United States

A properly trained first responder community is critical to the successful introduction of hydrogen fuel cell applications and their transformation in how we use energy. Providing resources with accurate information and current knowledge is essential to the delivery of effective hydrogen and fuel cell-related first responder training. The California Fuel Cell Partnership and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory have over 15 years of experience in developing and delivering hydrogen safety-related first responder training materials and programs. A National Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Emergency Response Training Resource was recently released. This training resource serves the delivery of a variety of training regimens. Associated materials are adaptable for different training formats ranging from high-level overview presentations to more comprehensive classroom training. This paper presents what has been learned from the development and delivery of hydrogen safety-related first responder training programs (online classroom hands-on) by the respective organizations. The collaborative strategy being developed for enhancing training materials and methods for greater accessibility based on stakeholder input will be discussed.

Safety is of paramount importance in all facets of the research development demonstration and deployment work of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Fuel Cell Technologies Program. The Safety Codes and Standards sub-program (SC&S) facilitates deployment and commercialization of fuel cell and hydrogen technologies by developing and disseminating information and knowledge resources for their safe use. A comprehensive safety management program utilizing the Hydrogen Safety Panel to raise safety consciousness at the project level and developing/disseminating a suite of safety knowledge resources is playing an integral role in DOE and SC&S efforts. This paper provides examples of accomplishments achieved while reaching a growing and diverse set of stakeholders involved in research development and demonstration; design and manufacturing; deployment and operations. The work of the Hydrogen Safety Panel highlights new knowledge and the insights gained through interaction with project teams. Various means of collaboration to enhance the value of the program’s safety knowledge tools and training resources are illustrated and the direction of future initiatives to reinforce the commitment to safety is discussed.

The U.S. Department of Energy supports the implementation of hydrogen fuel cell technologies by providing hydrogen safety and emergency response training to first responders. A collaboration was formed to develop and deliver a one-day course that uses a mobile fuel cell vehicle (FCV) burn prop designed and built by Kidde Fire Trainers. This paper describes the development of the training curriculum including the design and operation of the FCV prop; describes the successful delivery of this course to over 300 participants at three training centers in California; and discusses feedback and observations received on the course. Photographs and video clips of the training sessions will be presented.

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) can help to establish a set of design and operational requirements in hydrogen codes and standards that will ensure safe operation of hydrogen facilities. By analyzing a complete set of possible accidents in a QRA the risk drivers for these facilities can be identified. Accident prevention and mitigation features can then be analyzed to determine which are the most effective in addressing these risk drivers and thus reduce the risk from possible accidents. Accident prevention features/methods such as proper material selection and preventative maintenance are included in the design and operation of facilities. Accident mitigation features are included to reduce or terminate the potential consequences from unintended releases of hydrogen. Mitigation features can be either passive or active in nature. Passive features do not require any component to function in order to prevent or mitigate a hydrogen release. Examples of passive mitigation features include the use of separation distances barriers and flow limiting orifices. Active mitigation features initiate when specific conditions occur during an accident in order to terminate an accident or reduce its consequences. Examples of active mitigation features include detection and isolation systems fire suppression systems and purging systems. A concept being pursued by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) hydrogen standard development is to take credit for prevention and mitigation features as a means to reduce separation distances at hydrogen facilities. By utilizing other mitigation features the risk from accidents can be decreased and risk-informed separation distances can be reduced. This paper presents some preliminary QRA results where the risk reduction potential for several active and passive mitigation features was evaluated. These measures include automatic leak detection and isolation systems the use of flow limiting orifices and the use of barriers. Reducing the number of risk-significant components in a system was also evaluated as an accident prevention method. In addition the potential reduction in separation distances if such measures were incorporated at a facility was also determined.

Experiments were conducted to assess detectability of a low-level leak of hydrogen gas and the uniformity of hydrogen concentration at selected sensor placement locations in a realistic setting. A 5%2hydrogen/95%2nitrogen gas mixture was injected at a rate of 350 L/min for about 3/4 hour into a 93m3 residential garage space through a 0.09 m2 square open-top dispersion box located on the floor. Calibrated catalytic sensors were placed on ceiling and wall locations and the sensors detected hydrogen early in the release and continued to measure concentrations to peak and diminishing levels. Experiments were conducted with and without a car parked over the dispersion box. The results show that a car positioned over the dispersion box tends to promote dilution of the hydrogen cause a longer time for locations to reach a fixed threshold and produce lower peak concentrations than with no car present.

In the United States requirements for liquid motor vehicle fuelling stations have been in place for many years. Requirements for motor vehicle fuelling stations for gaseous fuels including hydrogen are relatively new. These requirements have in the United States been developed along different code and standards paths. The liquid fuels have been addressed in a single document and the gaseous fuels have been addressed in documents specific to an individual gas. The result of these parallel processes is that multi-fuel stations are subject to requirements in several fuelling regulations codes and standards (RCS). This paper describes a configuration of a multi-fuel motor vehicle fuelling station and provides a detailed breakdown of the codes and standards requirements. The multi-fuel station would dispense what the U.S. Department of Energy defines as the six key alternative fuels: biodiesel electricity ethanol hydrogen natural gas and propane. The paper will also identify any apparent gaps in RCS and potential research projects that could help fill these gaps.

Hydrogen jet flames resulting from ignition of unintended releases can be extensive in length and pose significant radiation and impingement hazards. One possible mitigation strategy to reduce exposure to jet flames is to incorporate barriers around hydrogen storage and delivery equipment. While reducing the extent of unacceptable consequences the walls may introduce other hazards if not properly configured. This paper describes experiments carried out to characterize the effectiveness of different barrier wall configurations at reducing the hazards created by jet fires. The hazards that are evaluated are the generation of overpressure during ignition the thermal radiation produced by the jet flame and the effectiveness of the wall at deflecting the flame.<br/>The tests were conducted against a vertical wall (1-wall configuration) and two “3-wall” configurations that consisted of the same vertical wall with two side walls of the same dimensions angled at 135° and 90°. The hydrogen jet impinged on the center of the central wall in all cases. In terms of reducing the radiation heat flux behind the wall the 1-wall configuration performed best followed by the 3-wall 135° configuration and the 3-wall 90°. The reduced shielding efficiency of the three-wall configurations was probably due to the additional confinement created by the side walls that limited the escape of hot gases to the sides of the wall and forced the hot gases to travel over the top of the wall.<br/>The 3-wall barrier with 135° side walls exhibited the best overall performance. Overpressures produced on the release side of the wall were similar to those produced in the 1-wall configuration. The attenuation of overpressure and impulse behind the wall was comparable to that of the three-wall configuration with 90° side walls. The 3-wall 135° configuration’s ability to shield the back side of the wall from the heat flux emitted from the jet flame was comparable to the 1-wall and better than the 3-wall 90° configuration. The ratio of peak overpressure (from in front of the wall and from behind the wall) showed that the 3-wall 135° configuration and the 3-wall 90° configuration had a similar effectiveness. In terms of the pressure mitigation the 3-wall configurations performed significantly better than the 1-wall configuration

This paper discusses the preliminary results of the Risk Management subtask efforts within the International Energy Agency (IEA) Hydrogen Implementing Agreement (HIA) Task 19 on Hydrogen Safety to develop uniform harm criteria for use in the Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) of hydrogen facilities. The IEA HIA Task 19 efforts are focused on developing guidelines and criteria for performing QRAs of hydrogen facilities. The performance of QRAs requires that the level of harm that is represented in the risk evaluation be established using deterministic models. The level of harm is a function of the type and level of hazard. The principle hazard associated with hydrogen facilities is uncontrolled accumulation of hydrogen in (semi) confined spaces and consecutive ignition. Another significant hazard is combustion of accidentally released hydrogen gas or liquid which may or may not happen instantaneously. The primary consequences from fire hazards consist of personnel injuries or fatalities or facility and equipment damage due to high air temperatures radiant heat fluxes or direct contact with hydrogen flames. The possible consequences of explosions on humans and structures or equipment include blast wave overpressure effects impact from fragments generated by the explosion the collapse of buildings and the heat effects from subsequent fire balls. A harm criterion is used to translate the consequences of an accident evaluated from deterministic models to a probability of harm to people structures or components. Different methods can be used to establish harm criteria including the use of threshold consequence levels and continuous functions that relate the level of a hazard to a probability of damage. This paper presents a survey of harm criteria that can be utilized in QRAs and makes recommendations on the criteria that should be utilized for hydrogen-related hazards.

The International Energy Agency’s Hydrogen Implementing Agreement (www.ieahia.org) initiated a collaborative task on hydrogen safety in 1994 and this has proved to an effective method of pooling expert knowledge to address the most significant problems associated with the barriers to the commercial adoption of hydrogen energy. Presently there are approximately 10 countries participating in the task and it has proven a valuable method of efficiently combining efforts and resources. The task is now in the fifth year of a six year term and will end in October 2010. This paper will describe the scope of the task the progress made and plans for future work. There are also a number of other tasks underway and this paper will give a brief summary of those activities. Because of the nature of the International Energy Agency which is an international agreement between governments it is intended that such collaboration will complement other efforts to help build the technology base around which codes and standards can be developed. This paper describes the specific scope and work plan for the collaboration that has been developed to date.

For hydrogen fuelled vehicles to attain significant market penetration it is essential that any potential risks be controlled within acceptable levels. To achieve this goal on-board vehicle hydrogen storage systems should undergo risk analyses during early concept development and design phases. By so doing the process of eliminating safety-critical failure modes will help guide storage system development and be more efficient to implement than if undertaken after the design-freeze stage. The focus of this paper is the development of quantitative risk analyses of storage systems which use onboard reversible materials such as conventional AB5 metal hydrides the complex hydride NaAlH4 or other material candidates currently being researched. Collision of a vehicle having such a hydrogen storage system was selected as a dominant accident initiator and a probabilistic event tree model has been developed for this initiator. The event tree model contains a set of comprehensive mutually exclusive accident sequences. The event tree represents chronological ordering of key events that are postulated to occur sequentially in time during the accident progression. Each event may represent occurrence of a phenomenon (e.g. hydride chemical reaction and dust cloud explosion) or a hardware failure (e.g. hydride storage vessel rupture). Event tree branch probabilities can be quantified using fault tree models or basic events with probability distributions. A fault tree model for hydride dust cloud explosion is provided as an example. Failure probabilities assigned to the basic events in the fault tree can be estimated from test results published data or expert opinion elicitation. To account for variabilities in the probabilities assigned to fault tree basic events and hence to propagate uncertainties in event tree sequences Monte Carlo sampling and Latin Hypercube sampling were employed and the statistics of the results from both techniques were compared.