United Kingdom

In line with the UK government’s de-carbonisation strategy Northern Gas Network’s (NGN) H21 project aims to demonstrate the feasibility of converting the existing <7barg gas distribution network to 100% hydrogen. After conversion of the gas networks hydrogen is transported from various sources through new and existing gas networks to industrial and domestic customers.

Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB networks to transport 100% hydrogen. Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2a evaluates network components and operational procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. Firstly a review of all NGN operating procedures was conducted by HSE Science and Research Centre (HSE S\&RC). From this review various recommendations for changes to some procedures were made for their application to a hydrogen network. Of these proposed changes some required more investigation and demonstration. To achieve this a gas demonstration network was built at DNV Spadeadam Research and Testing to accommodate full scale network parameters and typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE R\&SC and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:

♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations

♦ Finding leaks

♦ Accessing leaks

♦ Assessment of repair techniques

♦ Live gas operations

♦ Isolation techniques

♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities

♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures

♦ Pressure and flow validation

Each of these areas of testing and assessments were then divided in individual tests or tasks and identified with a unique ID name.

The current report details the work conducted in the H21 testing facility WBS5 downstream of the H21 demonstration facility herein referred to as the “Microgrid” in relation to finding and accessing buried leaks. The programme included consequence tests where live leaks and pockets of gas under various ground surfaces were ignited manned live leak finding operations (barholing/rockdrilling) and accessing leaks on gas saturated ground locations over an isolated section of leaking pipe.

This report details the experimental set-up instrumentation (if any) and test procedure used in Section 3; the results and main observations in Section 4 followed by interpretation of results and conclusions in Section 5. Appendixes at the back of the document contain photographs diagrams and further details for each test.

This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.

Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.

In line with the UK government’s de-carbonisation strategy Northern Gas Network’s (NGN) H21 project aims to demonstrate the feasibility of converting the existing <7 barg gas distribution network to 100% hydrogen. After conversion of the gas networks hydrogen is transported from various sources through new and existing gas networks to industrial and domestic customers. Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB networks to transport 100% hydrogen. Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2b evaluates network operational procedures conducted on a repurposed natural gas network. Identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve this a gas demonstration facility was built at South Bank Middlesbrough to accommodate low pressure network parameters and typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) for Phase 2 was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:

♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations

♦ Finding Leaks

♦ Accessing Leaks

♦ Assessment of repair techniques

♦ Planned live gas operations

♦ Isolation techniques

♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities

♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures

♦ Pressure and flow validation

Each practical test was derived from one of the above subcategories within the master test plan. This report details the work conducted within the Isolation Operations remit completed at the NGN H21 testing facility at South Bank. The programme included four isolation operations utilising different isolation techniques and was undertaken on the buried hydrogen low pressure network within the South Bank test facility. The network contained both metallic and PE mains with different diameters throughout the grid. This allowed operations to be undertaken in conditions mirroring real life as they would be completed out on the network. The objective of these experiments is to prove routine operations that are undertaken on a day-to-day basis on the NG distribution network can be completed on 100% hydrogen networks. This report details the experimental set-up isolation procedure and method statement used in Section 3; the results and main observations in Section 4 followed by interpretation of results and conclusions in Section 5. Appendixes at the back of the document contain photographs diagrams and further details for each test.

In line with the UK government’s de-carbonisation strategy Northern Gas Network’s (NGN) H21 project aims to enable the conversion of the UK gas networks to pure hydrogen. After conversion of the gas networks hydrogen is transported from various sources through new and existing gas networks to industrial and domestic customers.

Following progress on Phase 1 of the H21 programme Phase 2 was proposed to build on the knowledge acquired to provide further quantified safety-based evidence on the suitability of the GB networks to transport 100% hydrogen. Phase 2 consisted of a number of Project Phases. Phase 2a evaluates network components and procedures identifying which of these are suitable for a 100% hydrogen network and those that may require adjustments. To achieve this a gas demonstration network was built at DNV Spadeadam Research and Testing to accommodate full scale network parameters and typical network components. A Master Test Plan (MTP) was subsequently developed by NGN in collaboration with the HSE and DNV to address various aspects of existing network procedures and operations including:

♦ Emergency Response and bad practice demonstrations

♦ Finding leaks

♦ Accessing leaks

♦ Assessment of repair techniques

♦ Live gas operations

♦ Isolation techniques

♦ Commissioning and decommissioning activities

♦ Pressure regulation and maintenance procedures

♦ Pressure and flow validation

Each of these areas of testing and assessments were then divided in individual tests or tasks and identified with a unique ID name.

The current technical note details the work conducted in the H21 demonstration grid herein referred to as “Microgrid” in relation to assessment of repair techniques. Six used cast iron (CI) spun iron (SI) and steel (ST) assets purposedly made to present leaks or leak paths were repaired using six commonly used techniques in the current natural gas network including: muffed encapsulation anaerobic repair two-part joint injection polyform repair clamp repair and heat shrink repair. The repairs were then leak checked with nitrogen buried and connected to the H21 microgrid and commissioned with hydrogen. Weekly over the course of five months whilst the rest of the testing programme was being carried out the assets were individually isolated and checked for re-appearance of leakage over time and under service conditions by means of pressure decay tests.

This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.

Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.

HyNTS is a programme of work that seeks to identify the opportunities and address the challenges that transporting hydrogen within the National Transmission System (NTS) and Local Transmission System (LTS) presents. This will unlock the potential of hydrogen to deliver the UK’s 2050 Net Zero targets. The programme is being executed alongside other ongoing UK hydrogen initiatives such as National Grids Project Union and Cadent’s HyNet projects.

A key element of repurposing feasibility and therefore central to the overall HyNTS initiative is the requirement to have an improved understanding of the ‘fingerprint’ of pipeline assets prior to hydrogen injection. The Pipeline Dataset SIF project has two primary objectives:

♦ Defining and gathering the data necessary to ultimately facilitate repurposing of above 7 bar pipelines on the NTS and LTS

♦ Developing the tools and processes to store align and visualise data

Split into 3 phases the first ‘Discovery’ phase aims to develop the high-level data and data management requirements for repurposing as well as the current data availability across the NTS and LTS to meet these requirements. Subsequent Alpha and Beta phases involve detailed planning and subsequent execution of the data collection and data management activities identified in the Discovery phase.

The Discovery phase comprises four Workpacks as shown in the diagram below designed to cover the project objectives.

ROSEN and Cadent have partnered with National Grid (NGG) to deliver the Discovery phase. Close collaboration between NGG Cadent and ROSEN has been required to conduct all Workpacks particularly in terms of appraising the current data held and current Data Management arrangements within both organisations.

This report presents the findings from the Discovery Phase as well as providing recommendations to feed into shaping subsequent Alpha and Beta phase activities.

This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.

Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.

National Gas has identified the need to understand the effects of hydrogen on various pipeline materials commonly found in the UK National Transmission System (NTS) to determine their potential for a hydrogen use case. Accordingly National Gas is interested in investigating the potential use of oxygen as a mitigation of hydrogen embrittlement (HE) the detrimental effect of hydrogen on the mechanical properties of metallic materials. This report presents the laboratory findings part of the project “Inhibition of hydrogen embrittlement effects in pipeline steels” in which ROSEN has been requested to investigate the potential use of oxygen as a mitigation of hydrogen effects.<br/>Three pipe materials were investigated which included a ERW X52 commissioned in 1993 a DSAW X60 commissioned in 1973 and a DSAW X80 constructed in 2004. The test programme aimed to characterise the effectiveness of oxygen on mitigating hydrogen embrittlement and included an in-air baseline characterisation and three main hydrogen tests: threshold stress intensity factor KIH fracture toughness and two types of fatigue crack growth rate tests (frequency scans and Paris curve). Fracture toughness and fatigue crack growth rate tests were performed in pure hydrogen and at various oxygen concentrations ranging from 50 to 1000 ppm.<br/>The baseline in-air characterisation showed that some of the mechanical properties of the X52 and X60 were below the T/SP/PIP/1 requirements. For the X52 the yield strength of transverse parent material specimens was below the 360 MPa required by its designation. For the X60 both the longitudinal and transverse yield strength of the parent material were below the 415 MPa required for this grade. Furthermore CVN energies were also below the T/SP/PIP/1 requirements for parent metal and seam weld metal for the X60 pipe. The X80 was within specifications.<br/>Threshold stress intensity factor KIH tests were performed on the three investigated materials on base and weld metal in pure hydrogen. Crack extension was not seen in any of these tests for the applied stress intensity factors as high as 73 MPa√m. The absence of crack growth was verified by means of SEM examination which showed the direct transition from the fatigue pre-crack region to the final fracture region. For this reason KIH tests with oxygen additions were not conducted.<br/>Fracture toughness testing showed that the fracture resistance was reduced when testing in pure hydrogen. This was seen in X60 specimens that had a fracture resistance JQ of 31 kJ/m2 35% of that in air. The addition of oxygen resulted in an increase of the average JQ which at 250 ppm O2 was 85% of the in air value. At concentrations above this value the fracture resistance continued to approach in-air values although at a decreased rate. Increasing the oxygen concentration also resulted in smaller standard deviations of the fracture resistance decreasing from 13 to 2 kJ/m2 as the O2 concentration was increased from 50 to 500 ppm. These findings indicate there is a smaller variability of the performance when oxygen is added. The recovery of the fracture resistance was consistent with the SEM examination of fracture surfaces of tested specimens. In pure hydrogen fracture surfaces were consistent with a quasi-cleavage fracture characterised by planar facets with visible river marks. As oxygen was increased the fracture surface became more dimpled and areas with signs of plastic strain became evident. At concentrations of 250 ppm O2 the fracture surface resembled those obtained in air suggesting the same ductile failure mode. Obtaining quantitative fracture toughness data for the X52 and X80 specimens in oxygen additions was not possible due to material related challenges. However fractographic examination showed that in pure hydrogen and low oxygen concentrations e.g. 50 ppm the failure mode was predominantly brittle while at 250 ppm O2 and in air the failure mode was ductile and was accompanied of limited crack growth.<br/>The inhibiting effects of oxygen were also seen in fatigue crack growth rate tests. Frequency scan tests on X60 showed that the exposure to hydrogen resulted in high crack growth rates up to 2 orders of magnitude above the BS7910 in-air mean depending on the testing conditions. Crack growth rates were affected by the choice of the frequency. For the test performed with a Kmax of 45 ksi√in (49 MPa√m) crack growth rates continued to increase above 1 mm/cycle as the frequency was reduced to 1E-4 Hz. For the test performed with a Kmax of 38 ksi√in (42 MPa√m) crack growth rates reached a plateau at a frequency of 0.1 Hz. The additions of oxygen resulted in a reduction of crack growth to values a few times above the BS7910 in-air mean. Furthermore the effect of frequency was visibly reduced in 250 ppm O2 as reducing the frequency 40000 times resulted only in a 2 times increase of the crack growth rates. The effect of oxygen was also seen in Paris curve types of tests. In pure hydrogen crack growth rates were comparable with ASME B31.12 and Sandia National Laboratories reference curves and were in general up to an order of magnitude above the BS7910 in-air mean depending on ΔK and other parameters. The additions of oxygen at concentrations as low as 50 ppm resulted in reductions in fatigue crack growth rates to values closer to those in air. Further increases in the oxygen concentration resulted in slight reductions of crack growth rates that were more noticeable at higher ΔK and Kmax. The recovery of the fatigue performance was consistent with the fractography observations. The addition of oxygen resulted in an overall increase of the plastic strain seen on the fracture surfaces. In pure hydrogen fracture surfaces were consistent with quasi-cleavage failure and had planar cleavage facets with river marks and very fine striations that were mostly visible at high frequencies and ΔK under high magnifications (55800x). The fracture surfaces of specimens tested in presence of oxygen resembled those seen in the in-air fatigue pre-crack region especially at high frequencies and high ΔK. At low frequencies and low ΔK the fracture surfaces resembled that of quasi-cleavage fracture although they had a ‘fibrous’ aspect with visible signs of plastic strain. Striations were readily visible on the fracture surfaces of all specimens tested in presence of oxygen and were more defined than those seen in pure hydrogen.<br/>Based on the data generated in this work a concentration of 250 ppm O2 is recommended as the minimum value to achieve inhibition of hydrogen effects. This concentration provided a recovery of 85% of the in-air fracture resistance and resulted in crack growth rates close to in-air levels. The fracture surfaces of specimens tested at this oxygen concentration generally showed ductile features consistent with higher toughness failure mechanisms.

The project between DNV and NGT innovation is exploring the future impact of introducing hydrogen into the National Transmission System (NTS) network and specifically looking at the impact on the compressor station equipment. The consequent failure modes associated with the introduction of hydrogen will be assessed through Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA).

The work scope includes:

• Perform a staged approach FMEA study  Qualitative assessments determining the risk levels associated with the various components of the compressor trains.

• Perform the FMEA on each selected train type assessing the operational safety and environmental impact of H2 introduction.

Assessment has been made for two potential network gas types:

• 25% H2/NG blend

• 100% H2

The output is an FMEA on each generic compressor stations indicating the risk areas from H2 operation. This output will allow NGT to identify areas which require further assessment / action before H2 is introduced.

This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.

Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.

There was an event at the Redcar EcoHouse where after the isolation of the hydrogen pipework for 27 days over the Christmas break 2023/2024 and shortly after initiation of the flame in a hydrogen gas fire appliance a minor ignition event occurred. Visual investigation led to a discovery that the gas meter was damaged.

Air ingress into the isolated hydrogen pipework (causing a flammable mixture in this pipework) followed by the flame propagation from the ignition system of the hydrogen gas fire were considered to be the most likely reasons for the aforementioned event.

The aim of the work presented in this report was to complement the work undertaken by Steer Energy and to:

• investigate the possibility of the above phenomena to occur in domestic hydrogen installations with main focus on hydrogen appliance design

• to conclude whether there are plausible explanations of the event observed at the Redcar EcoHouse

• to propose possible mitigations which are likely to prevent similar events in the future.

This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.

Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.

Distribution Network Operators have investigated the potential to utilise iron mains and fittings in hydrogen service.

Iron mains operate at low (<75 mbarg.) or medium (<2 barg.) pressure iron fittings at up to intermediate pressure (<7 barg.) depending on design. No iron mains have been laid since the 1980s although certain grades of iron are still used to construct fittings which includes valves.

The work was conducted by DNV. It examined the impact that hydrogen might have on iron of different grades and also the risk of explosion posed by hydrogen if it escapes from a buried main. In carrying out the analysis no account was taken of additional mitigation measures associated with hydrogen conversion (e.g. in home detection) which would reduce risk to members of the public.

To enhance confidence at the request of Operators IGEM assembled a ‘Peer review panel’ of material science and risk modelling experts from a range of backgrounds. Their role was to express their professional opinion of the findings. The reports produced by DNV and the peer review panel are attached to this report in the appendix.

The conclusion is that iron fittings and most iron mains expected to be in operation after the current replacement programme is completed in December 2032 can operate in hydrogen service.

This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.

Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.

This Networks Innovation Allowance (NIA) funded project (NIA_NGGT0176) comprised a feasibility study on an exemplar National Grid Gas Transmission (NGGT) National Transmission System (NTS) compressor station. The study has examined safety environmental technical operational and economic issues in blending hydrogen/methane for combustion in a gas turbine (GT) driving NTS compression. The project also determined how to establish an innovative green hydrogen production storage and supply facility to fuel GTs on varying hydrogen/methane blends.

This strategic study is preparatory work ahead of demonstration on an NTS compressor station which precedes hydrogen blending in NTS compressors as ‘business as usual’. Higher hydrogen concentrations may be achieved in the GTs in advance of similar blends within the transmission pipes. As such this strategic and innovative project could de-risk the hydrogen transition of GT compression operations and bring forward CO2 and NOx reductions.

For the feasibility study two scenarios have been assessed: co-firing with 25%/75% vol hydrogen/natural gas blend and 100% vol hydrogen.

The study found it is viable to run the Siemens Energy SGT-A20 GTs on blends of hydrogen and natural gas up to 100% hydrogen and there are historic examples of this type of GT doing so without detriment.

This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.

Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz

HyNTS is a programme of work that seeks to identify the opportunities and address the challenges that transporting hydrogen within the National Transmission System (NTS) presents. This will unlock the potential of hydrogen to deliver the UK’s 2050 Net Zero targets. The programme will feed into a number of ongoing hydrogen initiatives such as Project Union which has the aim of creating a UK hydrogen transmission backbone for the UK using repurposed and new-build infrastructure.

The Pipeline Dataset SIF project has two primary objectives.

♦ Defining and gathering the data necessary to ultimately facilitate repurposing of above 7 bar pipelines on the NTS and LTS.

♦ Developing the tools and processes to store align and visualise data to facilitate effective Integrity Management decision-making during post-repurposing service.

This report provides a summary of the work completed in the HyNTS Pipeline Dataset project Alpha phase to address these objectives.

This report was submitted to HSE for their assessment of the safety evidence for 100% hydrogen heating which can be found at Hydrogen heating: HSE assessment of the safety evidence - GOV.UK.

Queries should be directed to DESNZ: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-desnz.