Japan

A total of 12 ventilation experiments with various combinations of hydrogen release rates and ventilation speeds were performed in order to study how ventilation speed and release rate effect the hydrogen concentration in a closed system. The experiential facility was constructed out of steel plates and beams in the shape of a rectangular enclosure. The volume of the test facility was about 60m3. The front face of the enclosure was covered by a plastic film in order to allow visible and infrared cameras to capture images of the flame. The inlet and outlet vents were located on the lower front face and the upper backside panel respectively. Hydrogen gas was released toward the ceiling from the center of the floor. The hydrogen gas was released at constant rate in each test. The hydrogen release rate ranged from 0.002 m3/s to 0.02 m3/s. Ventilation speeds were 0.1 0.2 and 0.4 m3/s respectively. Ignition was attempted at the end of the hydrogen release by using multiple continuous spark ignition modules on the ceiling and next to the release point. Time evolution of hydrogen concentration was measured using evacuated sample bottles. Overpressure and impulse inside and outside the facility were also measured. The mixture was ignited by a spark ignition module mounted on the ceiling in eight of eleven tests. In the other three tests the mixture was ignited by spark ignition modules mounted next to the nozzle. Overpressures generated by the hydrogen deflagration in most of these tests were low and represented a small risk to people or property. The primary risk associated with the hydrogen deflagrations studied in these tests was from the fire. The maximum concentration is proportional to the ratio of the hydrogen release rate to the ventilation speed within the range of parameters tested. Therefore a required ventilation speed can be estimated from the assumed hydrogen leak rate within the experimental conditions described in this paper.

When a hydrogen supply station is to be installed in Japan three fundamental laws must be taken into consideration: the High Pressure Gas Safety Law the Building Standards Law and the Fire Service Law. The High Pressure Gas Safety Law in particular regulates procedures for safety concerning hydrogen supply stations. This law came under review accompanying consideration of the potential utilization of fuel cell vehicles and hydrogen stations. At that time the Japan Petroleum Energy Center (JPEC) investigated safety technology for hydrogen supply stations and prepared a draft of the law. Since then a new combined gasoline/hydrogen supply station compliant with the revised law was established on December 2006. There are a large number of safety precautions incorporated into this station model which conform to the law. As a result of these modifications it was possible to reduce the safe setback distance. In this paper we present an overview of the new hydrogen supply station model the safety precautions and the regulations the station is based on.

The International Maritime Organization under the United Nations has developed safety requirements for seaborne transportation of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles in consideration of a recent increase in such transportation. Japan has led the development of new regulations in the light of some research outcomes including numerical simulations on hydrogen dispersion in a cargo space of a vehicle carrier in case of accidental leakage of hydrogen from the vehicle. Numerical results indicate that the region of space occupied by flammable hydrogen/air mixture strongly depends on the direction of ventilation openings. These findings have contributed to the development of new international regulations.

Storing a hydrogen fuel-cell vehicle in a garage poses a potential safety hazard because of the accidents that could arise from a hydrogen leak. A series of tests examined the risk involved with hydrogen releases and deflagrations in a structure built to simulate a one-car garage. The experiments involved igniting hydrogen gas that was released inside the structure and studying the effects of the deflagrations. The “garage” measured 2.72 m high 3.64 m wide and 6.10 m long internally and was constructed from steel using a reinforced design capable of withstanding a detonation. The front face of the garage was covered with a thin transparent plastic film. Experiments were performed to investigate extended-duration (20–40 min) hydrogen leaks. The effect that the presence of a vehicle in the garage has on the deflagration was also studied. The experiments examined the effectiveness of different ventilation techniques at reducing the hydrogen concentration in the enclosure. Ventilation techniques included natural upper and lower openings and mechanical ventilation systems. A system of evacuated sampling bottles was used to measure hydrogen concentration throughout the garage prior to ignition and at various times during the release. All experiments were documented with standard and infrared (IR) video. Flame front propagation was monitored with thermocouples. Pressures within the garage were measured by four pressure transducers mounted on the inside walls of the garage. Six free-field pressure transducers were used to measure the pressures outside the garage.

For the evaluation of hydrogen and fuel cell vehicle safety a new comprehensive facility was constructed in our institute. The new facility includes an explosion resistant indoor vehicle fire test building and high pressure hydrogen tank safety evaluation equipment. The indoor vehicle fire test building has sufficient strength to withstand even an explosion of a high pressure hydrogen tank of 260 liter capacity and 70 MPa pressure. It also has enough space to observe vehicle fire flames of not only hydrogen but also other conventional fuels such as gasoline or compressed natural gas. The inside dimensions of the building are a 16 meter height and 18 meter diameter. The walls are made of 1.2 meter thick reinforced concrete covered at the insides with steel plate. This paper shows examples of hydrogen vehicle fires compared with other fuel fires and hydrogen high pressure tank fire tests utilizing several kinds of fire sources. Another facility for evaluation of high pressure hydrogen tank safety includes a 110 MPa hydrogen compressor with a capacity of 200 Nm3/h a 300 MPa hydraulic compressor for burst tests of 70 MPa and higher pressure tanks and so on. This facility will be used for not only the safety evaluation of hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles but also the establishment of domestic/international regulations codes and standards.

Hydrogen is expected to be a next-generation energy source that does not emit carbon dioxide but when used as a fuel the issue is the increase in the amount of NOx that is caused by the increase in flame temperature. In this study we experimentally investigated NOx emissions rate when hydrogen was burned in a hydrocarbon gas burner which is used in a wide temperature range. As a result of the experiments the amount of NOx when burning hydrogen in a nozzle mixed burner was twice as high as when burning city gas. However by increasing the flow velocity of the combustion air the amount of NOx could be reduced. In addition by reducing the number of combustion air nozzles rather than decreasing the diameter of the air nozzles a larger recirculation flow could be formed into the furnace and the amount of NOx could be reduced by up to 51%. Furthermore the amount of exhaust gas recirculation was estimated from the reduction rate of NOx and the validity was confirmed by the relationship between adiabatic flame temperature and NOx calculated from the equilibrium calculation by chemical kinetics simulator software.

It is necessary to investigate cylinder crush behavior for improvement of fuel cell vehicle crash safety. However there have been few crushing behaviour investigations of high pressurized cylinders subjected to external force. We conducted a compression test of pressurized cylinders impacted by external force. We also investigated the cylinder strength and crushing behaviour of the cylinder. The following results were obtained.

• The crush force of high pressurized cylinders is different from the direction of external force. The lateral crush force of high pressurized cylinders is larger than the external axial crush force.
• Tensile stress occurs in the boundary area between the cylinder dome and central portion when the pressurized cylinder is subjected to axial compression force and the cylinder is destroyed.
• However the high pressurized cylinders tested had a high crush force which exceeded the assumed range of vehicle crash test procedures

Hydrogen is one of the important alternative fuels for future transportation. At the present stage research into hydrogen safety and designing risk mitigation measures are significant task. For compact storage of hydrogen in fuel cell vehicles storage of hydrogen under high pressure up to 40 MPa at refuelling stations is planned and safety in handling such high-pressure hydrogen is essential. This paper describes our experimental investigation into dispersion of high-pressure hydrogen gas which leaks through pinholes in the piping to the atmosphere. First in order to comprehend the basic behaviour of the steady dispersion of high-pressure hydrogen gas from the pinholes the time-averaged concentrations were measured. In our experiments initial release pressures of hydrogen gas were set at 20 MPa or 40 MPa and release diameters were in the range from 0.25 mm to 2 mm. The experimental results show that the hydrogen concentration along the axis of the dispersion plume can be expressed as a simple formula which is a function of the downwind distance X and the equivalent release diameter. This formula enables us to easily estimate the axial concentration (maximum concentration) at each downstream distance. However in order for the safety of flammable gas dispersion to be analyzed comparisons between time-averaged concentrations evaluated as above and lower flammable limit are insufficient. This is because even if time-averaged concentration is lower than the flammability limit instantaneous concentrations fluctuate and a higher instantaneous concentration occasionally appears due to turbulence. Therefore the time-averaged concentration value which can be used as a threshold for assessing safety must be determined considering concentration fluctuations. Once the threshold value is determined the safe distance from the leakage point can be evaluated by the above-mentioned simple formula. To clarify the phenomenon of concentration fluctuations instantaneous concentrations were measured with the fast-response flame ionization detector. A small amount of methane gas was mixed into the hydrogen as a tracer gas for this measurement. The relationship between the time-mean concentration and the occurrence probability of flammable concentration was analyzed. Under the same conditions spark-ignition experiments were also conducted and the relationship between the occurrence probability of flammable concentration and actual ignition probabilities were also investigated. The experimental results show that there is a clear correlation between the time-mean concentration the occurrence probability of flammable concentration flame length and occurrence probability of hydrogen flame.

Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles are expected to come into widespread use in the near future. Accordingly many hydrogen carrying vehicles will begin to pass through tunnels. It is therefore important to predict whether risk from leaked hydrogen accidents in tunnels can be avoided. CFD simulation was carried out on diffusion  of leaked hydrogen in tunnels. Three areas of tunnels were chosen for study. One is the typical longitudinal and lateral areas of tunnels and the others are underground ventilation facilities and electrostatic dust collectors which were simulated with an actual tunnel. The amount of hydrogen leaked was 60m3 (approximately 5.08 kg) which corresponds to the amount necessary for future fuel cell vehicles to achieve their desired running distance. Analytical periods were the time after leaks began until regions of hydrogen above the low flammability limit had almost disappeared or thirty minutes. We found that leaked hydrogen is immediately carried away from leaking area under existing ventilation conditions. We also obtained basic data on behaviour of leaked hydrogen.

At least once air filling a piping from main hydrogen pipe line to an individual home end should be replaced with hydrogen gas to use the gas in the home. Special attention is required to complete the replacing operation safely because air and supplied hydrogen may generate flammable/explosive gas mixture in the piping. The most probable method to fulfill the task is that at first an inert gas is used to purge air from the piping and then hydrogen will be supplied into the piping. It is easily understood that the amount of the inert gas consumed by this method is much to purge whole air especially in long piping system. Hence to achieve more economical efficiency an alternative method was considered. In this method previously injected nitrogen between air and hydrogen prevents them from mixing. The key point is that how much nitrogen is required to prevent the dangerous mixing and keep the condition in the piping safe. The authors investigated to find the minimum amount of nitrogen required to keep the replacing operation safe. The main objective of this study is to assess the effect of nitrogen and estimate a pipe length that the safety is maintained under various conditions by using computational fluid dynamic (CFD). The effects of the amount of injected nitrogen hydrogen-supply conditions and the structure of piping system are discussed.