignition tests will also be conducted to assess required conditions such as flow direction and gas concentration required to achieve both partial and stable ignition of hydrogen vents.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The formation of a technical review group has informed the project team of the parameters and some of the assumptions used for the modelling leading to the development of the SR/25 Hydrogen Supplement. The difference between the modelled and measured data seen in the HAIM Phase 1 project has been attributed to the modelled data being carried out under a minimum of 0.5 m/s cross winds. Completely still conditions are not expected to occur hence this 0.5 m/s minimum. The result of this wind on the model leads to a significant reduction of the height of the resulting plume and a corresponding increase in the radial displacement of the plume from the vent tip. This has shifted the focus of this project towards examining wind influenced vents.
Two sets of experiments are provided in this interim report: measurements of plumes from wind influenced vents and plumes from fixtures and fitting leaks. The report also includes early results from plume ignition studies which have shown that ignition is not instantaneous for high velocity plumes.
The wind influenced plume tests have measured 0.0005 kg/s hydrogen releases from 50 mm and 15 mm vent pipes. The largest hazardous zone for these releases stipulated in IGEM/SR/25 hydrogen supplement is Xr = 2.5 m and Xh = 1.5 m so these were used as the extent of measurement. With no wind the plume rises vertically from the vent tip with no radial deflection. Measured concentration peaks have exceeded the lower flammable limit (LFL) at the 1.5 m measurement height. The influence of wind radially displaces the plume the higher the wind the larger the displacement. Concentration peaks are reduced but a wind of 0.5 m/s still permitted levels above the 4 % LFL value. Wind levels of 1.0 m/s displaced the plume to the end of the 2.5 m measurement array. Wind levels of 1.5 m/s broke up the plumes potentially driving pockets of gas beyond the 2.5 m measurement array.
Partial ignition of both vent types was possible at 1.5 m above the vent tip but complete sustained ignition was only possible when closer than 1 m to the vent tip.
Plumes from higher pressure (above 0.1 barg) fixture and fitting leaks have shown a good correlation between the shapes of modelled and measured vents. Except for the lowest pressure leaks which are momentum-dominated jets the resulting plumes are long and thin unaffected by buoyancy. The concentration decay in measured plumes is observed to be faster with distance compared to modelled values. Typically the measured distance to reach 2 % volume from the leak position is about half of the specified zone distances.
Limited ignition tests have been conducted but ignition from a 2 barg adverse downward pointing leak was challenging beyond 30 cm from the leak. The hydrogen jet also repeatably extinguished the methane flame used as pilot light during tests.
The next steps for the project are to carry out more measurements and to scale up the magnitude of the gas releases. This will provide more evidence supporting specified magnitudes of hazardous zones. In addition it is proposed that mitigation measures are explored that could reduce the specified hazardous zones for given vents. This could include design guidelines for hydrogen vents.
Further ignition tests will also be conducted to assess required conditions such as flow direction and gas concentration required to achieve both partial and stable ignition of hydrogen vents.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
LTS Futures Grangemouth to Granton Pipeline Assessment of TD/1 Compliance
Mar 2026
Publication
SGN are undertaking the LTS Futures Project which forms part of the UK’s national hydrogen research programme to deliver a net zero decarbonisation solution for customers. The project seeks to research develop test and evidence the compatibility of the Great Britain (GB) Local Transmission System (LTS) assets pipelines associated plant and ancillary fittings for hydrogen service.
The aim of the project is to demonstrate that the LTS can be repurposed to convey hydrogen providing options for the decarbonisation of power industry heat and transport by delivering a safe supply of energy to all customers both during and after the energy transition. The LTS Futures project includes a repurposing trial of the Grangemouth to Granton pipeline.
Prior to repurposing to convey hydrogen the Grangemouth to Granton pipeline is to be audited in accordance with the requirements of IGEM/TD/1 Edition 6 clause 12.4.2.1 noting the requirements of Supplement 2 for High Pressure Hydrogen Pipelines [1 2]. This is a formal assessment of the integrity of the pipeline and an assessment of the risk posed on the surrounding population.
This report presents the assessment of TD/1 compliance of the Grangemouth to Granton pipeline.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The aim of the project is to demonstrate that the LTS can be repurposed to convey hydrogen providing options for the decarbonisation of power industry heat and transport by delivering a safe supply of energy to all customers both during and after the energy transition. The LTS Futures project includes a repurposing trial of the Grangemouth to Granton pipeline.
Prior to repurposing to convey hydrogen the Grangemouth to Granton pipeline is to be audited in accordance with the requirements of IGEM/TD/1 Edition 6 clause 12.4.2.1 noting the requirements of Supplement 2 for High Pressure Hydrogen Pipelines [1 2]. This is a formal assessment of the integrity of the pipeline and an assessment of the risk posed on the surrounding population.
This report presents the assessment of TD/1 compliance of the Grangemouth to Granton pipeline.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
MOBs Phase 3: Decarbonisation of Multi-occupancy Buildings Feasibility Study - Hydrogen in MOBs, GDN Aligned Summary Report
Mar 2026
Publication
This feasibility study has investigated the potential of repurposing existing gas installations for hydrogen use in Multi-Occupancy Buildings (MOBs). MOBs is a broad term extending from a single floor of flats over a shop to large tower blocks. For this study a MOB is defined as a building having at least one meter point and which meets one of these two criteria:
• The building contains at least three domestic dwellings
• The building contains a mixture of domestic dwellings and commercial units with there being at least three dwellings and units in total.
Due to the diverse nature of MOBs and the assets meter positions and appliances used in them it is necessary to sub-divide the population into archetypes and separately assess the risk posed in each category. Customers should only be exposed to Broadly Acceptable risk as defined as an individual risk of fatality of no more than 1 in 1 million per year in the HSE guidance document Reducing Risk Protecting People [1]. Due to the potential for multiple fatalities in MOBs it is important to understand how each building might respond to an incident and reduce risk to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
It is also reasonable to suggest that a customer’s risk after conversion to hydrogen should be comparable to that which currently exists for natural gas. Therefore risk to individuals within a building once converted to hydrogen should be no worse than either the risk faced by them prior to conversion or the average risk for that building height prior to conversion.
Based on SGN’s data the analysis has shown that with universally applied risk mitigation measures and up to two additional mitigations where required around 99% of MOBs can converted to hydrogen using repurposed assets. Detail can be located in Table 7 on page 12 of this report.
There are around 1% of MOBs where it is likely that existing natural gas installations cannot be repurposed for hydrogen use at an economic cost. The following options are available for this small proportion of buildings:
1. Accept a small individual risk increase in a small minority of building types.
2. Implement additional risk mitigation measures that would reduce those individual risks but at a disproportionate cost.
3. Remove gas supplies to these buildings and install an alternative energy source.
Based on the results the following recommendations are given:
• All MOBs to be divided into archetypes and subdivided by installation type prior to a pre-conversion site survey to identify the most practicable and cost-effective energy solution
• The survey will assess all the existing equipment which includes gas pipelines meter locations installation pipes and appliance locations against Gas Industry Standards
• Non-compliant installations will require further analysis and risk assessment on a case-by-case basis to determine their suitability for conversion to hydrogen
• It is proposed that where significant work will be required to re-purpose the existing installation to the required level of safety an economic assessment will be undertaken to determine the optimum solution for customers
• Further work should continue to develop and refine the risk assessment of hydrogen in MOBs. This will support the development of strategic decisions related to conversion. The risks associated with decommissioning gas installations in MOBs could also be assessed in future iterations
• Further work is required to assess Great Britain’s populations of MOBs and gas installation configurations
• Further work is required to provide a detailed cost benefit analysis across the Great Britain distribution networks to ensure that any proposals appropriately address societal expectations of risk versus investment and legal obligations
• Further work is required to define duty holders’ roles responsibilities and interoperability to convert MOBs to hydrogen
• The project has demonstrated that in most cases it is feasible to convert MOBs to hydrogen. The next steps include scoping of resource and operational strategies for conversion
• The additional MOB safety evidence recommendations detailed in Work Pack 3 - Task 12 of Appendix D should also be addressed.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
• The building contains at least three domestic dwellings
• The building contains a mixture of domestic dwellings and commercial units with there being at least three dwellings and units in total.
Due to the diverse nature of MOBs and the assets meter positions and appliances used in them it is necessary to sub-divide the population into archetypes and separately assess the risk posed in each category. Customers should only be exposed to Broadly Acceptable risk as defined as an individual risk of fatality of no more than 1 in 1 million per year in the HSE guidance document Reducing Risk Protecting People [1]. Due to the potential for multiple fatalities in MOBs it is important to understand how each building might respond to an incident and reduce risk to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
It is also reasonable to suggest that a customer’s risk after conversion to hydrogen should be comparable to that which currently exists for natural gas. Therefore risk to individuals within a building once converted to hydrogen should be no worse than either the risk faced by them prior to conversion or the average risk for that building height prior to conversion.
Based on SGN’s data the analysis has shown that with universally applied risk mitigation measures and up to two additional mitigations where required around 99% of MOBs can converted to hydrogen using repurposed assets. Detail can be located in Table 7 on page 12 of this report.
There are around 1% of MOBs where it is likely that existing natural gas installations cannot be repurposed for hydrogen use at an economic cost. The following options are available for this small proportion of buildings:
1. Accept a small individual risk increase in a small minority of building types.
2. Implement additional risk mitigation measures that would reduce those individual risks but at a disproportionate cost.
3. Remove gas supplies to these buildings and install an alternative energy source.
Based on the results the following recommendations are given:
• All MOBs to be divided into archetypes and subdivided by installation type prior to a pre-conversion site survey to identify the most practicable and cost-effective energy solution
• The survey will assess all the existing equipment which includes gas pipelines meter locations installation pipes and appliance locations against Gas Industry Standards
• Non-compliant installations will require further analysis and risk assessment on a case-by-case basis to determine their suitability for conversion to hydrogen
• It is proposed that where significant work will be required to re-purpose the existing installation to the required level of safety an economic assessment will be undertaken to determine the optimum solution for customers
• Further work should continue to develop and refine the risk assessment of hydrogen in MOBs. This will support the development of strategic decisions related to conversion. The risks associated with decommissioning gas installations in MOBs could also be assessed in future iterations
• Further work is required to assess Great Britain’s populations of MOBs and gas installation configurations
• Further work is required to provide a detailed cost benefit analysis across the Great Britain distribution networks to ensure that any proposals appropriately address societal expectations of risk versus investment and legal obligations
• Further work is required to define duty holders’ roles responsibilities and interoperability to convert MOBs to hydrogen
• The project has demonstrated that in most cases it is feasible to convert MOBs to hydrogen. The next steps include scoping of resource and operational strategies for conversion
• The additional MOB safety evidence recommendations detailed in Work Pack 3 - Task 12 of Appendix D should also be addressed.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
LTS Futures Technical Report No. 2: Charpy Impact Testing & Transverse Strip Tensile Testin
Mar 2026
Publication
This report covers the Charpy impact testing and the transverse strip (flat) tensile testing of SGN pipes. The testing has been conducted on specimens extracted from three types of X52 steel grade linepipe: (a) Pipe A seemless; (b) Pipe B spiral seam welded; (c) Pipe C longitudinal seam welded.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
SIF Alpha Phase - Velocity Design with Hydrogen, Summary Report
Mar 2026
Publication
The current UK natural gas networks operated by the Gas Distribution Networks have the potential to flow blended hydrogen and to be re-purposed to flow 100% hydrogen. The hydrogen networks would therefore have the potential to contribute to Ofgem’s strategic innovation fund (SIF) decarbonisation of heat challenge to help meet national 2030 and 2050 emissions targets.
To demonstrate how the current gas networks can be intelligently and efficiently transitioned to provide low carbon heating the gas velocity constraints for hydrogen applied at the design stage need to be identified. These constraints will directly impact the level of capital investment required in the transition of the system to accommodate blended and 100% hydrogen.
However hydrogen gas does not contain the same level of energy by volume as natural gas so the volume of hydrogen flowing to consumers would have to increase a little over 3 times for an 100% hydrogen network to deliver energy at an equivalent rate compared to natural gas. Without network reinforcement this increase in flow could require a significant increase to the pressure and/or velocity of gas.
Currently IGEM standards specify a nominal maximum velocity of 20 m/s mainly to avoid the risk of debris within the pipes being picked up by the gas stream and causing wear to pipe components possibly then resulting in early failure. A velocity limit of 40 m/s is assumed where the pipe assets are assumed to be clean.
Debris may be present in the system particularly in the lower pressure tiers in the form of dust mainly as a product of the historic manufacture of towns gas. Whilst many metallic mains particularly in the LP pressure tier have been replaced with PE (polyethylene) piping under the ongoing replacement scheme it is anticipated that debris will still be present in the pipes that have not been replaced and may have already been transported into the plastic pipes. Hydrogen has different properties to natural gas so it is not known if debris may be picked up to the same degree or if any other factor will limit velocity. Other factors such as noise and/or vibration may also constrain the design velocity of gas in the system.
Building on this initial work it was envisaged that validation of the pipe network behaviour would require full scale testing to investigate the erosion vibration and noise behaviour associated with transportation of hydrogen and hydrogen blends with natural gas to support the objective of validating and enhancing existing models. To develop the requirements for such testing the “Alpha phase” (this phase) of the SIF project was initiated with the intention of delivering conceptual designs of the full-scale test facilities a detailed test programme and to undertake any associated laboratory testing which would be required to support these activities.
This report summarises the SIF alpha phase conclusions and recommendations from work packages 1 to 5:
Work package 1 Conceptual design of test facilities
Work package 2 Detailed test plan
Work package 3 Laboratory testing
Work package 4 Network engagement
Work package 5 Cost-benefit analysis
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
To demonstrate how the current gas networks can be intelligently and efficiently transitioned to provide low carbon heating the gas velocity constraints for hydrogen applied at the design stage need to be identified. These constraints will directly impact the level of capital investment required in the transition of the system to accommodate blended and 100% hydrogen.
However hydrogen gas does not contain the same level of energy by volume as natural gas so the volume of hydrogen flowing to consumers would have to increase a little over 3 times for an 100% hydrogen network to deliver energy at an equivalent rate compared to natural gas. Without network reinforcement this increase in flow could require a significant increase to the pressure and/or velocity of gas.
Currently IGEM standards specify a nominal maximum velocity of 20 m/s mainly to avoid the risk of debris within the pipes being picked up by the gas stream and causing wear to pipe components possibly then resulting in early failure. A velocity limit of 40 m/s is assumed where the pipe assets are assumed to be clean.
Debris may be present in the system particularly in the lower pressure tiers in the form of dust mainly as a product of the historic manufacture of towns gas. Whilst many metallic mains particularly in the LP pressure tier have been replaced with PE (polyethylene) piping under the ongoing replacement scheme it is anticipated that debris will still be present in the pipes that have not been replaced and may have already been transported into the plastic pipes. Hydrogen has different properties to natural gas so it is not known if debris may be picked up to the same degree or if any other factor will limit velocity. Other factors such as noise and/or vibration may also constrain the design velocity of gas in the system.
Building on this initial work it was envisaged that validation of the pipe network behaviour would require full scale testing to investigate the erosion vibration and noise behaviour associated with transportation of hydrogen and hydrogen blends with natural gas to support the objective of validating and enhancing existing models. To develop the requirements for such testing the “Alpha phase” (this phase) of the SIF project was initiated with the intention of delivering conceptual designs of the full-scale test facilities a detailed test programme and to undertake any associated laboratory testing which would be required to support these activities.
This report summarises the SIF alpha phase conclusions and recommendations from work packages 1 to 5:
Work package 1 Conceptual design of test facilities
Work package 2 Detailed test plan
Work package 3 Laboratory testing
Work package 4 Network engagement
Work package 5 Cost-benefit analysis
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
H21 Phase 2: Purging of Hydrogen Distribution Pipelines
Mar 2026
Publication
Over the last two years a significant programme of work has been undertaken as part of the H21 Phase 2 project to investigate purging of hydrogen distribution pipelines. The aim has been to undertake the underpinning science to support the development of safe and efficient purging procedures for hydrogen distribution pipelines. This report documents that scientific evidence-gathering process.
The report starts with a review of the existing pipeline purging practice and standards. Previous scientific work supporting the purging of town gas and natural gas distribution pipelines is reviewed. The properties of hydrogen are examined and previous work on hydrogen ignition potential and Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) in pipes is assessed. The findings of the literature review are discussed and the decision to proceed with indirect (as opposed to direct) purging is explained.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The report starts with a review of the existing pipeline purging practice and standards. Previous scientific work supporting the purging of town gas and natural gas distribution pipelines is reviewed. The properties of hydrogen are examined and previous work on hydrogen ignition potential and Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) in pipes is assessed. The findings of the literature review are discussed and the decision to proceed with indirect (as opposed to direct) purging is explained.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
MOBs 357 Purging Hydrogen Risers (MOBS), Final Report
Mar 2026
Publication
Steer Energy and
SGN
Multiple Occupancy Buildings (MOBs) account for 21% of the UK’s domestic heating demand and tackling the challenge to decarbonise these properties will be key to meeting Government net zero targets.1 There is therefore a requirement for gas distribution network operators (GDNOs) to understand the cost safety and practicality of converting gas supplies to hydrogen. This project aimed to address evidence gaps centred around commissioning and decommissioning of risers associated with MOBs in particular purging operations.
The project has carried out a review of processes procedures and tooling used for purging MOBs examined site surveys and discussed purging with operators. Riser systems in MOBs are branched systems often comprising many vertical and horizontal elements taking a single supply source and distributing it to multiple individual dwellings in the building. Purging this network of elements is caried out in a routine manner as dictated by standards and procedures. Routine purging of MOBs is not challenging and this will continue to be the same when using hydrogen. The greatest challenge identified to purging MOBs is when each individual dwelling needs to be accessed to complete the purge. If an individual dwelling is inaccessible and individual lateral isolation valves are not installed then unpurged branches can remain. A consequence of leaving branches unpurged is a mixing of the air and fuel into a flammable mixture in the riser.
An experimental programme of work has been developed to investigate dispersion in unpurged branches of risers using methane and hydrogen. The experiments started with single pipes and developed in complexity to a branched system with six laterals. The main conclusions are: • If an unpurged branch is left over time the flammable volume at the interface between purged and unpurged sections will increase. Pipe diameter is the dominant parameter that dictates the speed of mixing of the two gases. • Gas dispersion occurs through a combination of buoyancy and diffusion buoyancy effects are diameter dependent becoming more dominant in pipe diameters greater than 50 mm. Below 50 mm gas dispersion is slow being dominated by diffusion alone. • Diffusion driven dispersion acts in the direction of concentration gradient from high to low. This acts to reduce the driving concentration gradient and slows down subsequent diffusion. In vertical pipes concentration gradients have been seen to act upwards or downwards. • Buoyancy effects act preferentially upwards but also promote mixing of different density gases in horizontal pipes. • In tests hydrogen dispersion was up to twice as fast as methane dispersion.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The project has carried out a review of processes procedures and tooling used for purging MOBs examined site surveys and discussed purging with operators. Riser systems in MOBs are branched systems often comprising many vertical and horizontal elements taking a single supply source and distributing it to multiple individual dwellings in the building. Purging this network of elements is caried out in a routine manner as dictated by standards and procedures. Routine purging of MOBs is not challenging and this will continue to be the same when using hydrogen. The greatest challenge identified to purging MOBs is when each individual dwelling needs to be accessed to complete the purge. If an individual dwelling is inaccessible and individual lateral isolation valves are not installed then unpurged branches can remain. A consequence of leaving branches unpurged is a mixing of the air and fuel into a flammable mixture in the riser.
An experimental programme of work has been developed to investigate dispersion in unpurged branches of risers using methane and hydrogen. The experiments started with single pipes and developed in complexity to a branched system with six laterals. The main conclusions are: • If an unpurged branch is left over time the flammable volume at the interface between purged and unpurged sections will increase. Pipe diameter is the dominant parameter that dictates the speed of mixing of the two gases. • Gas dispersion occurs through a combination of buoyancy and diffusion buoyancy effects are diameter dependent becoming more dominant in pipe diameters greater than 50 mm. Below 50 mm gas dispersion is slow being dominated by diffusion alone. • Diffusion driven dispersion acts in the direction of concentration gradient from high to low. This acts to reduce the driving concentration gradient and slows down subsequent diffusion. In vertical pipes concentration gradients have been seen to act upwards or downwards. • Buoyancy effects act preferentially upwards but also promote mixing of different density gases in horizontal pipes. • In tests hydrogen dispersion was up to twice as fast as methane dispersion.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
H21 Hydrogen Compatibility of Components Phase 2: Final Report
Mar 2026
Publication
Concerns relating to the production of carbon dioxide (CO₂) and its effects on global background temperatures have led to international efforts to reduce CO₂ emissions. A contributor to CO₂ emissions is the burning of natural gas in domestic and commercial fuel supplies. The use of hydrogen is being explored as a potential alternative to natural gas.
As part of the work associated with delivering H21’s 100% hydrogen gas network a requirement to develop a method of assessing the suitability of gas distribution network assets (e.g. pipes valves regulators) for use with hydrogen up to 7 barg was identified. Phase one of the project developed such a methodology which was delivered to the project stakeholders to conduct component level analysis of assets and determine their suitability without further mitigation. The methodology developed in phase 1 of this project under NIA 276 was used to assess a wide range of assets a number of which were considered as being not suitable for use with hydrogen according to the methodology without further mitigation.
The asset assemblies which did not pass the assessment method at the first stage were district governors/regulators service governors underground modules and slam shut valves. The materials that were identified as having high degradation level scores contributing to the overall ‘fail’ result included various carbon steels spring steels cast aluminium certain brasses one polymer and a range of brand-name sealants.
The work described in this report is a re-assessment and update of the various inputs that make up the method a detailed analysis of function and loading of selected failing assets and an evaluation of where new materials testing may permit an update of the materials degradation ratings. Fifty-seven assets failed the initial assessment of which twenty-seven were identified for further evaluation in this project.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
As part of the work associated with delivering H21’s 100% hydrogen gas network a requirement to develop a method of assessing the suitability of gas distribution network assets (e.g. pipes valves regulators) for use with hydrogen up to 7 barg was identified. Phase one of the project developed such a methodology which was delivered to the project stakeholders to conduct component level analysis of assets and determine their suitability without further mitigation. The methodology developed in phase 1 of this project under NIA 276 was used to assess a wide range of assets a number of which were considered as being not suitable for use with hydrogen according to the methodology without further mitigation.
The asset assemblies which did not pass the assessment method at the first stage were district governors/regulators service governors underground modules and slam shut valves. The materials that were identified as having high degradation level scores contributing to the overall ‘fail’ result included various carbon steels spring steels cast aluminium certain brasses one polymer and a range of brand-name sealants.
The work described in this report is a re-assessment and update of the various inputs that make up the method a detailed analysis of function and loading of selected failing assets and an evaluation of where new materials testing may permit an update of the materials degradation ratings. Fifty-seven assets failed the initial assessment of which twenty-seven were identified for further evaluation in this project.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Development of a Method for Assessing Material Compatibility and Component Functionality for 0-7 barg Gas Distribution Assets in Hydrogen Service: Summary Report (WP5, D8)
Mar 2026
Publication
Concerns relating to the production of carbon dioxide (CO2) and its effects on global background temperatures have led to international efforts to reduce CO2 emissions. A contributor to CO2 emissions is the burning of natural gas in domestic and commercial fuel supplies. The H21 project endeavours to explore the use of hydrogen gas as an alternative to natural gas.
As part of the work associated with delivering H21’s 100% hydrogen gas network a requirement was identified to develop a method of assessing the suitability of gas distribution network assets (e.g. pipes valves regulators) for use with hydrogen up to 7 barg. This project has developed such a methodology and this report summarises the work conducted and signposts the main deliverables.
The methodology developed for hydrogen suitability is based on a component-level analysis components being the individual items that make up an asset. The methodology structure is shown below where first the risk of the asset failing when operating on natural gas is determined. Next the asset is broken down to the component level and the individual risk of the components failing when operating on 100% hydrogen is determined. If the combination of these two risks is greater than is considered acceptable by the methodology the asset is considered not suitable for use with hydrogen without further mitigation.
The methodology is supported by the following key inputs delivered through the project:
♦ A list of assets on the gas distrbution network.
♦ A database of materials with their suitabiltiy for use with hydrogen quantified.
The method has been demonstrated on eight case studies and the next step will be for the project stakeholders to apply it to the population of network assets the results of which will gauge the networks readiness for hydrogen.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
As part of the work associated with delivering H21’s 100% hydrogen gas network a requirement was identified to develop a method of assessing the suitability of gas distribution network assets (e.g. pipes valves regulators) for use with hydrogen up to 7 barg. This project has developed such a methodology and this report summarises the work conducted and signposts the main deliverables.
The methodology developed for hydrogen suitability is based on a component-level analysis components being the individual items that make up an asset. The methodology structure is shown below where first the risk of the asset failing when operating on natural gas is determined. Next the asset is broken down to the component level and the individual risk of the components failing when operating on 100% hydrogen is determined. If the combination of these two risks is greater than is considered acceptable by the methodology the asset is considered not suitable for use with hydrogen without further mitigation.
The methodology is supported by the following key inputs delivered through the project:
♦ A list of assets on the gas distrbution network.
♦ A database of materials with their suitabiltiy for use with hydrogen quantified.
The method has been demonstrated on eight case studies and the next step will be for the project stakeholders to apply it to the population of network assets the results of which will gauge the networks readiness for hydrogen.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Vintage PE Pipes & Hydrogen: H21 Project, Summary Report
Mar 2026
Publication
Building on earlier work that created evidence on the use of contemporary polyethylene pipes for the distribution of hydrogen fuel gases at pressures below 10bar further work has been completed. This second work stream reports on hydrogen testing with materials supplied installed and operated in the United Kingdom since 1969 oftentimes referred as historic or vintage materials. The findings do not raise any new concerns rather they assist in completing a portfolio of evidence validating expectations of subject experts and of theoretical approaches that polyethylene pipe systems are not deleteriously affected by contact with hydrogen at gas distribution pressures. In an earlier study (NIA_SGN0105) used to underpin a safety case for a new hydrogen network in Fife much evidence was created on modern grades of polyethylene pipe but one question remained in relation to a property known as fracture toughness. This has been satisfactorily addressed and is reported here. Furthermore in relation to historic or vintage materials first generation pipes have been extracted from two locations in the United Kingdom and subjected to testing in contact with hydrogen. A particular focus for vintage pipe studies has been those failure modes that real pipes are most likely to experience in wear out phases for example slow crack growth failure linked to point loads offset pipe welds and squeeze off locations. Attention has also been made to the matter of permeation through materials well researched generally but here specific quantification with vintage/aged materials. The main learning outcome of interest is that permeation rates through materials are affected by temperature. As hydrogen networks can have high temperature feeds to the pipe network this is relevant and data is provided to quantify effects with vintage materials.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
NIA 346 H21 Hazardous Area Zoning Summary Report
Mar 2026
Publication
In order to utilise the existing gas transmission and distribution network to transport 100% hydrogen the effects of the changes in characteristics of hydrogen from natural gas need to be reviewed and the resultant effect on the network assessed. Hydrogen features a substantially larger range of flammable concentrations than natural gas which could potentially cause safety concerns if the existing network is not reviewed. Hazardous area zoning of equipment present on the gas transmission and distribution network is modelled in accordance with standard IGEM/SR/25 Ed. 2. A hazardous area is defined in this standard as “an area in which explosive gas/air mixtures are or may be expected to be in quantities as such as to require special precautions for the construction installation and use of electrical apparatus or other sources of ignition.” A supplement to this standard compatible with the use of hydrogen blends up to 20% in addition to pure hydrogen was published by IGEM in November 2022. This hydrogen supplement has been utilised to establish the hazardous area zoning of hydrogen gas in 13 sites across multiple networks.
Hydrogen possesses a lower molar mass than natural gas therefore the mass flow rate of gas escaping relief vent pipework during venting operations is expected to decrease during pressure-driven release. Due to the larger flammable concentration range of hydrogen-air mixtures the impact on the sizes of hazardous areas was not immediately present. Across all sites the size of hazardous areas was seen to increase upon calculating the hydrogen mass flow rate for a given vent. It was observed on several sites that the hazardous areas of relief vents extended beyond the site boundaries.
Additional consideration was paid to vent pipe geometry in relation to sections 7.8.3 and 7.8.4 of IGEM/TD/13 Ed. 2 Supplement 1 – Pressure Regulating Installations for Hydrogen at Pressures Exceeding 7 bar. These clauses require that the Length/Diameter ratio of a vent pipe be kept below 60:1 to reduce the chance of combustion or detonation due to depressurisation in the vent pipe. This is due to hydrogen experiencing an increase in temperature during depressurisation as opposed to natural gas which decreases in temperature. This affects all sites due to the prevalence of small-bore pipework (10-15mm) used in impulse and instrumentation pipework. This also has potential to affect smaller relief vent pipework such as that used on district governors (typically 1”/25NB) depending on specific pipe and valve placement.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Hydrogen possesses a lower molar mass than natural gas therefore the mass flow rate of gas escaping relief vent pipework during venting operations is expected to decrease during pressure-driven release. Due to the larger flammable concentration range of hydrogen-air mixtures the impact on the sizes of hazardous areas was not immediately present. Across all sites the size of hazardous areas was seen to increase upon calculating the hydrogen mass flow rate for a given vent. It was observed on several sites that the hazardous areas of relief vents extended beyond the site boundaries.
Additional consideration was paid to vent pipe geometry in relation to sections 7.8.3 and 7.8.4 of IGEM/TD/13 Ed. 2 Supplement 1 – Pressure Regulating Installations for Hydrogen at Pressures Exceeding 7 bar. These clauses require that the Length/Diameter ratio of a vent pipe be kept below 60:1 to reduce the chance of combustion or detonation due to depressurisation in the vent pipe. This is due to hydrogen experiencing an increase in temperature during depressurisation as opposed to natural gas which decreases in temperature. This affects all sites due to the prevalence of small-bore pipework (10-15mm) used in impulse and instrumentation pipework. This also has potential to affect smaller relief vent pipework such as that used on district governors (typically 1”/25NB) depending on specific pipe and valve placement.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
H21 Phase2B T&M Pressure Regulation and Maintenance
Mar 2026
Publication
In line with the UK government’s de-carbonisation strategy Northern Gas Network’s (NGN) H21 project aims to demonstrate the feasibility of converting the existing <7barg gas distribution network to 100% hydrogen. Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB networks to transport 100% hydrogen. Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2b evaluates network operational procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve this a gas demonstration network was built at South Bank Middlesbrough TS6 6LF to accommodate full scale network parameters and typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding Leaks
♦ Accessing Leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Planned live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each of these areas of testing and assessments were then divided in individual tests or tasks and identified with a unique ID name.
This current report details the work conducted in the NGN H21 testing facility at South Bank in RedCar with the maintenance of a Honeywell MP-LP Twin Stream Governor. The programme included the maintenance functional checks and a major overhaul operation conducted on the twin stream governor. This was completed on the hydrogen network within the facility.
This report details the Honeywell Twin Stream Regulator and the flow demands in section 3. The demonstrations set-up maintenance procedure and method statement used in Section 4; the results and main observations in Section 5 followed by interpretation of results and conclusions in Section 6. Appendix A at the back of the document contains site evidence for the demonstration.
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding Leaks
♦ Accessing Leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Planned live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each of these areas of testing and assessments were then divided in individual tests or tasks and identified with a unique ID name.
This current report details the work conducted in the NGN H21 testing facility at South Bank in RedCar with the maintenance of a Honeywell MP-LP Twin Stream Governor. The programme included the maintenance functional checks and a major overhaul operation conducted on the twin stream governor. This was completed on the hydrogen network within the facility.
This report details the Honeywell Twin Stream Regulator and the flow demands in section 3. The demonstrations set-up maintenance procedure and method statement used in Section 4; the results and main observations in Section 5 followed by interpretation of results and conclusions in Section 6. Appendix A at the back of the document contains site evidence for the demonstration.
H21 ATEX-SR25 Summary Technical Report
Mar 2026
Publication
In order to utilise the existing gas transmission and distribution network to transport 100% hydrogen the effects of the changes in characteristics of hydrogen from natural gas need to be reviewed and the resultant effect on the network assessed. Hydrogen features a substantially larger range of flammable concentrations than natural gas which could cause safety concerns if the existing network is not reviewed.
By surveying the electrical and instrumentation assets on site it was identified that many of the existing instruments currently in operation are not certified for the hydrogen environment (minimum Gas Group IIC) and require replacement.
There are a large quantity of instruments not suitable for the hydrogen environment due to asset condition / age and the effect of corrosion overtime affecting instruments such as missing or illegible faceplates resulting in being unable to verify ATEX certifications. A smaller percentage of existing instrumentation are in good condition but not certified for the hydrogen environment.
Equipment without a faceplate have been considered as not suitable for Hydrogen pending a review of certification for validation within a hydrogen atmosphere a replacement may not be required.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
By surveying the electrical and instrumentation assets on site it was identified that many of the existing instruments currently in operation are not certified for the hydrogen environment (minimum Gas Group IIC) and require replacement.
There are a large quantity of instruments not suitable for the hydrogen environment due to asset condition / age and the effect of corrosion overtime affecting instruments such as missing or illegible faceplates resulting in being unable to verify ATEX certifications. A smaller percentage of existing instrumentation are in good condition but not certified for the hydrogen environment.
Equipment without a faceplate have been considered as not suitable for Hydrogen pending a review of certification for validation within a hydrogen atmosphere a replacement may not be required.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
H21 Phase 2A: Commissioning and Decommissioning Operations
Mar 2026
Publication
In line with the UK government's de-carbonisation strategy Northern Gas Network's (NGN) H21 project aims to enable the conversion of the UK gas networks to pure hydrogen. After conversion of the gas networks hydrogen is transported from various sources through new and existing gas networks to industrial and domestic customers.
Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2a evaluates network operations tools and procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve this a gas demonstration network was built at DNV Spadeadam Research and Testing to accommodate full scale network parameters and typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE S&RC and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding leaks
♦ Accessing leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each of these areas of testing and assessments were then divided in individual tests or tasks and identified with a unique ID name.
The current report details the work conducted in the H21 demonstration grid at Spadeadam herein referred to as ""Microgrid"" in relation to commissioning and decommissioning activities. The programme included commissioning and decommissioning of straight mains branched networks and service pipes in each of the pressure tiers in the microgrid (IP MP and LP). In line with recommendations by the HSE S\&RC in their procedure review conducted earlier in Phase 2a; pipe diameters above 32 mm were commissioned or decommissioned indirectly (by displacing air with inert fluid followed by displacement of the inert fluid with hydrogen or vice versa). Pipe diameters under 32 mm (service pipe tests) were purged directly (air displaced by fuel gas or vice versa) according to a bespoke test procedure employing exclusion zones around pipes and vents.
Conversion style commissioning was also carried out in IP MP and LP mains i.e. converting pipes previously commissioned with Natural Gas to contain 100% hydrogen. This was also carried out by direct displacement of one fuel gas for the other.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2a evaluates network operations tools and procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve this a gas demonstration network was built at DNV Spadeadam Research and Testing to accommodate full scale network parameters and typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE S&RC and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding leaks
♦ Accessing leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each of these areas of testing and assessments were then divided in individual tests or tasks and identified with a unique ID name.
The current report details the work conducted in the H21 demonstration grid at Spadeadam herein referred to as ""Microgrid"" in relation to commissioning and decommissioning activities. The programme included commissioning and decommissioning of straight mains branched networks and service pipes in each of the pressure tiers in the microgrid (IP MP and LP). In line with recommendations by the HSE S\&RC in their procedure review conducted earlier in Phase 2a; pipe diameters above 32 mm were commissioned or decommissioned indirectly (by displacing air with inert fluid followed by displacement of the inert fluid with hydrogen or vice versa). Pipe diameters under 32 mm (service pipe tests) were purged directly (air displaced by fuel gas or vice versa) according to a bespoke test procedure employing exclusion zones around pipes and vents.
Conversion style commissioning was also carried out in IP MP and LP mains i.e. converting pipes previously commissioned with Natural Gas to contain 100% hydrogen. This was also carried out by direct displacement of one fuel gas for the other.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
H21 Phase 2A Testing - Part A: Minimum Purge Velocity Report
Mar 2026
Publication
In line with the UK governments decarbonisation strategy gas networks within the UK are continuing to investigate the potential to convert the UK gas networks to hydrogen. Northern Gas Network's (NGN) H21 project aims to enable the conversion to 100% hydrogen.
The process of converting the existing UK gas infrastructure involves primarily purging operations. Therefore there is a requirement to understand in more detail how hydrogen affects the requirements to conduct a safe and efficient purge.
The increased buoyancy forces associated with hydrogen is expected to increase the minimum purge velocity required to avoid stratification. This can easily be calculated theoretically for 100% hydrogen and can be used as a starting point for experimental investigations.
NGN's H21 project has focused on converting natural gas pipelines to 100% hydrogen via indirect purging which involves purging the air out with inert nitrogen first before commissioning with hydrogen. This avoids the potential to form a flammable mixture in the pipe as inert nitrogen is used as a buffer. However a minimum purge velocity is still required for the commissioning procedure to ensure efficiency and no pockets of nitrogen are left within the pipeline that could reach customers appliances.
This report provides the results of 32 set of tests which investigate stratification and the extent of mixing zones formed during the purge of the gases in pipe in relation to the purge speed. The programme is concerned with determining the minimum speed for successful purge in light of difficulties in satisfying Froude and Reynolds number criteria traditionally used as a basis for ensuring that stratified mixtures do not result and failed purges do not occur.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The process of converting the existing UK gas infrastructure involves primarily purging operations. Therefore there is a requirement to understand in more detail how hydrogen affects the requirements to conduct a safe and efficient purge.
The increased buoyancy forces associated with hydrogen is expected to increase the minimum purge velocity required to avoid stratification. This can easily be calculated theoretically for 100% hydrogen and can be used as a starting point for experimental investigations.
NGN's H21 project has focused on converting natural gas pipelines to 100% hydrogen via indirect purging which involves purging the air out with inert nitrogen first before commissioning with hydrogen. This avoids the potential to form a flammable mixture in the pipe as inert nitrogen is used as a buffer. However a minimum purge velocity is still required for the commissioning procedure to ensure efficiency and no pockets of nitrogen are left within the pipeline that could reach customers appliances.
This report provides the results of 32 set of tests which investigate stratification and the extent of mixing zones formed during the purge of the gases in pipe in relation to the purge speed. The programme is concerned with determining the minimum speed for successful purge in light of difficulties in satisfying Froude and Reynolds number criteria traditionally used as a basis for ensuring that stratified mixtures do not result and failed purges do not occur.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
EUSE Hydrogen Domestic Pipework Conversion – Final Report
Mar 2026
Publication
Greater assurance regarding the integrity of current domestic gas installation pipework is sought to enable its repurposing to hydrogen. This project needs to be viewed in the context of current leaks from natural gas (NG) of sufficient magnitude to create a fire explosion or injury incident. Gas systems do leak and roughly 400000 publicly reportable escapes (PRE’s) are made each year from 24 million connections. This represents a risk per property of about one PRE every 60 years. The overwhelming majority of these leaks are extremely small and probably better described as weeps.
Odorised gas (as distributed through the low-pressure gas network) can be smelt at about 1000ppm gas in air concentration [1] which is about 2.5% of the published lower flammable limit (LFL) of hydrogen (4% gas in air concentration). This roughly equates to a leak of 10 l/h (0.01 m3/h) in a 25 m3 room. The amount of gas from such a leak is small but still large compared to the leak detectable by a standard IGEM/UP/1/B Edition 3 20 mbarg tightness test which can detect a leak greater than about 0.2 l/h (0.0002 m3/h) [2] for a typical natural gas domestic installation.
Spontaneous leaks (rather than weeps) in domestic and small commercial gas systems are extremely rare. The pressure within these systems (nearly always ca. 20 mbarg) is sufficiently low that it does not cause impromptu pipework failure. The pipes used in these systems do not corrode from the inside and even with external corrosion the nature of this effectively results in a small leak (initially a weep) which only grows slowly with time.
During the period from 2016 to 2022 there was an average of 25 domestic gas incidents a year that were attributed to meters meter outlet pipes (effectively the gas carcass) or appliances but of these only about 0.4 to 1.5 injury incidents arose from spontaneous failure of internal pipework. Therefore risk exposure from the internal pipework itself is very much at the lower end of the ‘Broadly Acceptable’ range defined by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and so existing controls under natural gas service should be deemed adequate.
Provided appropriate precautions are taken during the conversion of each property from natural gas to hydrogen it is expected that the risk exposure will remain Broadly Acceptable.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Odorised gas (as distributed through the low-pressure gas network) can be smelt at about 1000ppm gas in air concentration [1] which is about 2.5% of the published lower flammable limit (LFL) of hydrogen (4% gas in air concentration). This roughly equates to a leak of 10 l/h (0.01 m3/h) in a 25 m3 room. The amount of gas from such a leak is small but still large compared to the leak detectable by a standard IGEM/UP/1/B Edition 3 20 mbarg tightness test which can detect a leak greater than about 0.2 l/h (0.0002 m3/h) [2] for a typical natural gas domestic installation.
Spontaneous leaks (rather than weeps) in domestic and small commercial gas systems are extremely rare. The pressure within these systems (nearly always ca. 20 mbarg) is sufficiently low that it does not cause impromptu pipework failure. The pipes used in these systems do not corrode from the inside and even with external corrosion the nature of this effectively results in a small leak (initially a weep) which only grows slowly with time.
During the period from 2016 to 2022 there was an average of 25 domestic gas incidents a year that were attributed to meters meter outlet pipes (effectively the gas carcass) or appliances but of these only about 0.4 to 1.5 injury incidents arose from spontaneous failure of internal pipework. Therefore risk exposure from the internal pipework itself is very much at the lower end of the ‘Broadly Acceptable’ range defined by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and so existing controls under natural gas service should be deemed adequate.
Provided appropriate precautions are taken during the conversion of each property from natural gas to hydrogen it is expected that the risk exposure will remain Broadly Acceptable.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
National Hydrogen Safety Assessment
Mar 2026
Publication
Hydrogen is being proposed as a suitable low carbon alternative to natural gas. It has the potential to reduce green-house gas emissions across Great Britain’s industrial landscape but also for heating buildings. The Department of Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) statistics show domestic heating currently accounts for 37% of the country’s CO2 emissions.
Hydrogen and natural gas are very similar when compared with other fuel sources. They are both gaseous at distribution operating pressures they can both be burned to release energy and they are both non-corrosives. This means that a piped distribution system and combustion appliances can be used to exploit their captured energy. They also differ from one another in that hydrogen has a broader range of flammability and lower ignition energy but is also much more buoyant and has higher diffusivity. Hydrogen does not have the potential to produce carbon monoxide when burnt the Health & Safety Executive’s (HSEs) incident statistics suggest that by 2032 there will still be 1.5 fatalities per year attributed to carbon monoxide poisoning as a direct result of using methane based natural gas for heating and cooking.
A Clean Heat Policy Decision from the Government is due in 2025. Ahead of this DESNZ has commissioned the Health and Safety Executive to carry out a Comprehensive Formal Assessment (CFA) of all safety and technical evidence on hydrogen due in mid-2025. The National Hydrogen Safety Assessment (NHSA) is being submitted to HSE along with other evidence for assessment as part of the CFA.
The purpose of the NHSA is to describe the minimum general arrangements that will be required to demonstrate that a network and its connected properties can be converted to hydrogen and be operated safely with risks appropriately managed for those working on the system or whose safety may be impacted including the general public (section 3). The NHSA applies to the transmission distribution and end use of hydrogen but does not include production or storage. At this time no specific parts of a network are planned for conversion and the NHSA therefore sets out the general approach to be taken for conversion and operation rather than detailed plans.
Subject to a successful policy decision on hydrogen for heating supported by HSE’s Comprehensive Formal Assessment of safety evidence the approach will be to develop detailed plans and safety cases to allow progression to delivering hydrogen conversion. The differences between natural gas and hydrogen mean that to transition from one gas to the other with the intention of utilising the same piped distribution system and end-utilisation requires due diligence assessment and where necessary updates to the system both to the assets themselves or the way they are operated.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Hydrogen and natural gas are very similar when compared with other fuel sources. They are both gaseous at distribution operating pressures they can both be burned to release energy and they are both non-corrosives. This means that a piped distribution system and combustion appliances can be used to exploit their captured energy. They also differ from one another in that hydrogen has a broader range of flammability and lower ignition energy but is also much more buoyant and has higher diffusivity. Hydrogen does not have the potential to produce carbon monoxide when burnt the Health & Safety Executive’s (HSEs) incident statistics suggest that by 2032 there will still be 1.5 fatalities per year attributed to carbon monoxide poisoning as a direct result of using methane based natural gas for heating and cooking.
A Clean Heat Policy Decision from the Government is due in 2025. Ahead of this DESNZ has commissioned the Health and Safety Executive to carry out a Comprehensive Formal Assessment (CFA) of all safety and technical evidence on hydrogen due in mid-2025. The National Hydrogen Safety Assessment (NHSA) is being submitted to HSE along with other evidence for assessment as part of the CFA.
The purpose of the NHSA is to describe the minimum general arrangements that will be required to demonstrate that a network and its connected properties can be converted to hydrogen and be operated safely with risks appropriately managed for those working on the system or whose safety may be impacted including the general public (section 3). The NHSA applies to the transmission distribution and end use of hydrogen but does not include production or storage. At this time no specific parts of a network are planned for conversion and the NHSA therefore sets out the general approach to be taken for conversion and operation rather than detailed plans.
Subject to a successful policy decision on hydrogen for heating supported by HSE’s Comprehensive Formal Assessment of safety evidence the approach will be to develop detailed plans and safety cases to allow progression to delivering hydrogen conversion. The differences between natural gas and hydrogen mean that to transition from one gas to the other with the intention of utilising the same piped distribution system and end-utilisation requires due diligence assessment and where necessary updates to the system both to the assets themselves or the way they are operated.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Dispersion of Helium Releases in Domestic Properties
Mar 2026
Publication
The UK’s pathway to net zero is likely to include the use of hydrogen in place of natural gas within the gas network. From the perspective of domestic end users of gas if a conversion is to take place then the behaviour of hydrogen after an escape within a property needs to be fully understood. Several studies have been carried out in recent years to understand the dispersion characteristics of hydrogen in the event of an internal escape within a building. From a domestic perspective this has always taken place in laboratory settings or purpose-built test houses which are probably not entirely reflective of UK housing stock. This work pulls together previous work on domestic ventilation and gas dispersion analysis to provide further evidence to show how a significantly lighter than air gas will move around a range of real domestic properties in the event of an internal gas escape. Reference is then made to work carried out on the consequences of ignition of hydrogen to show how the use of risk mitigation measures such as ventilation and hydrogen detectors can be used to support early conversion projects.
The outputs of previous research into the use of hydrogen in domestic properties suggested several recommendations on a hydrogen conversion. These recommendations included the following measures:
• Integrity assurance of pipework and gas appliances i.e. ensuring that the gas system within the property is leak-tight and all appliances are fitted with appropriate safety devices.
• Odourisation this will continue to occur to the same concentration (ca. 6 mg/m3).
• Excess Flow Valves (EFVs) to stop the gas flow in the event of a large leak.
• Appropriate ventilation and additional ventilation in small spaces such as cupboards.
• Gas detection in the form of an alarm or alarms with a 1000 ppm set point located in appropriate and central locations to alert the householder if a gas leak occurs.
To solidify these recommendations this experimental programme was carried out to investigate the propagation of a buoyant gas in a variety of as lived in houses under a range of leak scenarios. As such the work focussed on reducing the risk/protecting individuals in situations where a leak has already occurred via the optimal application of ventilation and gas detection.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The outputs of previous research into the use of hydrogen in domestic properties suggested several recommendations on a hydrogen conversion. These recommendations included the following measures:
• Integrity assurance of pipework and gas appliances i.e. ensuring that the gas system within the property is leak-tight and all appliances are fitted with appropriate safety devices.
• Odourisation this will continue to occur to the same concentration (ca. 6 mg/m3).
• Excess Flow Valves (EFVs) to stop the gas flow in the event of a large leak.
• Appropriate ventilation and additional ventilation in small spaces such as cupboards.
• Gas detection in the form of an alarm or alarms with a 1000 ppm set point located in appropriate and central locations to alert the householder if a gas leak occurs.
To solidify these recommendations this experimental programme was carried out to investigate the propagation of a buoyant gas in a variety of as lived in houses under a range of leak scenarios. As such the work focussed on reducing the risk/protecting individuals in situations where a leak has already occurred via the optimal application of ventilation and gas detection.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Hydrogen Conversion Strategy-Pipework – Literature Review and Interim Report
Mar 2026
Publication
The purpose of this study is to consider identify and mitigate risks associated with a conversion (repurposing) of a natural gas (NG) installation to a 100% hydrogen (H2) installation within the current UK gas network. The scope of this project focuses on domestic gas installations downstream of the ECV to the appliance inlet.
The report analyses accident and leak data to explore the types of leak that occur in current NG domestic pipework. The differences in the physical properties of hydrogen and methane are tabulated and the differing behaviour of hydrogen and methane leaks is analysed.
This report concentrates on spontaneous leaks in the gap between small and the large which will trip the EFV. The dispersion of gas from the different types of leak and available ventilation models are discussed in detail.
British Standard and IGEM guidance documents are discussed in detail along with previous studies of hydrogen and NG leak behaviour.
The review recommends modifications to the original project work programme. In particular WP3 will be modified to examine methods of testing internal pipework to ensure that it is suitable for repurposing to hydrogen. This is an essential output from this project. This will include consideration of a range of options:
• Visual inspection of visible pipework
• Low pressure tightness testing
• Higher pressure strength testing
• Novel techniques such as thermal imaging or visual inspection using borescopes
• The use of other gases (helium) to check pipework soundness.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The report analyses accident and leak data to explore the types of leak that occur in current NG domestic pipework. The differences in the physical properties of hydrogen and methane are tabulated and the differing behaviour of hydrogen and methane leaks is analysed.
This report concentrates on spontaneous leaks in the gap between small and the large which will trip the EFV. The dispersion of gas from the different types of leak and available ventilation models are discussed in detail.
British Standard and IGEM guidance documents are discussed in detail along with previous studies of hydrogen and NG leak behaviour.
The review recommends modifications to the original project work programme. In particular WP3 will be modified to examine methods of testing internal pipework to ensure that it is suitable for repurposing to hydrogen. This is an essential output from this project. This will include consideration of a range of options:
• Visual inspection of visible pipework
• Low pressure tightness testing
• Higher pressure strength testing
• Novel techniques such as thermal imaging or visual inspection using borescopes
• The use of other gases (helium) to check pipework soundness.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Use of Automatic Isolation Valve (AIV) Systems with Hydrogen, Final Report
Mar 2026
Publication
Kiwa,
Steer Energy and
Cadent
Automatic Isolation Valve (AIV) systems are common gas safety systems based around a powered isolation valve a control system and some form of measurement input that is often a gas detector or proving system. AIVs are a standard safety system already found in some commercial and industrial Natural Gas installations.
This project investigates their suitability for small commercial installations using hydrogen with a focus on the UK village trial sites. The project scope included a review of commercial installations in the two hydrogen village trial sites in Whitby and Redcar and assessed the potential benefits of using AIVs as a risk mitigation method in those sites.
A small number of AIV systems were found during the site surveys and the project considers the benefits of adding additional systems to improve installation safety with the hydrogen trials. The project scope also included an investigation of AIV systems suited for hydrogen and three such units were to be specified and tested.
The initial focus of the project was to assess the performance of AIVs with hydrogen. However it was later realised that the key to this assessment was the correct placement of detectors which required an understanding of how hydrogen moves and disperses compared to Natural Gas. The project was therefore refocused to include experimental studies using methane as a substitute for hydrogen and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) studies to model the movement and dispersion of hydrogen.
This report summarises the output of the project; additional details on individual elements of work are provided in the appendices. Appendix A gives details of the risk assessment methodology of the project. Appendix B comprises the interim project report and baseline project review. Appendix C has the full experimental programme of work. Appendix D covers the scenario modelling and village trial site visits. Appendices E and F provide manufacturer guidance on detector placement. Appendix G gives the reports on the CFD study.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
This project investigates their suitability for small commercial installations using hydrogen with a focus on the UK village trial sites. The project scope included a review of commercial installations in the two hydrogen village trial sites in Whitby and Redcar and assessed the potential benefits of using AIVs as a risk mitigation method in those sites.
A small number of AIV systems were found during the site surveys and the project considers the benefits of adding additional systems to improve installation safety with the hydrogen trials. The project scope also included an investigation of AIV systems suited for hydrogen and three such units were to be specified and tested.
The initial focus of the project was to assess the performance of AIVs with hydrogen. However it was later realised that the key to this assessment was the correct placement of detectors which required an understanding of how hydrogen moves and disperses compared to Natural Gas. The project was therefore refocused to include experimental studies using methane as a substitute for hydrogen and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) studies to model the movement and dispersion of hydrogen.
This report summarises the output of the project; additional details on individual elements of work are provided in the appendices. Appendix A gives details of the risk assessment methodology of the project. Appendix B comprises the interim project report and baseline project review. Appendix C has the full experimental programme of work. Appendix D covers the scenario modelling and village trial site visits. Appendices E and F provide manufacturer guidance on detector placement. Appendix G gives the reports on the CFD study.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Hydrogen Risk Mitigations – GDN risk mitigations selection proposal
Mar 2026
Publication
Hydrogen is being proposed as a suitable low carbon alternative to natural gas. It has the potential to reduce green-house gas emissions across Great Britain’s industrial landscape but also for heating buildings. The Department of Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) statistics show domestic heating currently accounts for 37% of the country’s CO2 emissions. Hydrogen also helps reduce fatalities associated with carbon monoxide. Discussions with the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) on incident statistics suggest that by 2032 there will still be 1.5 fatalities per year attributed to carbon monoxide poisoning as a direct result of using methane based natural gas for heating and cooking.
Hydrogen and natural gas are very similar when compared with other fuel sources. They are both gaseous at distribution operating pressures they can both be burned to release energy and they are both non-corrosives. This means that a piped distribution system and combustion appliances can be used to exploit their captured energy. They also differ from one another in that hydrogen has a broader range of flammability and lower ignition energy but is also much more buoyant and has higher diffusivity than natural gas; hydrogen also releases no carbon when burnt. The differences mean that to transition from one gas to the other with the intention of utilising the same piped distribution system and end-utilisation requires due diligence assessment and where necessary updates to the system – be that to the assets themselves or the way they are operated.
A strategic Government decision on the role of hydrogen in decarbonising heat is due in 2025. Ahead of this DESNZ has commissioned the Health and Safety Executive to carry out a Comprehensive Formal Assessment (CFA) of all safety and technical evidence on hydrogen due in mid-2025. The deadline to have all evidence to be assessed with the HSE is September 2024 (albeit work will continue after this date but not be part of the CFA). One of the safety demonstration requirements is an assessment of the change in risk posed by a transition to hydrogen. Whilst other projects focus on the risks related to transmission assets the emphasis of this piece of work has been on below 7 bar distribution assets and its end-users excluding industrial users and storage who would require bespoke risk assessments for their processes.
Several projects have been undertaken or contributed to hydrogen distribution and end-use risk assessments. DESNZ’s Hy4Heat Programme included a safety assessment in 2021. NGN’s H21 project and concurrent development of the Hydrogen Village Trial submissions helped progress the risk assessments in 2022 and 2023. They included the development of quantitative risk assessments (QRA) being carried out using the DNV modelling tool CONIFER which was developed specifically to differentiate between natural gas and hydrogen distribution systems.
Recognising the influx of additional safety and technical evidence throughout 2023 and 2024 leading up to the CFA deadline of September 2024 a final risk assessment was commissioned to cover all of Great Britain. It is the most thorough risk assessment the gas industry has ever carried out. All the Gas Distribution Networks (GDNs) and some of the Independent Gas Transporters (IGTs) have contributed to the study.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Hydrogen and natural gas are very similar when compared with other fuel sources. They are both gaseous at distribution operating pressures they can both be burned to release energy and they are both non-corrosives. This means that a piped distribution system and combustion appliances can be used to exploit their captured energy. They also differ from one another in that hydrogen has a broader range of flammability and lower ignition energy but is also much more buoyant and has higher diffusivity than natural gas; hydrogen also releases no carbon when burnt. The differences mean that to transition from one gas to the other with the intention of utilising the same piped distribution system and end-utilisation requires due diligence assessment and where necessary updates to the system – be that to the assets themselves or the way they are operated.
A strategic Government decision on the role of hydrogen in decarbonising heat is due in 2025. Ahead of this DESNZ has commissioned the Health and Safety Executive to carry out a Comprehensive Formal Assessment (CFA) of all safety and technical evidence on hydrogen due in mid-2025. The deadline to have all evidence to be assessed with the HSE is September 2024 (albeit work will continue after this date but not be part of the CFA). One of the safety demonstration requirements is an assessment of the change in risk posed by a transition to hydrogen. Whilst other projects focus on the risks related to transmission assets the emphasis of this piece of work has been on below 7 bar distribution assets and its end-users excluding industrial users and storage who would require bespoke risk assessments for their processes.
Several projects have been undertaken or contributed to hydrogen distribution and end-use risk assessments. DESNZ’s Hy4Heat Programme included a safety assessment in 2021. NGN’s H21 project and concurrent development of the Hydrogen Village Trial submissions helped progress the risk assessments in 2022 and 2023. They included the development of quantitative risk assessments (QRA) being carried out using the DNV modelling tool CONIFER which was developed specifically to differentiate between natural gas and hydrogen distribution systems.
Recognising the influx of additional safety and technical evidence throughout 2023 and 2024 leading up to the CFA deadline of September 2024 a final risk assessment was commissioned to cover all of Great Britain. It is the most thorough risk assessment the gas industry has ever carried out. All the Gas Distribution Networks (GDNs) and some of the Independent Gas Transporters (IGTs) have contributed to the study.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
380 Air Ingress in Isolated Installations, Interim Report
Mar 2026
Publication
The precursor to this project was an event leading to a damaged meter at the in January 2024 after the installation had been isolated for 27 days over the holiday period. The incident required two key events: an air/fuel mixture within the flammable range for hydrogen in the installation pipework and an ignition of that air/fuel mixture. The consequence of this was an overpressure in the system leading to damage occurring in the gas meter.
The initial investigations into the event suggested that there may be a mechanism allowing air ingress to occur in an isolated gas installation. The ignition itself was suspected to have been caused by an attempt to light the hydrogen fire with subsequent flashback into the installation.
This report details work carried out to date by Steer Energy supported by Enertek to investigate air ingress mechanisms in gas installations. The project is split into two overall work programmes:
• a detailed experimentally led study of the air ingress phenomenon to identify and understand gas exchange mechanisms in an isolated system leading to the creation of a flammable mixture in an installation.
• an investigation into the potential for ignition of a flammable mixture in an installation by an appliance or component in that system.
Both programmes will then conclude with mitigating measures for each event providing assurance for safe operation of hydrogen in gas installations during roll out.
This interim report provides details of the work carried out to date on the project. The work is not completed however good progress has been made in understanding the causes of both events described above.
Over 100 individual tests have been carried out air ingress has been demonstrated and a good understanding of the mechanisms has been gained. The effects have been seen with hydrogen heliumand methane. Key observations are:
• no air ingress has been seen while pressure remains above ambient.
• no air ingress has been seen when systems are connected to an upstream gas supply.
We can therefore conclude that air ingress does not occur whilst positive pressure is maintained in a gas installation and this can be achieved by maintaining the upstream supply.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The initial investigations into the event suggested that there may be a mechanism allowing air ingress to occur in an isolated gas installation. The ignition itself was suspected to have been caused by an attempt to light the hydrogen fire with subsequent flashback into the installation.
This report details work carried out to date by Steer Energy supported by Enertek to investigate air ingress mechanisms in gas installations. The project is split into two overall work programmes:
• a detailed experimentally led study of the air ingress phenomenon to identify and understand gas exchange mechanisms in an isolated system leading to the creation of a flammable mixture in an installation.
• an investigation into the potential for ignition of a flammable mixture in an installation by an appliance or component in that system.
Both programmes will then conclude with mitigating measures for each event providing assurance for safe operation of hydrogen in gas installations during roll out.
This interim report provides details of the work carried out to date on the project. The work is not completed however good progress has been made in understanding the causes of both events described above.
Over 100 individual tests have been carried out air ingress has been demonstrated and a good understanding of the mechanisms has been gained. The effects have been seen with hydrogen heliumand methane. Key observations are:
• no air ingress has been seen while pressure remains above ambient.
• no air ingress has been seen when systems are connected to an upstream gas supply.
We can therefore conclude that air ingress does not occur whilst positive pressure is maintained in a gas installation and this can be achieved by maintaining the upstream supply.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Air/Oxygen Ingress in Domestic Gas Installations, Phase 1 Summary Paper
Mar 2026
Publication
Air ingress is not a new phenomenon that is exclusive to hydrogen - it already occurs in natural gas installations today (but has not previously been recorded as a challenge). Subsequent ignition events are highly unlikely requiring a very specific combination of actions and conditions to occur. However the likelihood and potential consequences of an ignition event occurring are greater with hydrogen systems (if unmitigated) compared to natural gas. Therefore additional safeguards are recommended for hydrogen systems to appropriately manage these risks. This work has concluded that theoretically any ignition events in hydrogen installations in the future should be prevented by requiring additional assurances within the formal testing and certification process of hydrogen appliances. However as good-practice extra layers of protection are also being recommended as precautionary measures - to inhibit the mechanisms of air ingress and to minimise the consequences of any (now unforeseeable) flash-back events respectively. Air ingress can be successfully mitigated in the short-term using existing technology and methods. Opportunities exist for significant improvements on mitigation measures in the future by deploying evolving technologies and ‘smart’ systems.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Kiwa Energy Domestic Ventilation Report
Mar 2026
Publication
The report provides an evaluation of the effect of the levels of ventilation on hydrogen concentrations that could result from leaks.
A mathematical model has been developed using data collected from air tightness testing of real properties to simulate maximum gas in air concentrations achieved within a domestic property following a leak of hydrogen. The model is based on well-established theories in fluid dynamics and has been validated (by the model developers) by comparison with real experimental data gained from the Hy4Heat H100 and HyHouse programmes of work. A comprehensive range of scenarios have been modelled to assess leaks of varying severity under a range of ventilation regimes. Modelled hydrogen leak rates range from 0.02 m3/h to 51.7 m3/h and levels of property air permeability range from 4.2 to 24.7 m3/h/m2 @ 50 Pa by convention 0.21 to 1.24 Air Changes per hour (ACH).
As expected spaces with greater ventilation are predicted by the model to result in lower maximum gas in air concentrations and adding vents (internal and / or external) is effective at reducing concentrations within a room.
A general finding from air permeability tests of dwellings was kitchens and hallways within properties were less airtight than living rooms. This implies greater ventilation to/from these spaces. Consideration has been given in this work to the co-use of audible alarms where they are most likely to alert the occupiers. If pipework and appliances are in rooms connected to a central space typically a hallway an alarm (with integral detector) located at the highest point of that space should detect hydrogen from a leak in the connected rooms. In general this is the most likely location to form the audible alarm to be heard in the various rooms in a dwelling. However there will be cases where appliances and pipework are not in a room connected to a central location or where a large build-up of gas may occur (e.g. due to high ceilings relative to door height) before tracking to a central location. Adding internal high-level vents to facilitate tracking to the alarm location should aid timely detection of a leak in these cases. An alternative could be to install more alarm units which may be more practical and preferred.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
A mathematical model has been developed using data collected from air tightness testing of real properties to simulate maximum gas in air concentrations achieved within a domestic property following a leak of hydrogen. The model is based on well-established theories in fluid dynamics and has been validated (by the model developers) by comparison with real experimental data gained from the Hy4Heat H100 and HyHouse programmes of work. A comprehensive range of scenarios have been modelled to assess leaks of varying severity under a range of ventilation regimes. Modelled hydrogen leak rates range from 0.02 m3/h to 51.7 m3/h and levels of property air permeability range from 4.2 to 24.7 m3/h/m2 @ 50 Pa by convention 0.21 to 1.24 Air Changes per hour (ACH).
As expected spaces with greater ventilation are predicted by the model to result in lower maximum gas in air concentrations and adding vents (internal and / or external) is effective at reducing concentrations within a room.
A general finding from air permeability tests of dwellings was kitchens and hallways within properties were less airtight than living rooms. This implies greater ventilation to/from these spaces. Consideration has been given in this work to the co-use of audible alarms where they are most likely to alert the occupiers. If pipework and appliances are in rooms connected to a central space typically a hallway an alarm (with integral detector) located at the highest point of that space should detect hydrogen from a leak in the connected rooms. In general this is the most likely location to form the audible alarm to be heard in the various rooms in a dwelling. However there will be cases where appliances and pipework are not in a room connected to a central location or where a large build-up of gas may occur (e.g. due to high ceilings relative to door height) before tracking to a central location. Adding internal high-level vents to facilitate tracking to the alarm location should aid timely detection of a leak in these cases. An alternative could be to install more alarm units which may be more practical and preferred.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Hydrogen in Multi-occupancy Buildings Feasibility Study - Final Report
Mar 2026
Publication
There is a requirement for gas distribution network (GDN) operators to understand the cost safety and practicality of converting network pipelines from Natural Gas to Hydrogen in multi-occupancy buildings (MOBs). Previous work undertaken during project ‘MOBs Work Pack 2 Asset Information Review’ considered the requirements for converting MOBs to Hydrogen and identified gaps in technical evidence. SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to address the evidence gaps identified.
This report summarises the work which has been undertaken as part of Work Pack 3 – QRA and Testing. This includes the development of Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) for Hydrogen MOBs conversion and an overall impact review of the conversion of MOBs.
Work Pack 3 included the development of a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for Hydrogen MOBs conversion which should:
• Easily integrate with wider network QRAs (e.g. GB QRA) to help complete understanding of safety across the entire system
• Take account of the network and end user parts of the system in the building
• Provide a record of underlying evidential basis or where this is lacking the justified assumptions or simplifications made in reviewing existing evidential basis (e.g. can it be assumed that occupants will react to a Hydrogen leak in the same way as Natural Gas?)
• Provide a quantified assessment of risk either in the form of:
o Absolute risk
o Comparative risk
o ALARP (“as low as reasonably practicable”)
• Obtain agreement from HSE on conclusions of QRA.
Work Pack 3 also included a review of the overall impact of conversion of MOBs considering:
• The cost and practicality of converting the MOB stock
• The safety of Hydrogen in MOBs vs alternatives
• This study could draw on feasibility type studies – i.e. feasibility review of the conversion of a limited number of real MOBs
• Overall recommendation for the suitability of Hydrogen versus alternatives with potential split between different categories of building
• Further recommendations for transition NIA to SIF project:
o Trials
o Further confirmatory evidential work
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
This report summarises the work which has been undertaken as part of Work Pack 3 – QRA and Testing. This includes the development of Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) for Hydrogen MOBs conversion and an overall impact review of the conversion of MOBs.
Work Pack 3 included the development of a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for Hydrogen MOBs conversion which should:
• Easily integrate with wider network QRAs (e.g. GB QRA) to help complete understanding of safety across the entire system
• Take account of the network and end user parts of the system in the building
• Provide a record of underlying evidential basis or where this is lacking the justified assumptions or simplifications made in reviewing existing evidential basis (e.g. can it be assumed that occupants will react to a Hydrogen leak in the same way as Natural Gas?)
• Provide a quantified assessment of risk either in the form of:
o Absolute risk
o Comparative risk
o ALARP (“as low as reasonably practicable”)
• Obtain agreement from HSE on conclusions of QRA.
Work Pack 3 also included a review of the overall impact of conversion of MOBs considering:
• The cost and practicality of converting the MOB stock
• The safety of Hydrogen in MOBs vs alternatives
• This study could draw on feasibility type studies – i.e. feasibility review of the conversion of a limited number of real MOBs
• Overall recommendation for the suitability of Hydrogen versus alternatives with potential split between different categories of building
• Further recommendations for transition NIA to SIF project:
o Trials
o Further confirmatory evidential work
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
SNG Safety Management Framework: Managament Procedure for Converting Natural Gas Installations in Multi-occupancy Buildings to Hydrogen
Mar 2026
Publication
This procedure details the process of how riser and lateral installations currently supplying Natural Gas to domestic accommodation within multi-occupancy buildings (MOBs) are selected and converted to Hydrogen or identified for decommissioning and the provision of an alternative option.
This procedure describes the requirements for conversion of existing Natural Gas installations in multi-occupancy buildings to Hydrogen operating at pressures not exceeding 75 mbar. For gas installations deemed unsuitable for conversion it provides guidance for decommissioning and alternative energy solutions. The gas supplied is assumed to be 100% Hydrogen as specified by IGEM/H/1 and therefore does not cover blends of Hydrogen and Natural Gas.
This procedure covers guidance for:
• The identification selection and commissioning of network risers and laterals installed in existing multi-storey buildings deemed suitable for repurposing to Hydrogen as they currently are.
• The requirements to identify buildings that are not suitable for repurposing in their current form and outlines the necessary replacement or partial replacement renovation alteration or repair of existing riser and lateral installations from the pipeline isolation valve (PIV) through to the supplier’s emergency control valve (ECV) to enable Hydrogen conversion.
Note: Where an existing Natural Gas installation is to be repurposed for Hydrogen it will have been subjected to a pre-conversion survey and risk assessment to ensure components are suitable for use or otherwise replaced.
• The identification isolation and decommissioning of network risers and laterals installed in existing multi-storey buildings not deemed suitable for conversion to Hydrogen.
• The provision of alternative arrangements in the form of an energy centre or an alternative option such as heat electrification heat pump or heat network.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
This procedure describes the requirements for conversion of existing Natural Gas installations in multi-occupancy buildings to Hydrogen operating at pressures not exceeding 75 mbar. For gas installations deemed unsuitable for conversion it provides guidance for decommissioning and alternative energy solutions. The gas supplied is assumed to be 100% Hydrogen as specified by IGEM/H/1 and therefore does not cover blends of Hydrogen and Natural Gas.
This procedure covers guidance for:
• The identification selection and commissioning of network risers and laterals installed in existing multi-storey buildings deemed suitable for repurposing to Hydrogen as they currently are.
• The requirements to identify buildings that are not suitable for repurposing in their current form and outlines the necessary replacement or partial replacement renovation alteration or repair of existing riser and lateral installations from the pipeline isolation valve (PIV) through to the supplier’s emergency control valve (ECV) to enable Hydrogen conversion.
Note: Where an existing Natural Gas installation is to be repurposed for Hydrogen it will have been subjected to a pre-conversion survey and risk assessment to ensure components are suitable for use or otherwise replaced.
• The identification isolation and decommissioning of network risers and laterals installed in existing multi-storey buildings not deemed suitable for conversion to Hydrogen.
• The provision of alternative arrangements in the form of an energy centre or an alternative option such as heat electrification heat pump or heat network.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Draft Standard for Converting Natural Gas Installations in Multi-occupancy Buildings to Hydrogen
Mar 2026
Publication
This supplement gives additional requirements and qualifications for the conversion of Natural Gas installations in multi-occupancy buildings to Hydrogen and is only to be used in conjunction with IGEM/G/5 Edition 3. This supplement outlines the principles required for the conversion of existing Natural Gas installations in multi-occupancy buildings to 100% Hydrogen. A conversion to Hydrogen should consider the following options:
a) Repurposing existing installations
b) Renovating existing installations; this may involve for example an internal lining being applied to the existing network pipelines.
c) Replacing existing network pipelines with either:
a. New network pipelines or
b. An energy centre.
If following a risk assessment and cost benefit assessment none of the above options are considered suitable the remaining option would be to:
d) Decommission the existing gas installation and install a suitable alternative decarbonisation option (electrification heat pump heat network etc.).
This supplement covers the principles required for the repurposing renovating and replacement of existing gas installations for Hydrogen service and the decommissioning of existing gas installations.
This supplement provides the principles required to identify buildings and gas installations that are not suitable for repurposing and outlines remedial work that may be required prior to repurposing.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
a) Repurposing existing installations
b) Renovating existing installations; this may involve for example an internal lining being applied to the existing network pipelines.
c) Replacing existing network pipelines with either:
a. New network pipelines or
b. An energy centre.
If following a risk assessment and cost benefit assessment none of the above options are considered suitable the remaining option would be to:
d) Decommission the existing gas installation and install a suitable alternative decarbonisation option (electrification heat pump heat network etc.).
This supplement covers the principles required for the repurposing renovating and replacement of existing gas installations for Hydrogen service and the decommissioning of existing gas installations.
This supplement provides the principles required to identify buildings and gas installations that are not suitable for repurposing and outlines remedial work that may be required prior to repurposing.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Inclusive Innovation: Safeguarding the Switch to Domestic Hydrogen
Mar 2026
Publication
The UK Government is exploring the possibility of switching some homes from natural gas to hydrogen to help the country reach net zero carbon emissions. Wales & West Utilities commissioned the Energy Systems Catapult to run a project to understand how to enable this transition to work well for vulnerable consumers if it is undertaken.
To do this the Energy Systems Catapult engaged with a series of industry experts and reviewed the available evidence. This helped to understand what a transition of domestic properties from natural gas to hydrogen is likely to entail for consumers and what steps should be considered to enable the transition to go well. Once the process was defined we then engaged with consumers in a variety of vulnerable situations to discuss any challenges the proposed process may present to them. In understanding these challenges the project then sought to further engage with both a range of experts and vulnerable consumers to co-create appropriate packages of support to preserve wellbeing during a transition to hydrogen.
The project was able to successfully map out the key consumer touch points during a transition and identify what demands could be placed on consumers. This enabled appropriate packages of support to be designed that should be considered when seeking to support affected residents during each of the following eventualities - that could occur during a transition to domestic hydrogen.
• Enabling a surveyor to access and conduct a survey at the property prior to the conversion
• What to do if an unsafe gas appliance is discovered during the property survey and must be disconnected until it can be repaired or replaced
• How best to capture important information about the personal circumstances of those who live in the home (e.g. health finances) to understand how best to support them during the conversion
• Occupant expectation if a gas appliance in the home is deemed incompatible with hydrogen so cannot be adapted and must be replaced
• What support is needed if an occupant does not have gas for cooking heating or hot water for a few days
• How best to navigate and safeguard residents if more complex works at required at the property e.g. upgrading the existing pipework
Many concerns were identified when discussing the different consumer touch points. These included issues with increased anxiety the impact of any disruption to important daily routines a range of potential cost implications for residents and the heightened risk of accident or injury due to a variety of impairments. For each consumer touch point three tiers of support were co-created in order to mitigate these issues. The lower tier being offered to everyone with the other tiers used for people with more specific needs. The support offered included the provision of temporary equipment help to access local community support involving 3rd parties to support consumers at certain points and in some instances the offer to take the occupant away from the property whilst the work is ongoing.
The project was further able to establish some of the challenges that may arise if seeking to deploy hydrogen on a larger scale across the UK as well as identifying several key factors that should be considered in parallel to the conversion to ensure it goes as smoothly as possible.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
To do this the Energy Systems Catapult engaged with a series of industry experts and reviewed the available evidence. This helped to understand what a transition of domestic properties from natural gas to hydrogen is likely to entail for consumers and what steps should be considered to enable the transition to go well. Once the process was defined we then engaged with consumers in a variety of vulnerable situations to discuss any challenges the proposed process may present to them. In understanding these challenges the project then sought to further engage with both a range of experts and vulnerable consumers to co-create appropriate packages of support to preserve wellbeing during a transition to hydrogen.
The project was able to successfully map out the key consumer touch points during a transition and identify what demands could be placed on consumers. This enabled appropriate packages of support to be designed that should be considered when seeking to support affected residents during each of the following eventualities - that could occur during a transition to domestic hydrogen.
• Enabling a surveyor to access and conduct a survey at the property prior to the conversion
• What to do if an unsafe gas appliance is discovered during the property survey and must be disconnected until it can be repaired or replaced
• How best to capture important information about the personal circumstances of those who live in the home (e.g. health finances) to understand how best to support them during the conversion
• Occupant expectation if a gas appliance in the home is deemed incompatible with hydrogen so cannot be adapted and must be replaced
• What support is needed if an occupant does not have gas for cooking heating or hot water for a few days
• How best to navigate and safeguard residents if more complex works at required at the property e.g. upgrading the existing pipework
Many concerns were identified when discussing the different consumer touch points. These included issues with increased anxiety the impact of any disruption to important daily routines a range of potential cost implications for residents and the heightened risk of accident or injury due to a variety of impairments. For each consumer touch point three tiers of support were co-created in order to mitigate these issues. The lower tier being offered to everyone with the other tiers used for people with more specific needs. The support offered included the provision of temporary equipment help to access local community support involving 3rd parties to support consumers at certain points and in some instances the offer to take the occupant away from the property whilst the work is ongoing.
The project was further able to establish some of the challenges that may arise if seeking to deploy hydrogen on a larger scale across the UK as well as identifying several key factors that should be considered in parallel to the conversion to ensure it goes as smoothly as possible.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Kiwa Energy Hazardous Areas Report
Mar 2026
Publication
As part of the UK’s transition towards net zero carbon emissions by 2050 the possibility of using hydrogen to replace natural gas for heating domestic and small commercial properties is being investigated. One of the areas that needs to be considered is whether the conversion to hydrogen would bring about new issues regarding hazardous areas.
This report presents the results of a literature review which looks at the existing natural gas standards and hazardous area procedures. A comparison is then made to relevant work considering hydrogen including review of the IGEM SR/25 Hydrogen Supplement published by the HSE. Discussion and recommendations are made as to whether existing industry guidance continues to be suitable if the gas being used is hydrogen and not natural gas.
The focus of this work is on domestic and small commercial installations (e.g. single units with simple boiler and hot water installations) operating at gas pressures below 25 mbarg. It is important to note however that most available guidance and standards are for larger commercial environments. Although these are not directly applicable to domestic installations they have been considered as a reference point particularly for estimation of potential leak sizes.
Zoning of hazardous areas is not applicable in a domestic setting. However separation distances between electrical and gas installations within a domestic property are advised within BS 6891. Should a property be converted to hydrogen no changes are recommended to these distances. This is because in a low-pressure domestic situation fires do occasionally occur with copper pipe rubbing on electric cables but as both natural gas and hydrogen will ignite immediately the risk from the leak is essentially independent of the gas being carried. On many (probably most) occasions causing secondary fires. It is also advised that pliable meter connections should be wrapped to reduce the risk of fire from accidental electrical contact and this will be included within PAS4441.
Any workplace (including the small commercial properties discussed within) that has a natural gasinstallation and where explosive atmospheres may occur is required under DSEAR to classify hazardous andnon-hazardous areas within the facility. IGEM SR/25 and UP/16 are available to aid installers to complete hazardous area classification and design safe gas installations. It is recommended that UP/16 should be updated for hydrogen and this is currently underway (April 2023).
From experimental findings at low gas pressures it has been shown that the flammable zone for hydrogen in a vertical direction is 130% that of natural gas. However the values proposed within the SR/25 hydrogen supplement give flammable zones that are between 200% and 350% greater at low pressure. It may be that these are driven by an assumption that general deflagration can occur at the hydrogen published lower explosive limit (LEL) of 4%. In practice such deflagration does not occur below about 6% and does not propagate downwards until 8%. The implications of the move from wind driven ventilation (for natural gas) to buoyancy driven ventilation (for hydrogen) also needs thoroughly exploring. It could be argued (for low and medium pressure releases) that the ‘motive force’ provided by the low density of hydrogen is more reliable at clearing hydrogen concentrations than the wind-driven ventilation used for natural gas. In terms of general compliance with DSEAR acknowledgement should be made that Hy4Heat recommends the use of hydrogen detection and AIV’s in properties with a demand in excess of 20m3/h.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
This report presents the results of a literature review which looks at the existing natural gas standards and hazardous area procedures. A comparison is then made to relevant work considering hydrogen including review of the IGEM SR/25 Hydrogen Supplement published by the HSE. Discussion and recommendations are made as to whether existing industry guidance continues to be suitable if the gas being used is hydrogen and not natural gas.
The focus of this work is on domestic and small commercial installations (e.g. single units with simple boiler and hot water installations) operating at gas pressures below 25 mbarg. It is important to note however that most available guidance and standards are for larger commercial environments. Although these are not directly applicable to domestic installations they have been considered as a reference point particularly for estimation of potential leak sizes.
Zoning of hazardous areas is not applicable in a domestic setting. However separation distances between electrical and gas installations within a domestic property are advised within BS 6891. Should a property be converted to hydrogen no changes are recommended to these distances. This is because in a low-pressure domestic situation fires do occasionally occur with copper pipe rubbing on electric cables but as both natural gas and hydrogen will ignite immediately the risk from the leak is essentially independent of the gas being carried. On many (probably most) occasions causing secondary fires. It is also advised that pliable meter connections should be wrapped to reduce the risk of fire from accidental electrical contact and this will be included within PAS4441.
Any workplace (including the small commercial properties discussed within) that has a natural gasinstallation and where explosive atmospheres may occur is required under DSEAR to classify hazardous andnon-hazardous areas within the facility. IGEM SR/25 and UP/16 are available to aid installers to complete hazardous area classification and design safe gas installations. It is recommended that UP/16 should be updated for hydrogen and this is currently underway (April 2023).
From experimental findings at low gas pressures it has been shown that the flammable zone for hydrogen in a vertical direction is 130% that of natural gas. However the values proposed within the SR/25 hydrogen supplement give flammable zones that are between 200% and 350% greater at low pressure. It may be that these are driven by an assumption that general deflagration can occur at the hydrogen published lower explosive limit (LEL) of 4%. In practice such deflagration does not occur below about 6% and does not propagate downwards until 8%. The implications of the move from wind driven ventilation (for natural gas) to buoyancy driven ventilation (for hydrogen) also needs thoroughly exploring. It could be argued (for low and medium pressure releases) that the ‘motive force’ provided by the low density of hydrogen is more reliable at clearing hydrogen concentrations than the wind-driven ventilation used for natural gas. In terms of general compliance with DSEAR acknowledgement should be made that Hy4Heat recommends the use of hydrogen detection and AIV’s in properties with a demand in excess of 20m3/h.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
MOBs Phase 3: Task 10 - Pressure Testing
Mar 2026
Publication
There is a requirement for gas distribution network (GDN) operators to understand the cost safety and practicality of converting network pipelines from Natural Gas to Hydrogen in multi-occupancy buildings (MOBs). Previous work undertaken during project ‘MOBs Work Pack 2 Asset Information Review’ considered the requirements for pressure testing commissioning and decommissioning of MOBs following a conversion to Hydrogen and identified the following gap in technical evidence.
A desktop study and testing are required to confirm the applicability of test pressures test criteria and purge velocity with hydrogen to MOBs and the suitability of existing equipment for purging operation in MOBs. SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to understand the steps needed to convert MOBS to Hydrogen including any testing required to address any evidence gaps.
This report focuses on the pressure testing requirements associated with the conversion of MOBs from Natural Gas to Hydrogen. The purging aspects of evidence gap are being addressed by Steer Energy as part of a separate task. It was proposed that ROSEN review the gas leakage and dispersion modelling of pure Hydrogen undertaken as part of the H21 H100 HyDeploy and Hy4Heat projects to determine the maximum permitted leak rate / pass criterion for pressure testing of network pipelines intended for Hydrogen operation.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
A desktop study and testing are required to confirm the applicability of test pressures test criteria and purge velocity with hydrogen to MOBs and the suitability of existing equipment for purging operation in MOBs. SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to understand the steps needed to convert MOBS to Hydrogen including any testing required to address any evidence gaps.
This report focuses on the pressure testing requirements associated with the conversion of MOBs from Natural Gas to Hydrogen. The purging aspects of evidence gap are being addressed by Steer Energy as part of a separate task. It was proposed that ROSEN review the gas leakage and dispersion modelling of pure Hydrogen undertaken as part of the H21 H100 HyDeploy and Hy4Heat projects to determine the maximum permitted leak rate / pass criterion for pressure testing of network pipelines intended for Hydrogen operation.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
MOBs Phase 3: Task 7 - Combined Effect of Hydrogen and Thermal Loading on Material Integrity
Mar 2026
Publication
There is a requirement for gas distribution network (GDN) operators to understand the cost safety and practicality of converting network pipelines from Natural Gas to Hydrogen in multi-occupancy buildings (MOBs). SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to understand the steps needed to convert to Hydrogen. This report is part of Work Pack 3 and summarises Task 7: combined effect of hydrogen and thermal loading on material integrity.
The aim of this task is to fill the following evidence gaps identified in ROSEN report entitled ‘16357-1 Document Landscape Review Report Issue 1-0’:
♦ Validity of current diameter height lateral length and material limitations and permitted jointing methods.
♦ Susceptibility of low strength steel to hydrogen cracking when subjected to stresses resulting from expansion and contraction and effect of hydrogen on likelihood of failure of risers which do not have the required allowance for expansion and contraction.
♦ Applicability of existing thresholds including minimum permitted wall thickness before isolation and corrosion damage categories for pipe designed to operate at stress levels not greater than 40% SMYS with hydrogen.
Finite Element Analysis (FEA) has been performed to assess the performance of existing carbon steel gas riser configurations when subjected to thermal loading to understand the suitability of converting the existing pipework to hydrogen.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The aim of this task is to fill the following evidence gaps identified in ROSEN report entitled ‘16357-1 Document Landscape Review Report Issue 1-0’:
♦ Validity of current diameter height lateral length and material limitations and permitted jointing methods.
♦ Susceptibility of low strength steel to hydrogen cracking when subjected to stresses resulting from expansion and contraction and effect of hydrogen on likelihood of failure of risers which do not have the required allowance for expansion and contraction.
♦ Applicability of existing thresholds including minimum permitted wall thickness before isolation and corrosion damage categories for pipe designed to operate at stress levels not greater than 40% SMYS with hydrogen.
Finite Element Analysis (FEA) has been performed to assess the performance of existing carbon steel gas riser configurations when subjected to thermal loading to understand the suitability of converting the existing pipework to hydrogen.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
MOBs Phase 3: Task 9 - Fire Protection Measures
Mar 2026
Publication
There is a requirement for gas distribution network (GDN) operators to understand the cost safety and practicality of converting network pipelines from Natural Gas (NG) to Hydrogen in multi-occupancy buildings (MOBs). SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to understand the steps needed to convert to Hydrogen.
This report is for work pack 3 Task 9: Fire Protection Measures. The objective of this task is to review the applicability of current requirements for fittings and components relating to the permissible leakage rate during and after a high temperature event where Hydrogen is the gas being distributed.
The objectives of this task are to:
• Confirm the applicability of the test temperature of 650°C (currently specified in BS EN 1775 Procedure B and which corresponds to the self-ignition temperature of a Natural Gas / air mixture) with Hydrogen self-ignition temperature.
• Confirm the applicability of the specified leakage rate of 150 dm3/h for pipework components during and after a test in accordance with the requirements of BS EN 1775 Procedure A.
• Confirm the applicability of the specified leakage rate of 150 dm3/h for pipework components following a resistance to high temperature test in accordance with the requirements of BS EN 1775 Procedure B.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
This report is for work pack 3 Task 9: Fire Protection Measures. The objective of this task is to review the applicability of current requirements for fittings and components relating to the permissible leakage rate during and after a high temperature event where Hydrogen is the gas being distributed.
The objectives of this task are to:
• Confirm the applicability of the test temperature of 650°C (currently specified in BS EN 1775 Procedure B and which corresponds to the self-ignition temperature of a Natural Gas / air mixture) with Hydrogen self-ignition temperature.
• Confirm the applicability of the specified leakage rate of 150 dm3/h for pipework components during and after a test in accordance with the requirements of BS EN 1775 Procedure A.
• Confirm the applicability of the specified leakage rate of 150 dm3/h for pipework components following a resistance to high temperature test in accordance with the requirements of BS EN 1775 Procedure B.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
MOBs Phase 3: Task 8 - Electrical Safety Report
Mar 2026
Publication
There is a requirement for gas distribution network (GDN) operators to understand the cost safety and practicality of converting network pipelines from natural gas to hydrogen in multi-occupancy buildings (MOBs). Previous work undertaken during project “MOBs Work Pack 2 Asset Information Review” [1] considered the requirements for domestic electrical safety in MOBs following a conversion to hydrogen and identified gaps in technical evidence.
SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to understand the steps needed to convert MOBS to Hydrogen. Task 8 relates to potential electrical safety requirements associated with the conversion of MOBs from natural gas to hydrogen. It was proposed that ROSEN review the projects “EUSE – Hazardous Areas Within Buildings” [2] and “ATEX Equipment & SR/25 Modification Assessment” [3] to confirm their applicability to MOBs. The objectives of this review are to:
1. Confirm whether the standards to which electrical equipment is currently specified relates to natural gas only or to any flammable gas
2. Determine whether requirements for electrical equipment are impacted by hydrogen being gas group IIC versus gas group IIA for natural gas
3. Investigate whether the existing separation distance between natural gas pipes/meter and electrical equipment remains the same with hydrogen.
ROSEN has reviewed the outputs from these research projects as well as relevant standards to determine electrical safety requirements for the conversion of MOBs from natural gas to hydrogen.
The review of standards and research projects undertaken has drawn the following conclusions in regards to electrical safety.
1. To comply with the requirements of DSEAR meter banks energy centres and common areas within MOBs must be risk assessed to determine the location and extent of explosive atmospheres and their classification once repurposed for use with hydrogen. The risk assessment includes hazardous area classification of the pipework and components.
2. For pure hydrogen the necessary air change rate per hour to allow classification as Zone 2 NE is increased from 0.5 (for natural gas) to 1.5 air changes per hour (ACH). Where this cannot be achieved uncertified electric lighting and other electrical equipment will need to be relocated or replaced with certified gas group IIC equipment.
3. There will be no requirement for a hazardous area classification for hydrogen in a domestic environment (individual dwellings) as DSEAR does not apply.
4. The minimum separation distances between electrical equipment and gas equipment are independent of the gas being transported and research projects have concluded that these do not need to change.
5. Lightning protection requirements are independent of the gas being transported and are in place to protect the pipe structure from damage and existing IGEM/G/5 guidance can remain unchanged.
6. Research indicates that most incidents relating to electrical safety are due to non-compliance with current standards.
7. Any electrical equipment located in the vicinity of gas installations should be assessed for compliance by a competent person prior to the conversion of MOBs to hydrogen.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
SGN is leading a feasibility project with some applied testing to understand the steps needed to convert MOBS to Hydrogen. Task 8 relates to potential electrical safety requirements associated with the conversion of MOBs from natural gas to hydrogen. It was proposed that ROSEN review the projects “EUSE – Hazardous Areas Within Buildings” [2] and “ATEX Equipment & SR/25 Modification Assessment” [3] to confirm their applicability to MOBs. The objectives of this review are to:
1. Confirm whether the standards to which electrical equipment is currently specified relates to natural gas only or to any flammable gas
2. Determine whether requirements for electrical equipment are impacted by hydrogen being gas group IIC versus gas group IIA for natural gas
3. Investigate whether the existing separation distance between natural gas pipes/meter and electrical equipment remains the same with hydrogen.
ROSEN has reviewed the outputs from these research projects as well as relevant standards to determine electrical safety requirements for the conversion of MOBs from natural gas to hydrogen.
The review of standards and research projects undertaken has drawn the following conclusions in regards to electrical safety.
1. To comply with the requirements of DSEAR meter banks energy centres and common areas within MOBs must be risk assessed to determine the location and extent of explosive atmospheres and their classification once repurposed for use with hydrogen. The risk assessment includes hazardous area classification of the pipework and components.
2. For pure hydrogen the necessary air change rate per hour to allow classification as Zone 2 NE is increased from 0.5 (for natural gas) to 1.5 air changes per hour (ACH). Where this cannot be achieved uncertified electric lighting and other electrical equipment will need to be relocated or replaced with certified gas group IIC equipment.
3. There will be no requirement for a hazardous area classification for hydrogen in a domestic environment (individual dwellings) as DSEAR does not apply.
4. The minimum separation distances between electrical equipment and gas equipment are independent of the gas being transported and research projects have concluded that these do not need to change.
5. Lightning protection requirements are independent of the gas being transported and are in place to protect the pipe structure from damage and existing IGEM/G/5 guidance can remain unchanged.
6. Research indicates that most incidents relating to electrical safety are due to non-compliance with current standards.
7. Any electrical equipment located in the vicinity of gas installations should be assessed for compliance by a competent person prior to the conversion of MOBs to hydrogen.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Great Britain Distribution QRA Risk Predictions
Mar 2026
Publication
The natural gas distribution system has operated safely across Great Britain for around 50 years. It is an established means of supplying fuel for heating and cooking to residential dwellings and non-domestic buildings and is also used in some industrial processes. In order to meet environmental targets set by the UK Government multiple gas industry projects have been completed or are in progress to investigate the conversion of the existing natural gas system to carry hydrogen. This would make use of a valuable national asset and would help to meet carbon emissions targets.
As part of this programme of work across the gas industry DNV has carried out a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the gas distribution system across Great Britain. Note that the ‘distribution system’ in this report covers a wider scope than the common meaning of the ‘distribution network’. Here the system includes the gas distribution network operating at up to 7 bar upstream of the Emergency Control Valve (ECV) and gas use within customer properties downstream of the ECV. The primary aim of the assessment is to quantify the risks posed by a repurposed hydrogen system and the benefits of risk mitigation measures where necessary. To put these results in context the risk associated with the equivalent natural gas distribution system is also quantified.
This report contains the results of the risk predictions. Separate reports gives details of the following:
• A DNV report describes the methodology reviews and modelling updates that were carried out as part of this QRA of the Great Britain distribution system.
• A DNV report describes a separate project carried out to investigate the risks associated with hydrogen use in Multi Occupancy Buildings (MOBs).
• A report produced by the Gas Distribution Networks (GDNs) evaluates each potential risk mitigation measure and justifies their adoption or rejection.
The risk predictions cover the Great Britain gas distribution system and end use within buildings for heating and cooking. The study does not consider hydrogen production or storage gas transmission at pressures above 7 bar industrial use of gas or vehicle refuelling stations.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating:HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
As part of this programme of work across the gas industry DNV has carried out a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the gas distribution system across Great Britain. Note that the ‘distribution system’ in this report covers a wider scope than the common meaning of the ‘distribution network’. Here the system includes the gas distribution network operating at up to 7 bar upstream of the Emergency Control Valve (ECV) and gas use within customer properties downstream of the ECV. The primary aim of the assessment is to quantify the risks posed by a repurposed hydrogen system and the benefits of risk mitigation measures where necessary. To put these results in context the risk associated with the equivalent natural gas distribution system is also quantified.
This report contains the results of the risk predictions. Separate reports gives details of the following:
• A DNV report describes the methodology reviews and modelling updates that were carried out as part of this QRA of the Great Britain distribution system.
• A DNV report describes a separate project carried out to investigate the risks associated with hydrogen use in Multi Occupancy Buildings (MOBs).
• A report produced by the Gas Distribution Networks (GDNs) evaluates each potential risk mitigation measure and justifies their adoption or rejection.
The risk predictions cover the Great Britain gas distribution system and end use within buildings for heating and cooking. The study does not consider hydrogen production or storage gas transmission at pressures above 7 bar industrial use of gas or vehicle refuelling stations.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating:HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Great Britain Distribution QRA Methodology Updates in CONIFER
Mar 2026
Publication
The natural gas distribution system has operated safely across Great Britain for around 50 years. It is an established means of supplying fuel for heating and cooking to residential dwellings and non-domestic buildings and is also used in some industrial processes. In order to meet environmental targets set by the UK Government multiple gas industry projects have been completed or are in progress to investigate the conversion of the existing natural gas system to carry hydrogen. This would make use of a valuable national asset and would help to meet carbon emissions targets.
As part of this programme of work across the gas industry DNV has carried out a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the gas distribution system across Great Britain. Note that the ‘distribution system’ in this report covers a wider scope than the common meaning of the ‘distribution network’. Here the system includes the gas distribution network upstream of the Emergency Control Valve (ECV) and gas use within customer properties downstream of the ECV. The primary aim of the assessment is to quantify the risks posed by a repurposed hydrogen system and the benefits of risk mitigation measures where necessary. To put these results in context the risk associated with the equivalent natural gas distribution system is also quantified.
This work has been carried out in partnership with Cadent Northern Gas Networks and SGN. Additional information has been supplied by Wales and West Utilities and several of the Independent Gas Transporters thereby covering almost all the Great Britain distribution system.
This report contains the details of methodology reviews and modelling updates that were carried out as part of the Great Britain distribution system QRA. A separate report details the risk predictions. The updates include some made in response to review by the Evidence Review Group within the HSE and some that take make use of outputs from other gas industry projects. Major updates made as part of this work include:
• Introduction of non-domestic buildings and Multi Occupancy Buildings (MOBs) into the risk predictions. This report is primarily concerned with defining their characteristics and modifying the risk assessment models to represent their features that are not found in houses.
• Updates to the failure frequencies applied to all parts of the system from governor kiosks through the distribution network to end use.
• Modifications to the model that predicts gas movement through the ground following a leak from a main or service.
• Changes to the methodology used to predict gas dispersion movement and accumulation within a building.
• Updates to the treatment of gas explosions inside buildings.
• Several other minor changes and investigations into the sensitivity of various inputs.
This report also contains the risk calculation methodology for governors and benchmarking of the risk predictions against natural gas operational experience.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
As part of this programme of work across the gas industry DNV has carried out a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the gas distribution system across Great Britain. Note that the ‘distribution system’ in this report covers a wider scope than the common meaning of the ‘distribution network’. Here the system includes the gas distribution network upstream of the Emergency Control Valve (ECV) and gas use within customer properties downstream of the ECV. The primary aim of the assessment is to quantify the risks posed by a repurposed hydrogen system and the benefits of risk mitigation measures where necessary. To put these results in context the risk associated with the equivalent natural gas distribution system is also quantified.
This work has been carried out in partnership with Cadent Northern Gas Networks and SGN. Additional information has been supplied by Wales and West Utilities and several of the Independent Gas Transporters thereby covering almost all the Great Britain distribution system.
This report contains the details of methodology reviews and modelling updates that were carried out as part of the Great Britain distribution system QRA. A separate report details the risk predictions. The updates include some made in response to review by the Evidence Review Group within the HSE and some that take make use of outputs from other gas industry projects. Major updates made as part of this work include:
• Introduction of non-domestic buildings and Multi Occupancy Buildings (MOBs) into the risk predictions. This report is primarily concerned with defining their characteristics and modifying the risk assessment models to represent their features that are not found in houses.
• Updates to the failure frequencies applied to all parts of the system from governor kiosks through the distribution network to end use.
• Modifications to the model that predicts gas movement through the ground following a leak from a main or service.
• Changes to the methodology used to predict gas dispersion movement and accumulation within a building.
• Updates to the treatment of gas explosions inside buildings.
• Several other minor changes and investigations into the sensitivity of various inputs.
This report also contains the risk calculation methodology for governors and benchmarking of the risk predictions against natural gas operational experience.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
H21 Phase 2: Ignition Considerations for Network Procedures
Mar 2026
Publication
The objective of the H21 programme is to reach the point whereby it is feasible to convert the existing natural gas (NG) distribution network to 100% hydrogen (H₂) and provide a contribution to decarbonising GB’s heat and power sectors with the focus on decarbonised fuel at point of use. This report is one of a series of reports that look to address the work areas previously identified following a review of network procedures. It looks at the difference between the ignition sensitivities of natural gas and hydrogen primarily regarding electrostatics and friction and how they impact on network procedures. Equipment currently used by NGN was reviewed for its suitability for use with hydrogen. A number of further precautions have been identified for hydrogen and the main findings are summarised below.
Ignition topics that should not require alteration with hydrogen.
The LEL based criteria (20% LEL for the use of non-ATEX equipment when deciding upon evacuation and other safety precautions 70% LEL for switching off electrics under emergency conditions and 5% LEL and falling for reoccupation of buildings) remain fit for purpose with hydrogen; however these do require accurate hydrogen gas detection. Damp rag earthing of PE pipe was demonstrated experimentally to be effective in preventing electrostatic discharges and is suitable for use with hydrogen. Protection against electrostatic discharges extends 10 cm beyond the damp rag. The continuity bonds used for natural gas remain fit for use with hydrogen. The cathodic protection remains suitable for hydrogen from an electrostatics point of view although the location of impressed current cathodic protection (ICCP) systems should be in Zone 2 NE (Negligible Extent) areas. There is little change in the risk of pyrophoric ignition and electrostatic discharge remains the greatest ignition risk with “black dust”.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Ignition topics that should not require alteration with hydrogen.
The LEL based criteria (20% LEL for the use of non-ATEX equipment when deciding upon evacuation and other safety precautions 70% LEL for switching off electrics under emergency conditions and 5% LEL and falling for reoccupation of buildings) remain fit for purpose with hydrogen; however these do require accurate hydrogen gas detection. Damp rag earthing of PE pipe was demonstrated experimentally to be effective in preventing electrostatic discharges and is suitable for use with hydrogen. Protection against electrostatic discharges extends 10 cm beyond the damp rag. The continuity bonds used for natural gas remain fit for use with hydrogen. The cathodic protection remains suitable for hydrogen from an electrostatics point of view although the location of impressed current cathodic protection (ICCP) systems should be in Zone 2 NE (Negligible Extent) areas. There is little change in the risk of pyrophoric ignition and electrostatic discharge remains the greatest ignition risk with “black dust”.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
H21 Phase 2A: Finding and Accessing Leaks
Mar 2026
Publication
In line with the UK government’s de-carbonisation strategy Northern Gas Network’s (NGN) H21 project aims to demonstrate the feasibility of converting the existing <7barg gas distribution network to 100% hydrogen. After conversion of the gas networks hydrogen is transported from various sources through new and existing gas networks to industrial and domestic customers.
Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB networks to transport 100% hydrogen. Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2a evaluates network components and operational procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. Firstly a review of all NGN operating procedures was conducted by HSE Science and Research Centre (HSE S\&RC). From this review various recommendations for changes to some procedures were made for their application to a hydrogen network. Of these proposed changes some required more investigation and demonstration. To achieve this a gas demonstration network was built at DNV Spadeadam Research and Testing to accommodate full scale network parameters and typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE R\&SC and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding leaks
♦ Accessing leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each of these areas of testing and assessments were then divided in individual tests or tasks and identified with a unique ID name.
The current report details the work conducted in the H21 testing facility WBS5 downstream of the H21 demonstration facility herein referred to as the “Microgrid” in relation to finding and accessing buried leaks. The programme included consequence tests where live leaks and pockets of gas under various ground surfaces were ignited manned live leak finding operations (barholing/rockdrilling) and accessing leaks on gas saturated ground locations over an isolated section of leaking pipe.
This report details the experimental set-up instrumentation (if any) and test procedure used in Section 3; the results and main observations in Section 4 followed by interpretation of results and conclusions in Section 5. Appendixes at the back of the document contain photographs diagrams and further details for each test.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB networks to transport 100% hydrogen. Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2a evaluates network components and operational procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. Firstly a review of all NGN operating procedures was conducted by HSE Science and Research Centre (HSE S\&RC). From this review various recommendations for changes to some procedures were made for their application to a hydrogen network. Of these proposed changes some required more investigation and demonstration. To achieve this a gas demonstration network was built at DNV Spadeadam Research and Testing to accommodate full scale network parameters and typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE R\&SC and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding leaks
♦ Accessing leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each of these areas of testing and assessments were then divided in individual tests or tasks and identified with a unique ID name.
The current report details the work conducted in the H21 testing facility WBS5 downstream of the H21 demonstration facility herein referred to as the “Microgrid” in relation to finding and accessing buried leaks. The programme included consequence tests where live leaks and pockets of gas under various ground surfaces were ignited manned live leak finding operations (barholing/rockdrilling) and accessing leaks on gas saturated ground locations over an isolated section of leaking pipe.
This report details the experimental set-up instrumentation (if any) and test procedure used in Section 3; the results and main observations in Section 4 followed by interpretation of results and conclusions in Section 5. Appendixes at the back of the document contain photographs diagrams and further details for each test.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
H21 Phase 2B: Planned Live Gas Operations
Mar 2026
Publication
In line with the UK government’s de-carbonisation strategy Northern Gas Network’s (NGN) H21 project aims to demonstrate the feasibility of converting the existing <7barg gas distribution network to 100% hydrogen. Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB networks to transport 100% hydrogen. Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2b evaluates network operational procedures in use with 100% hydrogen. Conducted on a repurposed part of the natural gas distribution network and identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve this a gas demonstration facility centred around an existing part of the gas network was built at South Bank Middlesbrough to accommodate operations within low pressure network parameters and typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) for Phase 2 was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding Leaks
♦ Accessing Leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Planned live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each practical test was derived from one of the above subcategories within the master test plan. This report details the work conducted within the Planned Live Gas Operation remit completed at the NGN H21 testing facility at South Bank. The programme included eight live gas operations undertaken on the buried hydrogen low pressure network within the South Bank test facility the network contained both metallic and PE mains with different diameters throughout the grid. This allowed operations to be undertaken in conditions mirroring real life as they would be completed out on the network. The objective of these experiments is to prove routine operations that are undertaken on a day-to-day basis on the NG distribution network can be completed on 100% hydrogen networks. This report details the experimental set-up operation procedures and method statements used in Section 3; the results and main observations in Section 4 followed by interpretation of results and conclusions in Section 5.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding Leaks
♦ Accessing Leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Planned live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each practical test was derived from one of the above subcategories within the master test plan. This report details the work conducted within the Planned Live Gas Operation remit completed at the NGN H21 testing facility at South Bank. The programme included eight live gas operations undertaken on the buried hydrogen low pressure network within the South Bank test facility the network contained both metallic and PE mains with different diameters throughout the grid. This allowed operations to be undertaken in conditions mirroring real life as they would be completed out on the network. The objective of these experiments is to prove routine operations that are undertaken on a day-to-day basis on the NG distribution network can be completed on 100% hydrogen networks. This report details the experimental set-up operation procedures and method statements used in Section 3; the results and main observations in Section 4 followed by interpretation of results and conclusions in Section 5.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
H21 Phase 2B T&M: Isolation
Mar 2026
Publication
In line with the UK government’s de-carbonisation strategy Northern Gas Network’s (NGN) H21 project aims to demonstrate the feasibility of converting the existing <7 barg gas distribution network to 100% hydrogen. After conversion of the gas networks hydrogen is transported from various sources through new and existing gas networks to industrial and domestic customers. Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB networks to transport 100% hydrogen. Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2b evaluates network operational procedures conducted on a repurposed natural gas network. Identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve this a gas demonstration facility was built at South Bank Middlesbrough to accommodate low pressure network parameters and typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) for Phase 2 was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding Leaks
♦ Accessing Leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Planned live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each practical test was derived from one of the above subcategories within the master test plan. This report details the work conducted within the Isolation Operations remit completed at the NGN H21 testing facility at South Bank. The programme included four isolation operations utilising different isolation techniques and was undertaken on the buried hydrogen low pressure network within the South Bank test facility. The network contained both metallic and PE mains with different diameters throughout the grid. This allowed operations to be undertaken in conditions mirroring real life as they would be completed out on the network. The objective of these experiments is to prove routine operations that are undertaken on a day-to-day basis on the NG distribution network can be completed on 100% hydrogen networks. This report details the experimental set-up isolation procedure and method statement used in Section 3; the results and main observations in Section 4 followed by interpretation of results and conclusions in Section 5. Appendixes at the back of the document contain photographs diagrams and further details for each test.
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding Leaks
♦ Accessing Leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Planned live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each practical test was derived from one of the above subcategories within the master test plan. This report details the work conducted within the Isolation Operations remit completed at the NGN H21 testing facility at South Bank. The programme included four isolation operations utilising different isolation techniques and was undertaken on the buried hydrogen low pressure network within the South Bank test facility. The network contained both metallic and PE mains with different diameters throughout the grid. This allowed operations to be undertaken in conditions mirroring real life as they would be completed out on the network. The objective of these experiments is to prove routine operations that are undertaken on a day-to-day basis on the NG distribution network can be completed on 100% hydrogen networks. This report details the experimental set-up isolation procedure and method statement used in Section 3; the results and main observations in Section 4 followed by interpretation of results and conclusions in Section 5. Appendixes at the back of the document contain photographs diagrams and further details for each test.
H21 Phase 2A Testing - Part A: Planned Live Gas Operations and Isolation Techniques
Mar 2026
Publication
In line with the UK government’s de-carbonisation strategy Northern Gas Network’s (NGN) H21 project aims to demonstrate the feasibility of converting the existing <7barg gas distribution network to 100% hydrogen. After conversion of the gas networks hydrogen could be transported from various sources through new and existing gas networks to industrial and domestic customers.
Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB networks to transport 100% hydrogen. Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2a evaluates network operational procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve this a gas demonstration network was built at DNV Spadeadam Research and Development to accommodate full scale network parameters including typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE Science and Research Centre (HSE S\&RC) and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding leaks
♦ Accessing leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities (i.e. purging)
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each of these areas of testing and assessments were then divided in individual tests or tasks and identified with a unique ID name.
The current report details the work conducted on the H21 demonstration grid herein referred to as “Microgrid” in relation to planned live gas operations and isolation techniques. The programme included assessing the effectiveness of existing flow stopping techniques by measurement of the let-by rate downstream of the flow stopping device. The flow stopping techniques demonstrated included: a metallic stopple squeeze off ALH bag off and an MLS bag off. These techniques were performed by third parties according to Method Statements and Risk Assessments modified for the application to hydrogen. Principally the outcome of the Procedural Review conducted by HSE S\&RC1 was that flammable atmospheres within and around the tools pipework and vents as currently operated could not be tolerated as for hydrogen operations. As such the techniques were all conducted with the introduction of nitrogen inerting steps to avoid hydrogen and air mixing within any confined geometries.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB networks to transport 100% hydrogen. Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2a evaluates network operational procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve this a gas demonstration network was built at DNV Spadeadam Research and Development to accommodate full scale network parameters including typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE Science and Research Centre (HSE S\&RC) and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding leaks
♦ Accessing leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities (i.e. purging)
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each of these areas of testing and assessments were then divided in individual tests or tasks and identified with a unique ID name.
The current report details the work conducted on the H21 demonstration grid herein referred to as “Microgrid” in relation to planned live gas operations and isolation techniques. The programme included assessing the effectiveness of existing flow stopping techniques by measurement of the let-by rate downstream of the flow stopping device. The flow stopping techniques demonstrated included: a metallic stopple squeeze off ALH bag off and an MLS bag off. These techniques were performed by third parties according to Method Statements and Risk Assessments modified for the application to hydrogen. Principally the outcome of the Procedural Review conducted by HSE S\&RC1 was that flammable atmospheres within and around the tools pipework and vents as currently operated could not be tolerated as for hydrogen operations. As such the techniques were all conducted with the introduction of nitrogen inerting steps to avoid hydrogen and air mixing within any confined geometries.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
H21 Phase 2: Assessment of Repair Techniques
Mar 2026
Publication
In line with the UK government’s de-carbonisation strategy Northern Gas Network’s (NGN) H21 project aims to enable the conversion of the UK gas networks to pure hydrogen. After conversion of the gas networks hydrogen is transported from various sources through new and existing gas networks to industrial and domestic customers.
Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB networks to transport 100% hydrogen. Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2a evaluates network components and procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve this a gas demonstration network was built at DNV Spadeadam Research and Testing to accommodate full scale network parameters and typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding leaks
♦ Accessing leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each of these areas of testing and assessments were then divided in individual tests or tasks and identified with a unique ID name.
The current technical note details the work conducted in the H21 demonstration grid herein referred to as “Microgrid” in relation to assessment of repair techniques. Six used cast iron (CI) spun iron (SI) and steel (ST) assets purposedly made to present leaks or leak paths were repaired using six commonly used techniques in the current natural gas network including: muffed encapsulation anaerobic repair two-part joint injection polyform repair clamp repair and heat shrink repair. The repairs were then leak checked with nitrogen buried and connected to the H21 microgrid and commissioned with hydrogen. Weekly over the course of five months whilst the rest of the testing programme was being carried out the assets were individually isolated and checked for re-appearance of leakage over time and under service conditions by means of pressure decay tests.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB networks to transport 100% hydrogen. Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2a evaluates network components and procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve this a gas demonstration network was built at DNV Spadeadam Research and Testing to accommodate full scale network parameters and typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations
♦ Finding leaks
♦ Accessing leaks
♦ Assessment of repair techniques
♦ Live gas operations
♦ Isolation techniques
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures
♦ Pressure and flow validation
Each of these areas of testing and assessments were then divided in individual tests or tasks and identified with a unique ID name.
The current technical note details the work conducted in the H21 demonstration grid herein referred to as “Microgrid” in relation to assessment of repair techniques. Six used cast iron (CI) spun iron (SI) and steel (ST) assets purposedly made to present leaks or leak paths were repaired using six commonly used techniques in the current natural gas network including: muffed encapsulation anaerobic repair two-part joint injection polyform repair clamp repair and heat shrink repair. The repairs were then leak checked with nitrogen buried and connected to the H21 microgrid and commissioned with hydrogen. Weekly over the course of five months whilst the rest of the testing programme was being carried out the assets were individually isolated and checked for re-appearance of leakage over time and under service conditions by means of pressure decay tests.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
H21 Phase 2B: Finding and Accessing Leaks
Mar 2026
Publication
In line with the UK government's de-carbonisation strategy Northern Gas Network's (NGN) H21 project aims to demonstrate the feasibility of converting the existing GB gas distribution network to 100% hydrogen. Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB distribution networks to transport 100% hydrogen.
Phase 2 consisted of several project phases which evaluated operational procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve Phase 2a aims a gas demonstration network was built at DNV Spadeadam Research and Testing to accommodate full scale network OPERATIONS and typical network components. Phase 2b continued from Phase 2a with demonstrations undertaken in a public setting. A section of existing NGN gas distribution network was adopted and developed utilising existing buried ductile iron gas mains which once served now demolished terrace housing. These mains were interconnected by installing new 180mm PE pipe sections at South Bank Middlesbrough. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the Health & Safety Executives Science & Research Centre (HSE S\&RC) and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations (ER)
♦ Finding leaks (FL)
♦ Accessing leaks (AL)
♦ Assessment of repair techniques (R)
♦ Planned live gas operations (LG)
♦ Isolation techniques (IS)
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities (PU)
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures (MA)
♦ Pressure and flow validation modelling (MO)
This report details the work conducted in relation to the finding (FL) and accessing leaks (AL) tasks within Phase 2b of the MTP. The NGN procedures reviewed and demonstrated being EM72 and EM74 respectively. The programme included manned operational demonstrations of leak finding operations (bar holing/rock drilling) prior to accessing leaks operations (using various excavation techniques) on hydrogen gas-saturated ground locations near to live leaks. In a change to current natural gas procedures; the initial excavations were conducted away from the live leak location following recommendation from the HSE S\&RC's procedural review conducted during H21 Phase 2a¹. The recommendation is such that no work should be conducted in flammable atmospheres on hydrogen distribution networks where the potential for ignition is unknown and likely greater than that of natural gas. After completion of various finding leaks operations and exploratory excavations around the live leaks had been carried out excavations directly onto the leak were carried out in the gas-saturated ground after remote isolation of the buried pipework.
All testing was conducted at Middlesbrough Test Site (MTS) South Bank Middlesbrough TS6 6LF which was constructed specifically for the H21 Phase 2B program.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Phase 2 consisted of several project phases which evaluated operational procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve Phase 2a aims a gas demonstration network was built at DNV Spadeadam Research and Testing to accommodate full scale network OPERATIONS and typical network components. Phase 2b continued from Phase 2a with demonstrations undertaken in a public setting. A section of existing NGN gas distribution network was adopted and developed utilising existing buried ductile iron gas mains which once served now demolished terrace housing. These mains were interconnected by installing new 180mm PE pipe sections at South Bank Middlesbrough. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the Health & Safety Executives Science & Research Centre (HSE S\&RC) and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:
♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations (ER)
♦ Finding leaks (FL)
♦ Accessing leaks (AL)
♦ Assessment of repair techniques (R)
♦ Planned live gas operations (LG)
♦ Isolation techniques (IS)
♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities (PU)
♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures (MA)
♦ Pressure and flow validation modelling (MO)
This report details the work conducted in relation to the finding (FL) and accessing leaks (AL) tasks within Phase 2b of the MTP. The NGN procedures reviewed and demonstrated being EM72 and EM74 respectively. The programme included manned operational demonstrations of leak finding operations (bar holing/rock drilling) prior to accessing leaks operations (using various excavation techniques) on hydrogen gas-saturated ground locations near to live leaks. In a change to current natural gas procedures; the initial excavations were conducted away from the live leak location following recommendation from the HSE S\&RC's procedural review conducted during H21 Phase 2a¹. The recommendation is such that no work should be conducted in flammable atmospheres on hydrogen distribution networks where the potential for ignition is unknown and likely greater than that of natural gas. After completion of various finding leaks operations and exploratory excavations around the live leaks had been carried out excavations directly onto the leak were carried out in the gas-saturated ground after remote isolation of the buried pipework.
All testing was conducted at Middlesbrough Test Site (MTS) South Bank Middlesbrough TS6 6LF which was constructed specifically for the H21 Phase 2B program.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
HyNTS Pipeline Dataset SIF Project Discovery Phase: Final Report
Mar 2026
Publication
Rosen,
Cadent and
National Grid
HyNTS is a programme of work that seeks to identify the opportunities and address the challenges that transporting hydrogen within the National Transmission System (NTS) and Local Transmission System (LTS) presents. This will unlock the potential of hydrogen to deliver the UK’s 2050 Net Zero targets. The programme is being executed alongside other ongoing UK hydrogen initiatives such as National Grids Project Union and Cadent’s HyNet projects.
A key element of repurposing feasibility and therefore central to the overall HyNTS initiative is the requirement to have an improved understanding of the ‘fingerprint’ of pipeline assets prior to hydrogen injection. The Pipeline Dataset SIF project has two primary objectives:
♦ Defining and gathering the data necessary to ultimately facilitate repurposing of above 7 bar pipelines on the NTS and LTS
♦ Developing the tools and processes to store align and visualise data
Split into 3 phases the first ‘Discovery’ phase aims to develop the high-level data and data management requirements for repurposing as well as the current data availability across the NTS and LTS to meet these requirements. Subsequent Alpha and Beta phases involve detailed planning and subsequent execution of the data collection and data management activities identified in the Discovery phase.
The Discovery phase comprises four Workpacks as shown in the diagram below designed to cover the project objectives.
ROSEN and Cadent have partnered with National Grid (NGG) to deliver the Discovery phase. Close collaboration between NGG Cadent and ROSEN has been required to conduct all Workpacks particularly in terms of appraising the current data held and current Data Management arrangements within both organisations.
This report presents the findings from the Discovery Phase as well as providing recommendations to feed into shaping subsequent Alpha and Beta phase activities.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
A key element of repurposing feasibility and therefore central to the overall HyNTS initiative is the requirement to have an improved understanding of the ‘fingerprint’ of pipeline assets prior to hydrogen injection. The Pipeline Dataset SIF project has two primary objectives:
♦ Defining and gathering the data necessary to ultimately facilitate repurposing of above 7 bar pipelines on the NTS and LTS
♦ Developing the tools and processes to store align and visualise data
Split into 3 phases the first ‘Discovery’ phase aims to develop the high-level data and data management requirements for repurposing as well as the current data availability across the NTS and LTS to meet these requirements. Subsequent Alpha and Beta phases involve detailed planning and subsequent execution of the data collection and data management activities identified in the Discovery phase.
The Discovery phase comprises four Workpacks as shown in the diagram below designed to cover the project objectives.
ROSEN and Cadent have partnered with National Grid (NGG) to deliver the Discovery phase. Close collaboration between NGG Cadent and ROSEN has been required to conduct all Workpacks particularly in terms of appraising the current data held and current Data Management arrangements within both organisations.
This report presents the findings from the Discovery Phase as well as providing recommendations to feed into shaping subsequent Alpha and Beta phase activities.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
FutureGrid Phase 1: Facility, Closure Report
Mar 2026
Publication
The National Transmission System (NTS) is a cornerstone of the Great Britain’s (GB) energy infrastructure transporting over 800 TWh of energy annually across 5000 miles of pipelines in the UK.
This system provides GB with a significant opportunity to decarbonise various industries by transporting low-carbon gases such as hydrogen biomethane and various synthetic fuels. Transitioning this system would also pave the way for industrial emitters to decarbonise either through fuel switching or transporting carbon dioxide to potential storage sites around the United Kingdom (UK). Recognising the imperative to transition to a low-carbon future the FutureGrid project sought to explore the feasibility of repurposing the NTS to transport hydrogen. This project an essential part of the National Gas HyNTS programme endeavours to align the NTS with GB’s net zero ambitions by demonstrating the operational viability of the system with varying hydrogen blends using decommissioned assets typical of the natural gas network today ultimately aiming for 100% hydrogen conveyance.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating:HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
This system provides GB with a significant opportunity to decarbonise various industries by transporting low-carbon gases such as hydrogen biomethane and various synthetic fuels. Transitioning this system would also pave the way for industrial emitters to decarbonise either through fuel switching or transporting carbon dioxide to potential storage sites around the United Kingdom (UK). Recognising the imperative to transition to a low-carbon future the FutureGrid project sought to explore the feasibility of repurposing the NTS to transport hydrogen. This project an essential part of the National Gas HyNTS programme endeavours to align the NTS with GB’s net zero ambitions by demonstrating the operational viability of the system with varying hydrogen blends using decommissioned assets typical of the natural gas network today ultimately aiming for 100% hydrogen conveyance.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating:HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Inhibition of Hydrogen Embrittlement Effects in Pipeline Steel - Technical Report
Mar 2026
Publication
Rosen and
National Gas
National Gas has identified the need to understand the effects of hydrogen on various pipeline materials commonly found in the UK National Transmission System (NTS) to determine their potential for a hydrogen use case. Accordingly National Gas is interested in investigating the potential use of oxygen as a mitigation of hydrogen embrittlement (HE) the detrimental effect of hydrogen on the mechanical properties of metallic materials. This report presents the laboratory findings part of the project “Inhibition of hydrogen embrittlement effects in pipeline steels” in which ROSEN has been requested to investigate the potential use of oxygen as a mitigation of hydrogen effects.<br/>Three pipe materials were investigated which included a ERW X52 commissioned in 1993 a DSAW X60 commissioned in 1973 and a DSAW X80 constructed in 2004. The test programme aimed to characterise the effectiveness of oxygen on mitigating hydrogen embrittlement and included an in-air baseline characterisation and three main hydrogen tests: threshold stress intensity factor KIH fracture toughness and two types of fatigue crack growth rate tests (frequency scans and Paris curve). Fracture toughness and fatigue crack growth rate tests were performed in pure hydrogen and at various oxygen concentrations ranging from 50 to 1000 ppm.<br/>The baseline in-air characterisation showed that some of the mechanical properties of the X52 and X60 were below the T/SP/PIP/1 requirements. For the X52 the yield strength of transverse parent material specimens was below the 360 MPa required by its designation. For the X60 both the longitudinal and transverse yield strength of the parent material were below the 415 MPa required for this grade. Furthermore CVN energies were also below the T/SP/PIP/1 requirements for parent metal and seam weld metal for the X60 pipe. The X80 was within specifications.<br/>Threshold stress intensity factor KIH tests were performed on the three investigated materials on base and weld metal in pure hydrogen. Crack extension was not seen in any of these tests for the applied stress intensity factors as high as 73 MPa√m. The absence of crack growth was verified by means of SEM examination which showed the direct transition from the fatigue pre-crack region to the final fracture region. For this reason KIH tests with oxygen additions were not conducted.<br/>Fracture toughness testing showed that the fracture resistance was reduced when testing in pure hydrogen. This was seen in X60 specimens that had a fracture resistance JQ of 31 kJ/m2 35% of that in air. The addition of oxygen resulted in an increase of the average JQ which at 250 ppm O2 was 85% of the in air value. At concentrations above this value the fracture resistance continued to approach in-air values although at a decreased rate. Increasing the oxygen concentration also resulted in smaller standard deviations of the fracture resistance decreasing from 13 to 2 kJ/m2 as the O2 concentration was increased from 50 to 500 ppm. These findings indicate there is a smaller variability of the performance when oxygen is added. The recovery of the fracture resistance was consistent with the SEM examination of fracture surfaces of tested specimens. In pure hydrogen fracture surfaces were consistent with a quasi-cleavage fracture characterised by planar facets with visible river marks. As oxygen was increased the fracture surface became more dimpled and areas with signs of plastic strain became evident. At concentrations of 250 ppm O2 the fracture surface resembled those obtained in air suggesting the same ductile failure mode. Obtaining quantitative fracture toughness data for the X52 and X80 specimens in oxygen additions was not possible due to material related challenges. However fractographic examination showed that in pure hydrogen and low oxygen concentrations e.g. 50 ppm the failure mode was predominantly brittle while at 250 ppm O2 and in air the failure mode was ductile and was accompanied of limited crack growth.<br/>The inhibiting effects of oxygen were also seen in fatigue crack growth rate tests. Frequency scan tests on X60 showed that the exposure to hydrogen resulted in high crack growth rates up to 2 orders of magnitude above the BS7910 in-air mean depending on the testing conditions. Crack growth rates were affected by the choice of the frequency. For the test performed with a Kmax of 45 ksi√in (49 MPa√m) crack growth rates continued to increase above 1 mm/cycle as the frequency was reduced to 1E-4 Hz. For the test performed with a Kmax of 38 ksi√in (42 MPa√m) crack growth rates reached a plateau at a frequency of 0.1 Hz. The additions of oxygen resulted in a reduction of crack growth to values a few times above the BS7910 in-air mean. Furthermore the effect of frequency was visibly reduced in 250 ppm O2 as reducing the frequency 40000 times resulted only in a 2 times increase of the crack growth rates. The effect of oxygen was also seen in Paris curve types of tests. In pure hydrogen crack growth rates were comparable with ASME B31.12 and Sandia National Laboratories reference curves and were in general up to an order of magnitude above the BS7910 in-air mean depending on ΔK and other parameters. The additions of oxygen at concentrations as low as 50 ppm resulted in reductions in fatigue crack growth rates to values closer to those in air. Further increases in the oxygen concentration resulted in slight reductions of crack growth rates that were more noticeable at higher ΔK and Kmax. The recovery of the fatigue performance was consistent with the fractography observations. The addition of oxygen resulted in an overall increase of the plastic strain seen on the fracture surfaces. In pure hydrogen fracture surfaces were consistent with quasi-cleavage failure and had planar cleavage facets with river marks and very fine striations that were mostly visible at high frequencies and ΔK under high magnifications (55800x). The fracture surfaces of specimens tested in presence of oxygen resembled those seen in the in-air fatigue pre-crack region especially at high frequencies and high ΔK. At low frequencies and low ΔK the fracture surfaces resembled that of quasi-cleavage fracture although they had a ‘fibrous’ aspect with visible signs of plastic strain. Striations were readily visible on the fracture surfaces of all specimens tested in presence of oxygen and were more defined than those seen in pure hydrogen.<br/>Based on the data generated in this work a concentration of 250 ppm O2 is recommended as the minimum value to achieve inhibition of hydrogen effects. This concentration provided a recovery of 85% of the in-air fracture resistance and resulted in crack growth rates close to in-air levels. The fracture surfaces of specimens tested at this oxygen concentration generally showed ductile features consistent with higher toughness failure mechanisms.
NTS Materials Testing to Enable Hydrogen Injection in High Pressure Pipelines, Technical Summary Report
Mar 2026
Publication
DNV and
National Gas
National Gas is aiming to demonstrate the potential use of hydrogen in high pressure transmission pipelines and associated equipment through the FutureGrid NIC programme. This involves construction and operation of a realistic high pressure transmission system using decommissioned National Gas assets. The linepipe for the facility will be X-52 and X-65 grade steels. A key parameter for the facility is to operate at the current NTS pressure tier.
The most applicable pipeline design code is ASME B31.12 used in the USA and currently used by UK HSE for evaluating hydrogen pipeline designs. Hydrogen supplements to the IGEM/TD/1 and IGEM/TD/13 codes also refer to this standard. The code has prescriptive design methods for allowable pressures which would reduce the FutureGrid maximum allowable design pressure (MAOP) to below current NTS pressure. The code does however allow less prescriptive methods if the linepipe has been tested for fracture toughness and fatigue performance in hydrogen using a protocol as defined by ASME VIII Section 3 Article KD-10. This would potentially allow a higher MAOP for FutureGrid1.
A materials test programme has therefore been established to evaluate the fracture toughness and fatigue properties of the actual linepipe used for the FutureGrid facility. The X-52 and X-65 linepipe being used to construct the facility has been tested in hydrogen including realistic seam welds and girth welds. This data has been used to confirm an appropriate maximum operating pressure for the FutureGrid test facility by carrying out fracture mechanics analyses in accordance with the above standards.
The materials test programme also includes a task to generate similar fracture toughness and fatigue data for a wider range of materials within the NTS as described in Table 1 below. This report provides test results for all of these materials along with analysis and interpretation of the results. It therefore satisfies the reporting requirements associated with a number of milestones as follows:
• Task 7 “Update of Data Analysis/Design using additional X60 results”
• Task 19 “Completion of Task 3 Reporting”
• Task 20 “Completion of Task 4 & Associated Reporting”
At present the report does not include details of tests carried out within Task 17 “Sub-critical crack growth testing” as some of those tests are still ongoing. The report will be updated to include these data when the tests are complete.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The most applicable pipeline design code is ASME B31.12 used in the USA and currently used by UK HSE for evaluating hydrogen pipeline designs. Hydrogen supplements to the IGEM/TD/1 and IGEM/TD/13 codes also refer to this standard. The code has prescriptive design methods for allowable pressures which would reduce the FutureGrid maximum allowable design pressure (MAOP) to below current NTS pressure. The code does however allow less prescriptive methods if the linepipe has been tested for fracture toughness and fatigue performance in hydrogen using a protocol as defined by ASME VIII Section 3 Article KD-10. This would potentially allow a higher MAOP for FutureGrid1.
A materials test programme has therefore been established to evaluate the fracture toughness and fatigue properties of the actual linepipe used for the FutureGrid facility. The X-52 and X-65 linepipe being used to construct the facility has been tested in hydrogen including realistic seam welds and girth welds. This data has been used to confirm an appropriate maximum operating pressure for the FutureGrid test facility by carrying out fracture mechanics analyses in accordance with the above standards.
The materials test programme also includes a task to generate similar fracture toughness and fatigue data for a wider range of materials within the NTS as described in Table 1 below. This report provides test results for all of these materials along with analysis and interpretation of the results. It therefore satisfies the reporting requirements associated with a number of milestones as follows:
• Task 7 “Update of Data Analysis/Design using additional X60 results”
• Task 19 “Completion of Task 3 Reporting”
• Task 20 “Completion of Task 4 & Associated Reporting”
At present the report does not include details of tests carried out within Task 17 “Sub-critical crack growth testing” as some of those tests are still ongoing. The report will be updated to include these data when the tests are complete.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
NGT Compressor Station FMEA for Hydrogen: FMEA Summary Report
Mar 2026
Publication
DNV and
National Grid
The project between DNV and NGT innovation is exploring the future impact of introducing hydrogen into the National Transmission System (NTS) network and specifically looking at the impact on the compressor station equipment. The consequent failure modes associated with the introduction of hydrogen will be assessed through Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA).
The work scope includes:
• Perform a staged approach FMEA study Qualitative assessments determining the risk levels associated with the various components of the compressor trains.
• Perform the FMEA on each selected train type assessing the operational safety and environmental impact of H2 introduction.
Assessment has been made for two potential network gas types:
• 25% H2/NG blend
• 100% H2
The output is an FMEA on each generic compressor stations indicating the risk areas from H2 operation. This output will allow NGT to identify areas which require further assessment / action before H2 is introduced.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The work scope includes:
• Perform a staged approach FMEA study Qualitative assessments determining the risk levels associated with the various components of the compressor trains.
• Perform the FMEA on each selected train type assessing the operational safety and environmental impact of H2 introduction.
Assessment has been made for two potential network gas types:
• 25% H2/NG blend
• 100% H2
The output is an FMEA on each generic compressor stations indicating the risk areas from H2 operation. This output will allow NGT to identify areas which require further assessment / action before H2 is introduced.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Safe Venting and Recompression of Hydrogen - Final Technical Report
Mar 2026
Publication
This document summarises The Safe Venting and Recompression of Hydrogen project (NIA_NGGT0205) project carried out by Wood PLC for National Gas Transmission from Feb 2023 to Feb 2024. The project explored the possible impacts of transition from natural gas fuel to hydrogen (or to hydrogen/natural gas mixtures) on the requirement to depressurise transmission pipelines and associated equipment for maintenance or other purposes. NGT currently employ gas recompression or venting to atmosphere as a means of achieving safe conditions for intrusive work. The project investigated the impact of the presence of hydrogen on these and other potential technologies for providing safe conditions of work. Details of the work carried out is recorded in Technical Notes TN01 to TN04. High level summaries of each technical note are included at the end of this Executive summary.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Oxygen Ingress - Interim Report 2
Mar 2026
Publication
There was an event at the Redcar EcoHouse where after the isolation of the hydrogen pipework for 27 days over the Christmas break 2023/2024 and shortly after initiation of the flame in a hydrogen gas fire appliance a minor ignition event occurred. Visual investigation led to a discovery that the gas meter was damaged.
Air ingress into the isolated hydrogen pipework (causing a flammable mixture in this pipework) followed by the flame propagation from the ignition system of the hydrogen gas fire were considered to be the most likely reasons for the aforementioned event.
The aim of the work presented in this report was to complement the work undertaken by Steer Energy and to:
• investigate the possibility of the above phenomena to occur in domestic hydrogen installations with main focus on hydrogen appliance design
• to conclude whether there are plausible explanations of the event observed at the Redcar EcoHouse
• to propose possible mitigations which are likely to prevent similar events in the future.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Air ingress into the isolated hydrogen pipework (causing a flammable mixture in this pipework) followed by the flame propagation from the ignition system of the hydrogen gas fire were considered to be the most likely reasons for the aforementioned event.
The aim of the work presented in this report was to complement the work undertaken by Steer Energy and to:
• investigate the possibility of the above phenomena to occur in domestic hydrogen installations with main focus on hydrogen appliance design
• to conclude whether there are plausible explanations of the event observed at the Redcar EcoHouse
• to propose possible mitigations which are likely to prevent similar events in the future.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
SIF Discovery Project - Hydrogen Barrier Coatings for Gas Network Assets, Technical Summary Report: Hydrogen Barrier Coatings
Mar 2026
Publication
This report is the Technical Summary Report of the SIF Discovery project (10022648) Hydrogen Barrier Coatings for Gas Network Assets. This report summarises the hydrogen barrier coatings work packages undertaken in the project which were led by Ultima Forma Ltd with inputs from National Grid Gas Transmission.
Around 23 million homes in UK are currently heated by natural gas supplied via the National Transmission System. Green hydrogen generated via renewable energy has potential to be a zero-carbon replacement for natural gas for heating. Re-purposing the existing National Transmission System for the transmission of hydrogen gas in lieu of natural gas would provide resilience and storage rather than relying on transient production. However hydrogen has been shown to embrittle certain pipeline materials thereby reducing allowable operating parameters. Hydrogen barrier coatings applied to the internal surface of the pipeline assets could prevent the need to replace the assets and/or enable the operation of the network in a flexible and optimised manner.
This report builds on and summarises the recommendations arising from project deliverables D1: Potential Coating Materials Their Properties And Application Technologies D2: Use Cases Summary Report and D3: Analysis of Potential Coating Solutions. From D1 zinc cadmium copper tin aluminium and nickel were identified as strong candidate materials. From D2 pipework girth welds valves and filters were identified as high-priority assets able to provide diverse requirements. From D3 electroplating metal spraying and hot-dipping were identified as candidate coating technologies. These are all therefore further explored within this report but brought together to find solutions for the use cases and the technologies best suited for the candidate materials. Additionally due to the importance of the underlying surface quality prior to coating a section within the report was devoted to looking at surface preparation methods. This included paint removal chemical treatment and epoxy coating.
After bringing the various elements together it is clear that different technologies are suitable for different use cases. As zinc is suitable for all proposed coating technologies coating zinc is very mature and zinc is cheaper than tin it is recommended that further research be carried out on the hydrogen permeability of zinc. As hot-dipping is only suitable on the uncoated or paint striped steel and is unsuitable for many candidate materials it should likely not be a priority for further investigation and the focus should instead be on electroplating and cold spraying. For these technologies copper tin cadmium and nickel are suitable. Cadmium has a risk of toxicity tin is more expensive and nickel has a risk of embrittlement when not part of an alloy therefore promoting copper as the next most suitable candidate material for further research.
This Discovery phase has identified a number of candidate materials and application processes in order to successfully mitigate the risk of hydrogen to the existing National Transmission System and to allow for a greener hydrogen transition. A detailed plan for validating these processes and technologies has been made and set out in the follow-on Alpha phase application.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Around 23 million homes in UK are currently heated by natural gas supplied via the National Transmission System. Green hydrogen generated via renewable energy has potential to be a zero-carbon replacement for natural gas for heating. Re-purposing the existing National Transmission System for the transmission of hydrogen gas in lieu of natural gas would provide resilience and storage rather than relying on transient production. However hydrogen has been shown to embrittle certain pipeline materials thereby reducing allowable operating parameters. Hydrogen barrier coatings applied to the internal surface of the pipeline assets could prevent the need to replace the assets and/or enable the operation of the network in a flexible and optimised manner.
This report builds on and summarises the recommendations arising from project deliverables D1: Potential Coating Materials Their Properties And Application Technologies D2: Use Cases Summary Report and D3: Analysis of Potential Coating Solutions. From D1 zinc cadmium copper tin aluminium and nickel were identified as strong candidate materials. From D2 pipework girth welds valves and filters were identified as high-priority assets able to provide diverse requirements. From D3 electroplating metal spraying and hot-dipping were identified as candidate coating technologies. These are all therefore further explored within this report but brought together to find solutions for the use cases and the technologies best suited for the candidate materials. Additionally due to the importance of the underlying surface quality prior to coating a section within the report was devoted to looking at surface preparation methods. This included paint removal chemical treatment and epoxy coating.
After bringing the various elements together it is clear that different technologies are suitable for different use cases. As zinc is suitable for all proposed coating technologies coating zinc is very mature and zinc is cheaper than tin it is recommended that further research be carried out on the hydrogen permeability of zinc. As hot-dipping is only suitable on the uncoated or paint striped steel and is unsuitable for many candidate materials it should likely not be a priority for further investigation and the focus should instead be on electroplating and cold spraying. For these technologies copper tin cadmium and nickel are suitable. Cadmium has a risk of toxicity tin is more expensive and nickel has a risk of embrittlement when not part of an alloy therefore promoting copper as the next most suitable candidate material for further research.
This Discovery phase has identified a number of candidate materials and application processes in order to successfully mitigate the risk of hydrogen to the existing National Transmission System and to allow for a greener hydrogen transition. A detailed plan for validating these processes and technologies has been made and set out in the follow-on Alpha phase application.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Iron mains and fittings in hydrogen service
Mar 2026
Publication
Distribution Network Operators have investigated the potential to utilise iron mains and fittings in hydrogen service.
Iron mains operate at low (<75 mbarg.) or medium (<2 barg.) pressure iron fittings at up to intermediate pressure (<7 barg.) depending on design. No iron mains have been laid since the 1980s although certain grades of iron are still used to construct fittings which includes valves.
The work was conducted by DNV. It examined the impact that hydrogen might have on iron of different grades and also the risk of explosion posed by hydrogen if it escapes from a buried main. In carrying out the analysis no account was taken of additional mitigation measures associated with hydrogen conversion (e.g. in home detection) which would reduce risk to members of the public.
To enhance confidence at the request of Operators IGEM assembled a ‘Peer review panel’ of material science and risk modelling experts from a range of backgrounds. Their role was to express their professional opinion of the findings. The reports produced by DNV and the peer review panel are attached to this report in the appendix.
The conclusion is that iron fittings and most iron mains expected to be in operation after the current replacement programme is completed in December 2032 can operate in hydrogen service.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Iron mains operate at low (<75 mbarg.) or medium (<2 barg.) pressure iron fittings at up to intermediate pressure (<7 barg.) depending on design. No iron mains have been laid since the 1980s although certain grades of iron are still used to construct fittings which includes valves.
The work was conducted by DNV. It examined the impact that hydrogen might have on iron of different grades and also the risk of explosion posed by hydrogen if it escapes from a buried main. In carrying out the analysis no account was taken of additional mitigation measures associated with hydrogen conversion (e.g. in home detection) which would reduce risk to members of the public.
To enhance confidence at the request of Operators IGEM assembled a ‘Peer review panel’ of material science and risk modelling experts from a range of backgrounds. Their role was to express their professional opinion of the findings. The reports produced by DNV and the peer review panel are attached to this report in the appendix.
The conclusion is that iron fittings and most iron mains expected to be in operation after the current replacement programme is completed in December 2032 can operate in hydrogen service.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
EUSE Hydrogen Purity - Contaminants Impact Materials in Domestic Installations
Mar 2026
Publication
The EUSE hydrogen purity project is investigating the impact of contaminants in a .pipeline network that has been repurposed from natural gas to hydrogen. With the focus on end users the impact of the contaminants on the pipework and appliance materials downstream of the Emergency Control Valve (ECV) to the appliance is considered and in addition the impact on the combustion of the hydrogen with the contaminants present.
DNV carried out a review using its own experience together with information from IGEM standards and information collated as part of the BEIS Hy4Heat programme to identify the most abundant material types that are present in domestic installations. This data was supplemented by information from Cadent on the surveys that were undertaken as part of the Whitby Village trial.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
DNV carried out a review using its own experience together with information from IGEM standards and information collated as part of the BEIS Hy4Heat programme to identify the most abundant material types that are present in domestic installations. This data was supplemented by information from Cadent on the surveys that were undertaken as part of the Whitby Village trial.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Technical Summary of the NGGT and Partners' Feasibility Study of Hydrogen Fuel Gas for NTS Compressors
Mar 2026
Publication
This Networks Innovation Allowance (NIA) funded project (NIA_NGGT0176) comprised a feasibility study on an exemplar National Grid Gas Transmission (NGGT) National Transmission System (NTS) compressor station. The study has examined safety environmental technical operational and economic issues in blending hydrogen/methane for combustion in a gas turbine (GT) driving NTS compression. The project also determined how to establish an innovative green hydrogen production storage and supply facility to fuel GTs on varying hydrogen/methane blends.
This strategic study is preparatory work ahead of demonstration on an NTS compressor station which precedes hydrogen blending in NTS compressors as ‘business as usual’. Higher hydrogen concentrations may be achieved in the GTs in advance of similar blends within the transmission pipes. As such this strategic and innovative project could de-risk the hydrogen transition of GT compression operations and bring forward CO2 and NOx reductions.
For the feasibility study two scenarios have been assessed: co-firing with 25%/75% vol hydrogen/natural gas blend and 100% vol hydrogen.
The study found it is viable to run the Siemens Energy SGT-A20 GTs on blends of hydrogen and natural gas up to 100% hydrogen and there are historic examples of this type of GT doing so without detriment.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz
This strategic study is preparatory work ahead of demonstration on an NTS compressor station which precedes hydrogen blending in NTS compressors as ‘business as usual’. Higher hydrogen concentrations may be achieved in the GTs in advance of similar blends within the transmission pipes. As such this strategic and innovative project could de-risk the hydrogen transition of GT compression operations and bring forward CO2 and NOx reductions.
For the feasibility study two scenarios have been assessed: co-firing with 25%/75% vol hydrogen/natural gas blend and 100% vol hydrogen.
The study found it is viable to run the Siemens Energy SGT-A20 GTs on blends of hydrogen and natural gas up to 100% hydrogen and there are historic examples of this type of GT doing so without detriment.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz
HyNTS Compression, Alpha Technical Report
Mar 2026
Publication
The HyNTS Compression project investigates the key challenges associated with compression of hydrogen and hydrogen blends through NTS assets. The project will determine the most cost-effective technically feasible solution for hydrogen compression on the NTS and develop the strategy for hydrogen compression. The alpha phase of the project has focussed on the following before progression to the beta phase of the project:
• Business case and Requirements for hydrogen compression
• Gas Turbine System
• Compression System
• Ancillary Equipment
• Demonstration Facility Development
The conceptual design development has concluded that it is possible to repurpose existing compression assets to demonstrate their capability of operating with 100% hydrogen. This will obtain the evidence necessary to update the Safety Case to enable deployment across the NTS. This phase of work further reinforces the importance of carrying out a demonstration to gather evidence of how repurposed compression assets would operate and the impact this would have on their performance. If repurposing NTS compression assets for hydrogen service can be proven there is potential for huge savings when realised across the entire NTS compression fleet.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
• Business case and Requirements for hydrogen compression
• Gas Turbine System
• Compression System
• Ancillary Equipment
• Demonstration Facility Development
The conceptual design development has concluded that it is possible to repurpose existing compression assets to demonstrate their capability of operating with 100% hydrogen. This will obtain the evidence necessary to update the Safety Case to enable deployment across the NTS. This phase of work further reinforces the importance of carrying out a demonstration to gather evidence of how repurposed compression assets would operate and the impact this would have on their performance. If repurposing NTS compression assets for hydrogen service can be proven there is potential for huge savings when realised across the entire NTS compression fleet.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
HyNTS Pipeline Dataset Aplha Phase: Final Technical Report
Mar 2026
Publication
Rosen,
National Gas and
Cadent
HyNTS is a programme of work that seeks to identify the opportunities and address the challenges that transporting hydrogen within the National Transmission System (NTS) presents. This will unlock the potential of hydrogen to deliver the UK’s 2050 Net Zero targets. The programme will feed into a number of ongoing hydrogen initiatives such as Project Union which has the aim of creating a UK hydrogen transmission backbone for the UK using repurposed and new-build infrastructure.
The Pipeline Dataset SIF project has two primary objectives.
♦ Defining and gathering the data necessary to ultimately facilitate repurposing of above 7 bar pipelines on the NTS and LTS.
♦ Developing the tools and processes to store align and visualise data to facilitate effective Integrity Management decision-making during post-repurposing service.
This report provides a summary of the work completed in the HyNTS Pipeline Dataset project Alpha phase to address these objectives.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
The Pipeline Dataset SIF project has two primary objectives.
♦ Defining and gathering the data necessary to ultimately facilitate repurposing of above 7 bar pipelines on the NTS and LTS.
♦ Developing the tools and processes to store align and visualise data to facilitate effective Integrity Management decision-making during post-repurposing service.
This report provides a summary of the work completed in the HyNTS Pipeline Dataset project Alpha phase to address these objectives.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
Hydrogen Impact on Pipeline Cathodic Protection Performance and External Coating Degradation
Mar 2026
Publication
National Grid Gas Transmission (NGGT) contracted Rosen UK Ltd (Rosen) and The University of Warwick UK (Warwick) to conduct a literature review on the subject of “impact of hydrogen conveyance on the performance of cathodic protection (CP) and pipeline coating degradation”. NGGT’s motivation for this project comes as part of the route to Net Zero with NGGT looking at opportunities to increase the percentage of hydrogen transported within natural gas. As the percentage of hydrogen increases there may be increased risk for the evolution of atomic hydrogen which could permeate through the steel pipe and affect external coatings and the efficacy of CP polarization potentials. Pertaining to the above NGGT’s goal is to gain an appreciation of the work that has been undertaken on coatings and CP systems of hydrogen pipelines and what corrosion protection currently utilized on hydrogen pipelines worldwide as well as reported effects of hydrogen on the behaviour of coating
types with or without impressed voltage. Specifically the focus was to identify potential impacts of hydrogen on coating performance adhesion and CP polarization for differing concentration levels of hydrogen being transported at a range of pressures for:
1. A selection of applied and factory coatings and coating types both for a range of aged and new applications.
2. A selection of coating holiday (coating defect) sizes at varying levels of CP polarization.
The project was divided into three work packages:
1. Work Package 1: Literature Review – Rosen as an Industrial Partner.
2. Work Package 2: Literature Review – Warwick as an Academic Partner.
3. Work Package 3: Reporting – presented as a joint effort between Rosen and Warwick.
During the execution of the projects all parties involved participated in two interactive on-line workshops; Workshop 1 was held on the 20th of December 2022 and Workshop 2 on the 2nd of May 2023. Both workshops served as platforms for sharing work progress and obtained results and their discussion; presentation slides delivered at both workshops can be found in Appendix A – Workshop 1 Presentations and Appendix B – Workshop 2 Presentation.
The current document presents the final stage of the project i.e. Work Package 3.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
types with or without impressed voltage. Specifically the focus was to identify potential impacts of hydrogen on coating performance adhesion and CP polarization for differing concentration levels of hydrogen being transported at a range of pressures for:
1. A selection of applied and factory coatings and coating types both for a range of aged and new applications.
2. A selection of coating holiday (coating defect) sizes at varying levels of CP polarization.
The project was divided into three work packages:
1. Work Package 1: Literature Review – Rosen as an Industrial Partner.
2. Work Package 2: Literature Review – Warwick as an Academic Partner.
3. Work Package 3: Reporting – presented as a joint effort between Rosen and Warwick.
During the execution of the projects all parties involved participated in two interactive on-line workshops; Workshop 1 was held on the 20th of December 2022 and Workshop 2 on the 2nd of May 2023. Both workshops served as platforms for sharing work progress and obtained results and their discussion; presentation slides delivered at both workshops can be found in Appendix A – Workshop 1 Presentations and Appendix B – Workshop 2 Presentation.
The current document presents the final stage of the project i.e. Work Package 3.
This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.
Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.
No more items...